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A STUDY OF ETHICAL PROOF IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OPINIONS OF 
JUDGE LEARNED HAND
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Scope of the Study 
This is a study of an eminent judge, his criminal law 
opinions, and the self-recommendations rhetorically made in 
these opinions. The purpose of this study is to (1) examine 
Judge Learned Hand's image and (2) with this image in mind 
analyze his criminal law opinions for the presence of ethical 
proof used as a persuasive device whereby the Judge offered 
himself as a credible source worthy of being believed.^
About Judge Hand, former Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter wrote; "Equipped scholarship will in good time
^"Ethical proof" as used in this study refers to the 
broad interpretation of ethos which considers qualities other 
than those judged to be morally right or wrong. William Martin 
Sattler says of the broad approach: "To limit ethos to quali­
ties which receive approval on an ethical basis, however, is 
the narrow definition of the concept. There may be other fac­
tors pertaining to the speaker's [or writer's] character which 
contribute to his persuasive force. Such personal qualities 
as general intelligence, knowledge of the subject, appropriate­
ness of diction and even pronunciation or appearance are a part
2
assay his vast output of opinions. . . ." What appears de­
manded is an in-depth study of Hand's legal opinions against 
the background of his life, not to render legal interpretations 
but to explain better why his legal opinions enjoyed the sup­
port and praise given them. Even Hand's analysis of a good 
judge encourages further examination of these opinions to 
isolate their persuasive elements: "The good judge is an art­
ist, perhaps most like a chef. Into the composition of his 
dishes he adds so much of this or that element as will blend 
the whole into a compound, delectable or at any rate tolerable 
to the palates of his guests."^ What elements did Hand blend 
into his legal compound to make it "delectable or at any rate 
tolerable"? Were some of these elements the manner in which 
he recommended himself to his judicial critics, first through 
the way he lived his life and second through the way he subtly 
introduced recommendations of himself as a credible source into 
his legal opinions? The interaction of these two sources of 
persuasion, namely as Hand was favorably perceived apart from 
his legal rhetoric and as Hand was received through his legal 
rhetoric, is an intriguing area for study which to now remains
of the 'character' of the man speaking. At times such traits 
are judged by the ethical criterion, but they have little to 
do with the 'ethical.'" "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of Speech, Northwestern 
University, 1941), p. 8.
2
"Learned Hand," Harvard Law Review, LXXV (November,
1961), 1.
^In Felix Frankfurter, "Judge Learned Hand," Harvard 
Law Review. LV (February, 1947), 327.
unexplored. Consequently, the thesis to be examined is that 
Hand was a judicial rhetorician, whether intentional or not, 
who made adept use of the ethical mode of persuasion. The 
focus of this study is on the use of ethical proof as an artis­
tic creation brought about by Hand's recommendation of his 
credibility in his criminal law opinions. Preliminary to this 
focus, description of the Hand image should serve to sharpen 
the outline of the ethical proof found in the court opinions.
Judge Hand brought into the courtroom a credible image 
established apart from that manifested in his decision-making. 
According to Judge Thomas D. Thacher of the Court of Appeals 
of the State of New York: "Judge Hand has left . . . along
his trail many parchments which speak eloquently of his mind, 
his character and his philosophy of life. These are the 
extraordinary attributes of the man. If we comprehend them 
we may perhaps comprehend h i m . I n d e e d ,  if we first under­
stand him, we should be better able to appreciate the introduc­
tion of Hand's character into his opinions as a means to 
enhance their acceptance. Judge Bok, commenting on the average 
trial judge, echoed Judge Thacher's point when he said: "His
friends, his family life, his vacations, his religion— a little 
of these must be known in order to feel the integrity of expe­
rience of which his work is the outward expression."^ That
Judge Learned Hand," Record of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York. II (May, 1947), 189-190.
^In Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 177.
"a man's works imply all the influences which have shaped his 
character" comes from Judge Hand's own philosophical utter­
ances.^ Therefore, an understanding of pre-existing credibil­
ity is necessary to fully appreciate those ethical elements 
written into Hand's criminal law opinions.
Scholars, speculating about the Hand technique that 
produced opinions of universal admiration, contend that "if 
Learned Hand be the great judge that great men of the bench 
unite in designating him, an analysis of his opinions should 
show forth his greatness."^ Even if the Judge had not unveiled 
himself in his speeches and non-legal writings, his more than 
two thousand opinions would have offered virgin territory for 
exploration of those persuasive techniques which induce admira­
tion and acceptance. But, since "law may vary with the person­
ality of the judge who happens to pass upon any given case,"
determination of any such techniques will not insure their
8possession by or recommendation for use by another judge.
Such determination should, however, attempt to isolate those 
techniques and that method which serve to excite admiration for 
a particular judge. Where circumstances warrant and the per­
sonality of the judge is fitting, judges in the future may wish
^"Class Day Oration," in Learned Hand, The Spirit of 
Liberty, ed. Irving Billiard (New York: Vintage Books Inc.,
1959), p. 5.
■7
Robert Samuel Lancaster, "Judge Learned Hand and the 
Limits of Judicial Discretion," Vanderbilt Law Review, IX 
(April, 1956), 443.
Q
Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: 
Brentano's, 1930), p. 111.
to give thought to replicating the Hand technique with the hope 
of enjoying similar eminence and acceptance.
To fulfill the specific purpose of this study, which 
includes analyzing Hand's opinions which might "show forth his 
greatness," the opinions had to be reduced to those which were 
both manageable and particularly relevant. Examination of 
randomly selected cases from the diverse areas in which the 
Judge rendered decisions indicated that his criminal law opin­
ions satisfied both requirements. They constituted slightly 
over one hundred in number; and they sufficiently involved Hand 
in their content in such a manner that ethical components, if 
present in any of his opinions, could be expected to be found 
in cases of this nature.
In concluding the purpose and scope statement of this 
study an underlying motive for attempting the effort requires 
explanation. Impetus for the study comes from the perceptive 
observations of Jack W. Peltason, a political scientist, who 
believes that
the insulation of judges is related to the lack of wide­
spread and continuous public concern about judicial 
activity. . . . The general public lacks knowledge about 
the views and values represented by judges. . . .  Many 
students in college courses on American government can . 
describe the values represented by Senator Bricker, 
Secretary Benson, or Congressman Tabor. Yet they do not 
know what concepts of public interest, what values, are 
promoted by Justices Black or F r a n k f u r t e r . °
An examination of the ethical proof woven into the fabric of
Q
Federal Courts in the Judicial Process (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 24-25.
a judge's opinion can provide a revealing study of these con­
cepts and values as they assume persuasive characteristics.
Subject of the Study
The words of the late justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
claims the editor of Hand's papers and speeches, most accu­
rately describe the "purpose and practice" of Learned Hand's 
life:
I learned in the regiment and in the class the conclusion, 
at least, of what I think the best service that we can do 
for our country and ourselves: To see so far as one may
and to feel the great forces that are behind every detail 
. . . to hammer out as compact and solid a piece of work 
as one can, to try to make it first rate, and to leave it 
unadvertised.10
For fifty years Learned Hand listened to arguments.
For fifty years as a federal judge he evaluated these arguments 
and passed his evaluations on to posterity in over two thousand 
legal opinions. Permeated with philosophy his opinions ran the 
gamut of diverse subjects from patent rights and obscenity to 
Communism and college education. Many judges and lawyers 
praised Hand as the outstanding member of the federal judiciary 
of his age. Though fate denied to the Supreme Court the tal­
ents and wisdom of Learned Hand, some compared him anyway with 
members of the high court. They saw him as the successor to 
the judicial leadership provided by such greats as Marshall, 
Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo.^^
~^In The Spirit of Liberty, p. v.
^^Philip Hamburger, "The Great Judge," Life. XXI 
(November 4, 1946), 117.
What was there about this judge which made him so
notable? What was there which caused Judge Herbert F. Goodrich
to recall that "his comment upon any legal question carried
such great weight that an expressed doubt by him was a source
of danger to the acceptance of any proposition, no matter how
12plausibly urged"? What was there that caused Justice
Frankfurter to state upon Hand's retirement from the bench:
Speaking for myself, the only gain possibly to be had from 
his retirement from the Court of Appeals is that hereafter 
I shall feel freer to act on my belief that a decision of 
the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit might give occasion 
for review by the Supreme Court, and I might even perchance 
at times feel that an opinion which he wrote might be 
wrong?13
What was there that has caused the Supreme Court to cite his 
opinions probably more often than those of any other lower 
federal judge?^^ There are no quick and easy answers to these 
questions. A comprehensive study of Hand's life outside the 
court, his career on the bench, and his opinions is necessary 
to provide an informed appreciation and understanding of the 
achievements which created the legend of Judge Learned Hand. 
"Increasingly the talk is not about a delightful, incalculable, 
firmly indecisive, whimsically penetrating creature called 
Learned Hand, but about a legend. For it deserves repeating
12"Learned Hand and the Work of the American Law 
Institute," Harvard Law Review, LK (February, 1947), 346.
^^In "A Great Judge Retires: American Law Institute
Honors Learned Hand," American Bar Association Journal, XXXVII 
(July, 1951), 503.
^^Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 125.
8that Learned Hand is heading straight for the glory and the 
dangers of a legend.
Judge Hand was a highly ethical man around whom his 
critics created the legend. The legend is not founded in nyth 
but in achievement. Guided by an elevated system of consist­
ently followed values, the man's achievements provided him with 
a rich life. This life, devoted to the hard work of under­
standing the nature of mankind, had its educational roots in 
Harvard University. At Harvard, Hand thrived in the philosoph­
ical atmosphere of James, Santayana, and Royce and the legal 
atmosphere of Langdell, Ames, Thayer, and Gray, After Harvard 
and an abbreviated law practice, at the judicially young age 
of thirty-seven. President Taft in 1909 appointed Hand to the 
Federal District Court in New York. Fifteen years later he 
progressed up to the Federal Court of Appeals in New York where 
he was to remain until his technical retirement in 1951. Though 
the Supreme Court appointment eluded him, his esteem in the 
eyes of the judicial world brought to him the image of the 
tenth justice of the Supreme Court.
Amid the discussions and clash of minds growing out of 
appellate court conferences Hand was at his best. Challenged 
and stimulated by his work he won the respect and confidence 
of practitioners of diverse specialties of law from admiralty 
to patents. He was no simple-minded country judge. He was "a 
man with a first-class mind who . . . used it in that most
^^Frankfurter in "A Great Judge Retires . . . , " p. 503.
unusual of human endeavors, the thoughtful consideration of 
hard p r o b l e m s . H i s  consideration of hard problems was, in 
part, "thoughtful" because he possessed a "profound understand­
ing of human relationships . . .  [which] made his judicial 
pronouncements a cherished heritage.
In 1951, at seventy-nine, the Judge still worked a 
six-day week including all holidays except Christmas. His 
customary daily procedure of walking the four miles from his 
Manhattan home to the United States Court House changed only 
to enable part of the trip to be made on the Third Avenue Ele­
vated where he read anything from Aristotle to advanced phys- 
18ics. Such was the routine of the learned Judge Hand. Only 
his retirement from the bench, and his death in 1961, inter­
rupted this routine.
Hand was a man of moods who preferred to be among
people. His acquaintance with almost all subjects and his
ability to combine high ethical standards with a satirical type
of humor produced for him the reputation of a fabulous mimic,
19storyteller, and talker. Among his intimate friends were 
men of the arts and sciences, philosophers, statesmen, judges,
^^"Learned Hand: Senior Circuit Judge— Second Circuit,"
American Bar Association Journal, XXXIII (September, 1947), 869.
^^Tom C. Clark, "The Honorable Learned Hand," Federal 
Bar Journal. VIII (January, 1947), 151.
18Irwin Ross, "The Legend of Learned Hand," Reader's 
Digest. LIX (July, 1951), 106.
19C. C. Burlingham, "Judge Learned Hand," Harvard Law 
Review. LX (February, 1947), 331.
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legal scholars, and lawyers. From all he garnered respect and 
attention. But what generated this respect? Indeed, the image 
of an entrancing storyteller who enjoyed long walks to work and 
full days at the office writing legal philosophy would be a 
grossly inadequate picture. Perhaps, a more adequate explana­
tion for the respect is implicit in the sentiments of author 
and lawyer George W. Pepper, who observed
that Hand has small patience with those who laud self- 
expression, as such, without insisting on the prior 
development of the self which it is worth our while to 
meet. I am sure, too, that he wholly disagrees with 
those who think a writer has done his all when he has 
presented the bare bones of his thought without adding 
those touches by which the Creator managed to fashion 
man in His own image.20
As one meets Learned Hand in this study he might attempt to
decide if a judge, "worth our while to meet," displays those
touches in his writing which demonstrate how "the Creator
fashioned the man in His own image."
Sources of the Study 
Despite the respect and praise bestowed on Judge Hand 
and despite the growth of the Hand legend, no complete biogra­
phy of the Judge has yet been written. In fact he has left his 
life and thoughts so unadvertised that only one book-title card 
in the catalogue of the Library of Congress bears his name as 
author. However, available literature is of sufficient quantity 
to enable consideration of those ethical elements which are 
hypothesized to emanate from the Judge in his judicial opinions.
Of)
"The Literary Style of Learned Hand," Harvard Law 
Review. LX (February, 1947), 335.
11
Scholars, educators, judges, lawyers, and journalists 
constitute the sources for this study. They provide consider­
able commemorative, biographic, and scholarly insight, explana­
tion, and detail essential to fulfillment of the study's 
purpose. Principal contributions come from educators, Robert 
Samuel Lancaster and William Martin Sattler, and a journalist, 
Irving M. Billiard. Lancaster presented a Ph.D. dissertation 
in 1954, while a political science student at the University 
of Michigan, on "The Jurisprudence and Political Thought of 
Learned Hand." His research highlights information relevant 
toward developing an understanding of the Judge. Sattler pre­
sented a Ph.D. dissertation in 1941, while a speech student at 
Northwestern University, on "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric." 
His research on the rhetorical nature of ethos is a valuable 
condensation and perceptive synthesis of a vast amount of 
material, knowledge of which is relevant to an analysis of 
Hand's opinions and the ethical proof contained therein. 
Dilliard has gathered together Hand's papers and public ad-
21dresses and compiled them into the only source of its kind.
This study utilizes data from these sources in assessing those 
ideas and values which were part of the Man and the Judge. 
Criminal cases, primary source material contained in the fed­
eral court reports, and the legal and general periodicals 
praising and commenting on the Judge all provide information 
without which this study could not be fully accomplished.
^^The Spirit of Liberty.
12
These sources reflect material pioneered by others; the 
area the study explores is virgin territory.
Method of Organization
The purpose of this study, examination of the ethical 
proof in Hand's criminal opinions, necessitates consideration 
of three ingredients; Hand, ethical proof, and Hand's criminal 
law opinions. To integrate these three ingredients into a 
meaningful whole the method of organization, in its four essen­
tial parts, is as follows: Chapter II relates the legal herit­
age and the early beginnings of the embryonic lawyer. The 
chapter includes the image created by the man himself and by 
those about him. Appreciation of Hand's emerging image as 
divorced from the bench lends additional and needed meaning 
to those ethical elements to be isolated later in the criminal 
law opinions.
Chapter III develops Hand's career on the bench, his 
attitude toward the law and the bench, and the assessment of 
his worth by peers and contemporaries. The chapter includes 
Hand's conception of the nature and scope of the judicial func­
tion as the man merges into the judge and the responsibility of 
decision-making presents its challenge.
Chapter IV is descriptive, transitional, and prepara­
tory: descriptive in that it describes concepts of ethical
proof; transitional in that it binds together Chapters II and 
III, which develop Hand's general image, to Chapter V which 
analyzes the ethical proof occurring in his criminal opinions;
13
and preparatory in that it establishes the constituents of 
ethical proof which guide the examination of Hand's opinions 
in Chapter V.
The method of organization used is satisfactory because,
according to Judge Frank, Hand "is an exquisitely complex per-
22son, or, rather, a complex multitude of persons." Thus, this 
study of Hand treats him as a man and as a judge, in court and 
out, at home and in public. Additional benefit from this method 
results in that an understanding of the whole man is not sacri­
ficed by looking at only segments of Hand's life in isolation 
without concern for the total pattern. Judge Hand would look 
with favor upon this advantage for he claimed that "a man's 
life, like a piece of tapestry, is made up of many strands 
which interwoven makes a pattern; to separate a single one and 
look at it alone not only destroys the whole, but gives the 
strand itself a false value.
22Jerome N. Frank, "Some Reflections on Learned Hand," 
Universitv of Chicago Law Review, XXIV (Summer, 1957), 668.
"Mr. Justice Brandeis," in The Spirit of Liberty,
p. 128.
CHAPTER II
HAND— THE MAN
Introduction
Learned Hand, discussing America's heritage, once
observed; "The use of history is to tell us what we are; for
at our birth we are nearly empty vessels and we become what
1
our traditions pour into us." The application of this reason­
ing to human life presents an interesting parallel and prompts 
concern for understanding Hand's heritage and formative years 
as that which fate poured into the "nearly empty vessel."
As Hand grew, his image grew with him. Both he and 
his contemporaries built the image of the Man. That portion 
of the once "nearly empty vessel" which represented the Man, 
as distinct from the Judge, is the concern of this chapter. 
Particularly when contemporaries assess the Man there is dif­
ficulty in separating reaction to the Man from reaction to the 
Judge. On occasion such may not be separable. But, despite 
the risk of impinging on the subject matter of Chapter III, 
pertaining to the Judge, the separation appears warranted for
^"The Hall of Our History," New York Times Magazine 
(August 9, 1953), p. 8.
14
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Hand was a complex creature who did not, and does not now, lend 
himself to simple, single-label analysis.
Prelude to Judicial Prominence
Learned Hand's attainment of his eventual role as cir­
cuit judge was neither prolonged nor meteoric, nor was his 
ultimate life's work to be unexpected. One need only look 
at Hand's ancestry, rooted in the law, and at his formative 
training and experience to give credit to any prophet who might 
have pre-destined him for the bench.
Heritage
Although one might hesitate about assessing the causal 
effect which ancestry has upon the making of men, examples of 
influence derived from attribution of the ancestor's traits to 
the heir are too numerous in history to ignore. In this 
respect, young Hand was particularly fortunate in his inherit­
ance.
"In his background of inheritance we find seafaring men 
who went down to the sea in ships . . .  ; ministers of the gos­
pel; Puritans who taught Calvinism and lived it; lawyers and
2
judges outstanding in their profession." In America the 
heritage started when John Hand came from Kent, England, in 
1644, and became one of the original settlers of Easthampton, 
Long Island. By 1792, Hand family activity centered around
2
Thomas D. Thacher, "Judge Learned Hand," Record of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. II (May, 1947), 
190.
16
Shoreham, Vermont, on the shores of Lake Champlain. In neigh­
boring Connecticut, Hand's grandfather, Augustus (1803-1878), 
attended the first law school in this country. This pioneer 
of the law, in the Hand name, became a leader at the bar and 
in public life, a state senator, a member of Congress, and a 
jurist of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Learned's 
father, Samuel (1833-1886), after serving his legal apprentice­
ship with his father and gaining admission to the bar, married 
Lydia Learned, and practiced law in Albany, New York. "Almost 
from the first he was successful. By 1876 his reputation had 
grown to the point that he was offered an appointment by 
Governor Tilden to the Supreme Court of New York. Two years 
later he accepted an appointment as Associate Justice of the 
Court of Appeals."^ Before this court he had argued more cases 
than any other lawyer of his time.^  In addition. Learned's 
uncles, Clifford and Richard Hand, shared with his father the 
reputation for being notable lawyers.
By 1878, six years after his birth, "Learned Hand was 
unwittingly the possessor of a goodly inheritance. He was the 
son of a man who had made his mark upon the legal tree of a 
great state. He was the nephew of two talented and respected
^Robert Samuel Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence and Polit­
ical Thought of Learned Hand" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Dept, of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1954), 
pp. 7-8.
^Charles C. Burlingham, "Judge Learned Hand," Harvard 
Law Review, LX (February, 1947), 330.
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lawyers. He was the grandson of a man . . . who became a 
member of Congress, a Justice of the Supreme Court of his 
state.
Formative Years
Hand's formative years, which here include those prior 
to assuming the responsibilities of judicial decision-making, 
began to fill the "nearly empty vessel" with wide reading, 
close companionships, broad formal training at Harvard, unhappy 
legal practice, and a disastrous sortie into politics. All 
made their mark and shaped the man.
Stimulated by parental encouragement. Hand began early 
to read widely and develop a taste for good literature. 
Lancaster believes that "it may be conjectured that the liberal 
tolerant cast of mind which later so charmingly characterized 
the lawyer and judge was fashioned in part by the moderating 
influences of wide reading to which he became accustomed as a 
c h i l d . H o w e v e r ,  appreciation of good reading at an early 
age did not result in a cloistered youth; for Learned also 
appreciated the importance of a close friendship with his 
cousin, Augustus, who was two and a half years his senior.
This friendship resulted in exploring and camping excursions 
into the Adirondacks where the two boys began an association, 
which through Harvard and the federal bench, was to long endure.
^Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence . . .," p. 9.
^Ibid.. p. 11.
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A frequent companion on these excursions was Learned's lawyer- 
father whose life abruptly ended at fifty-three years of age. 
Learned, then fourteen, lost an early influence on his forma­
tive years.
Although the influence of his father ceased, the influ­
ence of private school training was just beginning. Albany 
Academy in Albany, New York, introduced Learned to the rigors 
and adventures of the classroom. At Albany "he was a solid, 
earnest student, fond of books and especially interested in 
sports and excursions into the forests and fields."^ He also 
kept busy by playing football and serving as Hunting and Trap­
ping Editor of a school publication, "The Albany Cue." Learned 
called his editorship "the great fraud of my life. I never 
had so much as fired a gun or trapped a squirrel, and even 
though I fancied myself as Deerslayer Hand, all my hunting 
lore was lifted straight out of the pages of outdoor maga-
p
zines." Nevertheless, Learned survived "the great fraud of 
his life," and Albany prepared him for the more advanced train­
ing which followed.
Learned Hand entered Harvard University in 1889. The 
emergence of the intellectual contributions of James, Santayana, 
Royce, and Munsterberg was then taking place. He majored in 
philosophy, and examination of his career reveals that this 
study long continued to permeate his thinking. Later, he
^Ibid., p. 10.
Q
In Bill Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand; Titan of the 
Law," Coronet. XXVI (September, 1949), 111.
19
reflected back on his undergraduate days at Harvard: "I felt
a keen desire to devote my life to philosophy. I was much 
impressed by William James, George Santayana, Josiah Royce and
9
Hugo Munsterberg, then on the Harvard faculty."
As a Harvard student Learned was known for his individ­
ualistic tendencies. With his hair parted in the middle, a 
drooping mustache, a pointed black beard, heavy eye brows, and 
massive features he acquired the moniker of "The Ancient Mongo­
lian." Before completing his undergraduate training. Phi Beta 
Kappa and class-day orator honors came to him.
Following graduation with the class of 1893, Learned 
returned to Harvard where he received his master of arts degree. 
Though philosophy attracted him, the pull of forces encouraging 
legal training dominated. Cousin Augustus already had entered 
the Harvard Law School; and besides, as Lancaster explains the 
matter, "there was the law in his b l o o d . H a n d  claimed that 
he decided to study law because "so many of my forebears had 
been lawyers that my family expected me to follow suit. So I 
went into law to please them.
Learned Hand graduated with honors from the Harvard 
Law School in 1896. He took with him the influence of those
9
In Herman Finkelstein, "A Memoir of Judge Learned Hand 
(1872-1961)," Bulletin of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.,
IX (October, 1961), 6.
^*^"The Jurisprudence . . . ," p. 13.
^^Finkelstein, "A Memoir of Judge Learned Hand,"p. 6.
Cf. Philip Hamburger, "The Great Judge," Life. XXI (November 
4, 1946), 125.
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Harvard jurists who trained him. Their impression on him may
have caused the view he later took of the role of the judge.
Lancaster believes that
during his years as a law student at Harvard he came under 
the influence of those great Harvard jurists of yesterday 
whose names are still uttered with respect: Christopher
Columbus Langdell, John Chapman Gray, James Barr Ames,
James Bradley Thayer. Undoubtedly he took from his teach­
ers a view of the nature of law as a social force that 
colored his later thinking. It is possible that much of 
the legal realism and the somewhat restricted view Hand 
later took of the role of the judge as lawmaker may be 
traced in seminal form to the convictions generated by 
the discussion, debate, and controversy of those student 
days. Certainly the young lawyer came out of Harvard with 
a sharpened mind and a desire to probe for the forces 
behind the detail.12
Hand earned three degrees from Harvard. Columbia,
Yale, Pennsylvania, Amherst, Dartmouth, Princeton, and Harvard
later conferred honorary degrees upon him. On receiving the
honorary degree from his alma mater. Harvard, he told what the
educators at Harvard had taught him:
Many years ago in this place I sat under . . . men who
believed that the pursuit of knowledge was enough to 
absorb all their powers and more. They taught me, not by 
precept, but by example, that nothing is more commendable, 
and more fair, than that a man should lay aside all else, 
and seek truth; not to preach what he might find; and 
surely not to try to make his views prevail; but to find 
his satisfaction in the search itself. These men did not 
seek to rebuild the world nearer to the heart's desire; 
they were content to be themselves, confident that, if they 
were faithful in that, their light would shine, steady and 
far. Like others, I have not been true to what they taught 
me; I have strayed from their ways; yet in days of dis­
couragement . . . the memory of these teachers of mine has
returned again and again to freshen, and renew, my spirit. 
Unafraid before the unknown universe; indifferent to the 
world's disparagements and uncorrupted by its prizes; 
ardent and secure in that faith by which alone mankind in
^^"The Jurisprudence . . . p. 13.
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the end can live; they were themselves the best lesson 
that I took a w a y . 13
On yet another occasion Hand explained that which he took away
from Harvard in addition to his degrees. He described it as
a "creed" whose conviction grew upon him.
For myself I learned and took away . . .  a creed . . . 
whose conviction has grown upon me as the years have 
passed. You were not taught it in words; you gathered it 
unwittingly from uncorrupted and incorruptible masters.
It was in the air; you did not affirm or proclaim it; you 
would have felt ashamed to demonstrate the obvious. You 
came to know that you could hold no certain title to 
beliefs that you had not won; and indeed you did not win 
many. But that did not so much matter for you had come 
into possession of a touchstone; you had learned how to 
judge a good title; and, although tomorrow might turn up 
a flaw in it, you believed that you could detect the flaw. 
And chiefly and best of all, you were in a company of those 
who thought that the noblest of man's works was the pursuit 
of truth; who valued the goal so highly that they were 
never quite content that the goal that they had reached 
was the goal they were after; who believed that man's 
highest courage was to bet his all on what was no more 
than the best guess he could make; who asked no warranties 
and distrusted all such; who faced the puzzle of life with­
out any kit of ready-made answers, yet trusting that, if 
they persevered long enough, they would find— in the words 
of John Dewey— that they might safely "lean back on 
things."14
After Hand graduated from law school, the New York bar 
admitted him to practice. In Albany, where his father had 
practiced successfully, he first ventured out to apply his 
newly acquired knowledge. Despite having been editor of the 
Harvard Law Review, having graduated with honors, and having 
set up practice all was not well. "'He had a speculative train
"On Receiving an Honorary Degree," in Learned Hand,
The Spirit of Liberty, ed. Irving Dilliard, (New York: Vintage
Books Inc., 1959), pp. 105-106.
^^"At Fourscore," in The Spirit of Liberty, pp. 196-197.
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of thought,' his cousin recalls; 'and thinking based to a con­
siderable extent on precedent did not particularly interest 
h i m . " ' M a n y  times I felt like putting a gun to my head,' 
he said. 'Nothing but foreclosures, mortgages, settlement of 
estates. Everything was petty and formal. Nobody wanted to 
get behind a problem.' Nevertheless, Hand practiced law in 
Albany and New York City for thirteen successful years despite 
his discontent. He became known as "a good but a rebellious
lawyer who disliked legal drudgery and verbose, self-important 
T 7lawyers." Davidson says of "the repugnance, however, [that
it] did not prevent him from making money, and he did meet many
able, older lawyers with whom he enjoyed discussing philosophy
18and metaphysics."
President Taft's attorney general, George Wickersham, 
and C. C. Burlingham were two of those older lawyers with whom 
Hand had contact. In Learned Hand they recognized judicial 
talent. With their encouragement, Taft appointed Hand a fed­
eral judge for the Southern District of New York. But within 
three years of this May 1909 appointment Hand was to reject 
the man who made him a federal judge, bolt the G.O.P., align 
with Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party, and run on the Bull Moose 
ticket for the post of Chief Judge of the New York Court of 
Appeals.
^^Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 125.
17Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," p. 111.
^®Ibid.
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Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, disturbed by Supreme 
Court decisions, bitterly objected to a judiciary which ob­
structed industrial, economic, and social reform. In the 
campaign of 1912, Roosevelt favored the recall of decisions by 
allowing the Congress to re-enact and make binding a statute 
nullified by the Supreme Court. Even before this agitation 
"pretty plainly. Learned Hand . . . believed that, concerning 
due process as to social and economic legislation, our courts
should accept, substantially, the English principle of legis-
19lative supremacy." Eventually, Judge Hand, his thinking
compatible with that of Roosevelt's, sent a copy of Herbert
Croly's book. The Promise of American Life. to Roosevelt, while
he was abroad. Croly's book contributed ideas and general
principles to the Bull Moose philosophy. As an active Bull
Mooser, Hand believed the nation "had to break away from the
20Hanna thing— the control of the nation by big business."
Consequently he ran for Chief Judge in 1913 on the Progessive
ticket. Like Roosevelt, Hand, too, failed to be elected. "'He
21just stood up,’ his cousin recalls, 'and was knocked down.'"
He never again went into politics and subsequently renounced 
affiliation with any political party.
19Jerome N. Frank, "Some Reflections on Judge Learned 
Hand," University of Chicago Law Review, XXIV (Summer, 1957), 
689.
20
In Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 125.
^^Ibid.
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Thus, Hand's formative years witnessed academic suc­
cess, legal-practice discontent, and political failure. Sig­
nificant, however, was the recognition of judicial qualities 
in the Man. This recognition initiated a long and fruitful 
career on the bench for one destined to share his talents for 
the betterment of a nation whose stature was to grow with the 
Judge’s stature. Indeed, the "nearly empty vessel" was rapidly 
filling.
Creation of an Image
On April 11, 1959, the day after a celebration honoring
Judge Hand for having served fifty years on the bench, the New
York Times reported: "He might have been speaking of himself
when he wrote that the qualities that clear the path to truth
are skepticism, tolerance, discrimination, urbanity, some— but
not too much— reserve toward change, insistence upon proportion,
22and, above all, humility before the vast unknown." This 
succinct disclosure of character qualities makes a sizeable 
contribution to the image of Learned Hand. But contributions 
which build the image exceed those of mass circulation news­
papers. The paradoxical Hand as a pensive, contemplative man 
and a gregarious, witty man, sometimes given to excess, comes 
alive upon consideration of both personal and contemporary 
contributions to his image.
22p. 12.
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The Thinking Man
Contributions from the Man
What Hand said about himself and what he said about 
those ideals and values to which he subscribed contribute to 
the Hand image and to an understanding of the Man.
Perceptions of himself
Some attributes of his character Hand frankly confessed 
while others he more subtly implied. Skepticism and uncer­
tainty combined with a harmless humility were among his most 
significant attributes. "'Skepticism is my only gospel,' he
23is fond of saying, 'but I don't want to make a dogma of it.'"
Ross credits Hand for his humility in confessing errors which
allowed him to admit when he was wrong and to overrule himself
24when warranted. He calls this a rare trait among judges.
Hand manifested his humility, not by stating that he was humble 
(such as his statement that he was a skeptic given to uncer­
tainty) , but by demonstrating humility particularly in utter­
ances where he showed a recognition of his limitations.
The simplest problems which come up from day to day seem 
to me quite unanswerable as soon as I try to get below the 
surface. Each side, when I hear it, seems to me right 
till I hear the other. I have neither the time nor the 
ability to learn the facts, or to estimate their importance 
if I knew them; I am disposed to accept the decision of 
those charged with the responsibility of dealing with them. 
My vote is one of the most unimportant acts of my life; if
23 Irwin Ross, "The Legend of Learned Hand," Reader's 
Digest, LIX (July, 1951), 107.
^^"The Legend of Learned Hand," p. 107.
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I were to acquaint myself with the matters on which it 
ought to depend, if I were to try to get a judgment on 
which I was willing to risk affairs of even the smallest 
moment, I should be doing nothing else, and that seems a 
fatuous conclusion to a fatuous undertaking. Because, if 
all were done, for what after all does my single voice 
count among so many? Surely I can play my part better in 
the society where I chance to be, if I stick to my last, 
and leave governing to those who have had the temerity to 
accept the j o b . 25
At eighty years of age on January 27, 1952, Hand 
addressed the Harvard Club of New York. Later, he told Irving 
Dilliard that this speech probably "does more completely repre­
sent my views about ultimate values than anything else I have 
w r i t t e n . T h e s e  ultimate values include a sincerely optimis­
tic spirit which emerged as Hand looked at himself and the
destiny of man;
I do not pin my dreams for the future to my country or 
even to my race. I think it probable that civilization 
somehow will last as long as I care to look ahead. . . .
I think it not improbable that man . . . may have cosmic
destinies that he does not understand. And so beyond 
the vision of battling races and an impoverished earth 
I catch a dreaming glimpse of p e a c e . 27
Thus, Hand by self-admission perceived himself to be 
a skeptic faced with the inevitable uncertainties of life. 
Imbued with a frequently reiterated feeling of humility, he 
cautiously avoided bold self-assertion and admitted his limi­
tations. While skeptical about what others considered the 
certainties of life. Hand, nevertheless, remained optimistic
25"Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realities," in
The Spirit of Liberty, p. 72.
^^In The Spirit of Liberty, p. 192.
"At Fourscore," in The Spirit of Liberty, p. 193.
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about the perpetual existence of that life. If allowed to redo
his own life he once said;
I think perhaps I would be a physicist— open new vistas, 
move in step with the world. You know, I used to hope 
that I might be able to garner a harvest of wisdom. That 
has turned out to be a mistake, for I cannot see much 
further into the tangle of life than I could 50 years ago. 
I'm less disappointed than I should have thought. Indeed, 
there is solace in a companionship where all are groping 
their way equally in the same f o g . 28
Professions of beliefs
Although his mind, insight, experience, and literary 
skill equipped him to write, Learned Hand left no systematic 
and comprehensive work wherein he collectively set forth his 
beliefs on man, liberty, tolerance, or any of the other sub­
jects about which he spoke. Nevertheless, his random utter­
ances which have been recorded are of particular interest to 
the scholar. According to Hamburger, "Many students of Judge 
Hand's work feel that his public addresses and articles in law 
journals have been among his greatest contributions. In them
he has given expression to some of his deepest feelings on law
29and life. . . . "  An analysis of the variety of subjects 
dealt with reveals professions of beliefs valuable toward 
understanding the character of the Man and the image conveyed.
On the preservation of personality. In a 1927 com­
mencement address at Bryn Mawr College, Hand professed his
Op
Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 128.
29
Ibid., p. 126.
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beliefs on the dangers of conformity:
Our dangers, as it seems to me, are not from the outrageous 
but from the conforming; not from those who rarely and 
under lurid glare of obloquy upset our moral complaisance, 
or shock us with unaccustomed conduct, but from those, the 
mass of us, who take their virtues and their tastes like 
their shirts and their furniture, from the limited patterns 
which the market offers.30
A questionable role was found by Hand for those who can "look
below the surface" of problems and offer leadership to those
who must be managed:
There must in any event be a few who look below the sur­
face, and know how the game is played. These can determine 
what the fashions shall be, and being, as it were, at the 
transmitting station, they can make them what they want. 
After all, most men are incapable of deciding for them­
selves, and have got to have a leader somewhere. If the 
new discoveries in mass suggestion enable us to make gov­
ernment easier, not only political, but moral and aesthet­
ic, why not welcome them like other useful inventions?31
But Hand quickly cautioned: "Perhaps some of you will agree
with me not to be content with an order in which even the 
enlightened We might be the wire-pullers, who make the man­
nikins dance, whilst they, falsely imputing to their prancing
a meaning we supply, live and die in ignorance of what it has
3 2ever been all about." The importance of the individual as
an individual permeated his thinking. "Our problem," according
to Hand, "is how to give the mannikin, assailed on all hands
with what we now so like to call propaganda, the chance of
survival as a person at all, not merely as a leaf driven by
33the wind, a symbol in a formula."
"The Preservation of Personality," in The Spirit of 
Libertv. p. 25.
^^Ibid.. p. 27. ^^Ibid.. p. 28. ^^Ibid.
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The requirements for one to preserve himself from being 
lost in the mass of humanity particularly concerned Hand when 
he stressed that "experience soon teaches the seeker, not so 
much that he can find the key to the universe, as the limits 
of his search and the paucity of his trove. Tolerance, scep­
ticism and humility are the commoner end-products of a deter­
mination to see for oneself, than of docile and tractable 
acceptance of what has been revealed to the past.
On tolerance. Frequently Hand has reminded his genera­
tion of the values inherent in the tolerant mind. Tolerance 
of our own limitations, of man's imperfections, and of the fact 
that permanent solutions to the problems of life do not exist 
constitute his message.
"We are all inferior creatures," claimed Hand, "we are 
humans and our imperfections will come out in one way or anoth­
er. . . . How much of the time are our choices really influ­
enced by our own interests? We cannot expect more of other 
people than we have ourselves.
Perhaps one of the strongest character traits which 
strengthened his reasoning process and which highlighted his 
message about tolerance is that there are no permanent solu­
tions to the problems of life. Hand's recognition of the 
inevitability of uncertainty, although it impinges on his
"^^ Ibid.
"Morals in Public Life," in The Spirit of Liberty, 
pp. 175-176.
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beliefs about an open mind and the preservation of liberty, 
still warrants separate consideration particularly for its 
emphasis on the necessity of freedom of independent thought.
In an address before the Juristic Society of the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School, Hand developed this belief:
Ideas, fashions, dogmas, literary, political, scien­
tific, religious, have a very similar course; they get a 
currency, spread like wildfire, have their day and. there­
after nothing can revive them. Were the old questions 
ever answered? Has anyone ever proved or disproved the 
right of secession? Most issues are not decided; their 
importance passes and they follow after. But in their 
day they rack the world they infest; men mill about them 
like a frantic herd: not understanding what their doctrines
imply, or whither they lead. To them attach the noblest, 
and the meanest, motives, indifferent to all but that there 
is a cause to die for, or to profit by. Such habits are 
not conducive to the life of reason; that kind of devotion 
is not the method by which man has raised himself from a 
savage. Rather by quite another way, by doubt, by trial,
by tentative conclusion.36
In the same speech Hand called "liberty" an essence, found in
the hearts of men, "in the belief that knowledge is hard to get,
that man must break through again and again the thin crust on
which he walks, that the certainties of today may become the
superstitions of tomorrow; that we have no warrant of assur-
37ance save by everlasting readiness to test and test again."
Lancaster, in his study of Hand's jurisprudence and 
political thought, contends that "Learned Hand is firmly con­
vinced that truth is a relative term. He has traveled as far 
as most on the narrow path that leads to the temple of wisdom
p. 58.
37
"Sources of Tolerance," in The Spirit of Liberty.
Ibid., p. 64.
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and as he has traveled he has speculated, perhaps brooded, over
38the saving grace of a tolerant, understanding mind and spirit."
On an open mind. Just as Hand frequently reminded his 
generation about the values of a tolerant mind so, too, did he 
impress the value of an open mind freed from the dangers of 
absolutism and dogmatism. He was skeptical about easy explana­
tions, detested broad generalizations, and though appearing 
self-assured he constantly re-examined those peaceful meadows 
in which doubt might grow. His favorite quotation which he 
would have had inscribed on every church, school, courthouse, 
and legislative institution epitomized his concern for an open 
mind. This quotation, the prayer of Oliver Cromwell as he 
unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with the Scots before the
Battle of Dunbar, is: "I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ,
39think ye that ye may be mistaken." That an open mind is not 
easily attained was clearly apparent to Hand. "Doubt and 
scrutiny," he believed, "the most serviceable of man's tools, 
were the last that he acquired. He has never quite reconciled 
himself to their use; they are always repellent and painful.
Despite the recognized complications in obtaining and 
maintaining an open mind. Hand encouraged its attainment and 
summarized his beliefs on the subject in an eloquent "plea for 
the open mind":
O Q
Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence . . .," pp. 257-258.
^^In The Spirit of Liberty, p. xx.
^^"The Hall of Our History," p. 8.
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Risk for risk, for myself I had rather take my chance that 
some traitors will escape detection than spread abroad a 
spirit of general suspicion and distrust, which accepts 
rumor and gossip in place of undismayed and unintimidated 
inquiry. I believe that that community is already in 
process of dissolution where each man begins to eye his 
neighbor as a possible enemy, where non-conformity with 
the accepted creed, political as well as religious, is a 
mark of disaffection; where denunciation, without specifi­
cation or backing, takes the place of evidence; where 
orthodoxy chokes freedom of dissent; where faith in the 
eventual supremacy of reason has become so timid that we 
dare not enter our convictions in the open lists, to win 
or lose. Such fears as these are a solvent which can eat 
out the cement that binds the stones together; they may in 
the end subject us to a despotism as evil as any that we 
dread; and they can be allayed only in so far as we refuse 
to proceed on suspicion, and trust one another until we 
have tangible ground for misgiving. The mutual confidence 
on which all else depends can be maintained only by an 
open mind and a brave reliance upon free discussion. I 
do not say that these will suffice; who knows but we may 
be on a slope which leads down to aboriginal savagery.
But of this I am sure: if we are to escape, we must not
yield a foot upon demanding a fair field and an honest 
race to all i d e a s . 41
On liberty.- Closely interrelated, in Hand's terminol­
ogy and system of values, with tolerance and an open mind is 
the subject of liberty. Hand claimed that whether a society 
based on civil liberties and human rights will endure remains 
undetermined. However, he found the existing alternatives to 
be "immeasurably w o r s e . A d d r e s s i n g  the American Jewish 
Committee on the subject of civil liberties and human rights 
he recognized that "the natural, though naive, opinion is that 
it [liberty] means no more than that each individual shall be
^^"A Plea for the Open Mind and Free Discussion," in
The Spirit of Liberty, p. 216 
p. 224.
^^"A Fanfare for Prometheus," in The Spirit of Liberty,
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allowed to pursue his own desires without let or hindrance; 
and that, although it is true that this is practically impos­
sible, still it does remain the goal, approach to which
it43measures our success.
In 1944 at an "I Am an American Day" celebration in 
New York City, Hand made his most frequently repeated and prob­
ably most widely known speech. One passage has been extracted 
and repeatedly reappears in commemorative articles about Hand. 
Indeed, nothing need be added to further explain Hand's beliefs 
on liberty as this concise and revealing passage embodies his 
philosophy by answering the question: "What then is the Spirit
of Liberty?"
I cannot define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The 
spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that 
it is right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which 
seeks to understand the minds of other men and women; the 
spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their inter­
ests alongside its own without bias; the spirit of liberty 
remembers that not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded; 
the spirit of liberty is the spirit of Him who, near two 
thousand years ago, taught mankind that lesson it has never 
learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there may be 
a kingdom where the least shall be heard and considered 
side by side with the g r e a t e s t . 44
Thus, Hand on the preservation of personality, on 
tolerance, on an open mind, and on liberty reveals professions 
of beliefs valuable toward understanding his character and 
contributing to his emerging image. For here can be seen a 
man who believed in the worth of the individual as an individual;
"^ I^bid. , p. 220.
p. 144.
^^"The Spirit of Liberty," in The Spirit of Liberty,
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a man who believed that permanent answers to life's problems 
do not exist; a man who believed in the virtues of doubt, 
caution, and skepticism; and a man who believed that "the 
spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it 
is right." An appropriate way to leave this subject and one 
which adds a final touch to the contributions from the man to 
his image involves Hand's concept of how man can lead his life 
to enable him to provide a happy and justifiable defense of 
his accomplishments;
By some happy fortuity, man is a projector, a designer, 
a builder, a craftsman; it is among his most dependable 
joys to impose upon the flux that passes before him some 
mark of himself, aware though he always must be of the odds 
against him. His reward is not so much in the work as in 
its making; not so much in the prize as in the race. We 
may win when we lose, if we have done what we can; for by 
so doing we have made real at least some part of that 
finished product in whose fabrication we are most concerned; 
ourselves. And if at the end some friendly critic shall 
pass by and say; "My friend, how good a job do you really 
think you have made of it all?" we can answer; "I know 
as well as you that it is not of high quality; but I did 
put into it whatever I had, and that was the game I started 
out to play."45
Contributions from contemporaries
Learned Hand was not unconcerned about what others 
thought of him. "I have often thought it might be interesting 
if you could come back after you were dead and read your obitu­
ary, " he once said.^^ Undoubtedly he would have been pleased
^^"A Fanfare for Prometheus," in The Spirit of Liberty.
p. 224.
^^In "A Great Judge Retires; American Law Institute 
Honors Learned Hand," American Bar Association Journal. XXXVII 
(July, 1951), 504.
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if his wish could have been fulfilled. Anecdotal contributions 
from varied walks of life, coming both before and immediately 
after his death, constitute that obituary and sharpen the 
outlines of the man's image.
From the bar
Members of the bar have commended Hand, among numerous 
other attributes, for his pursuit of the truth, for his human 
qualities, for his discontent with dogmas, for his respect for 
freedom, for his high ethical standards, and for possession of 
a philosophy which reflected itself in his writing.
Herman Finkelstein, former law clerk to the Judge, says 
of Hand: "There was always a last lingering doubt about every­
thing except a conviction that the pursuit of truth was the 
highest v i r t u e . E v e n  if Hand could not find the truth.
attorney Charles C. Burlingham believes that "he would have
48been an inspiration to others to pursue the search." Burl­
ingham further regards Hand's blending of high ethical stand-
49ards with a satirical type of humor as an enduring combination.
"What we all love in Judge Hand is the very simple 
thing that he is wholly human," claims Harrison Tweed, former 
President of the American Law I n s t i t u t e . J o h n  Lord O'Brian, 
a distinguished lawyer and close friend of Hand, found his 
prime contribution to be
"A Memoir of Judge Leaned Hand, "p. 6.
^^"Judge Learned Hand," p. 331. ^^Ibid.
^^In "A Great Judge Retires . . .," p. 504.
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his constant attitude [which] has been one of seeking to 
open up and broaden the minds of men about him; to make 
humankind wiser in the sense of being less dogmatic and 
less cautious. He has had no faith in formularies or 
dogmas, and he has said over and over again that the 
idea of freedom, in whatever aspect it may arise in daily 
life, is not a formula. As he has expressed it, freedom 
is not a concrete concept. It is an essence, and it is 
an essence that will escape from any vial however strongly 
corked.51
Author, lawyer, and former United States Senator, George
W. Pepper, reports on yet another facet about Hand: "His
philosophy of life manifests itself in everything that he says.
He seems to be able without effort to make a nice choice of
52words and a pleasing use of metaphor and allusion."
Finkelstein and Burlingham identify Hand with his 
search for the truth. Tweed notes his human qualities, and 
O'Brian stresses his contributions to mankind. Pepper's empha­
sis differs again in that he points to Hand's literary style. 
These lawyers are not in disagreement. They are well aware 
that they are appraising a complex individual with multiple 
attributes. This composite picture drawn from some of the 
reaction of the bar to the Man further contributes to the total 
image of Learned Hand.
From the bench
Jerome Frank, an associate of Judge Hand's on the 
federal bench, regards Hand's life to have been "like a work
^^In "Proceedings of a Special Session to Commemorate 
Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service by the Honorable 
Learned Hand," Federal Reporter, 264 F.(2d) 9.
c n
"The Literary Style of Learned Hand," Harvard Law 
Review, LX (February, 1947), 333.
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of art, like a novel written by himself. . . . His long life 
. . . has enabled him to round out that novel. It is replete 
with poetry and contains many delightful chapters and inter­
ludes."^^ Frank commends Hand for having recognized the impos­
sibility of applying permanent solutions to the challenging 
uncertainties of life's problems. This insight, according to 
Frank, resulted from Hand's liberal spirit freed from dogma­
tism. "Such a liberal has no list of fixed particularized 
ideas on which he insists as wholly right or wholly wrong. He 
does not phonograph like, rattle off, with an air if [sic] 
infallibility, a long series of do's and dont's applicable in 
all circumstances. He is no slogan-addict. He looks upon 
liberalism as a mood, not as a system or catalogue of precise 
c o m m a n d s . J u d g e  Frank's commendation of Hand, in the 
University of Chicago Law Review, concludes with a tribute to 
his deep thinking and feeling which produced an understanding 
of human nature: "Horace Walpole said that 'life is a comedy
for those who think and a tragedy for those who feel.' Learned 
Hand, who both thinks deeply and feels deeply, sees life as a 
marvelous comic-tragedy. He is not one who 'despises men ten­
derly. ' He has a love for an understanding of his fellow- 
creatures, like him, humanly fallible. I commend him to you 
as a great man. . . . Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 
former law secretary to Judge Hand and later United States
"Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand," p. 668.
^^Ibid., p. 703. ^^Ibid.. p. 705.
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district judge for Massachusetts, supports Frank's claim that 
Hand perceptively understood human nature. His reputation 
grew with the skill and artistry employed in his work, "but 
what counted most was that his vision, unrestricted by bound­
aries of partisanship, provinciality, or narrow mores, had an 
inclusive wisdom, a Shakespearean understanding of what men 
are like. He shared their melancholy and their robust joy.
Like Montaigne, he knew that, though a man sits upon the top 
of the world, yet sits he upon his tail."
Thus, the bench, of which these two judges, who knew 
Hand well, are probably most representative in their praise, 
saw in the Man a tolerant, cautious liberal not given to dogma­
tism who thought and felt deeply as he attempted an understand­
ing of his fellow man throughout a life which resembled a work 
of art.
From the literary world
When Hand was eighty-one, Martin Gumpert, in the New
York Times Magazine, called him
an outstanding example of American culture . . . the most 
beautiful old man I have ever seen->-a face cut of stone, 
eyes that are heavy browed and sad, but incandescent, and 
an indescribable aura of goodness, wisdom and strength.
. . . He is one of the most precious spiritual assets of 
the nation. . . .  No one in our time expresses so force­
fully in his own person the values of American ideals, of 
tolerance, freedom and human dignity, as this great 
judge.57
^^"Learned Hand," Atlantic. CCVIII (December, 1961), 54.
57 "Te:
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Eugene Gressman writing for New Republic adds to 
Gumpert's concept of Hand by associating him with the "great 
American tradition." Gressman respects Hand for embodying 
"the ideals, the aspirations and the emotions which charac-
eg
terize the democratic humane instincts of a free society."
His knowledge, necessary to be free, and his wisdom, necessary
to relate this knowledge to the surrounding world, are signif­
icant characteristics, according to Gressman, "but most of all, 
he possesses the ability to question his own first principles, 
to search out the truth wherever it may seem to lead.
The death of Learned Hand in 1961 prompted reflection 
and comment from various sources as reported in different news 
media. Max Ascoli, editor and publisher of The Reporter, 
reflected;
One must be very measured in praising Learned Hand,
for even now that he is dead one can hear how he would
react: wise, caustic sometimes profane. He knew how to
exert restraint on himself, and how to exact it on others. 
He made of self-criticism a consummate art, and when he 
met any man, high or low, who was pompous or smug or vague, 
that man was out of luck.
The range of his interests was probably equal to the 
depth of his passion, but he never let his sense of per­
sonal and public responsibility take a holiday. . . .
With so rich an inner life to keep under control, he 
was always self-possessed, never self-centered. To an 
extraordinary degree he developed the skills of inward 
discipline and outward perception.60
An editorial writer in the New York Times commented:
^®"With Vision and Grace," CXXVI (June 2, 1952), 19. 
S^ Ibid.
GO"Learned Hand (1872-1961)," XXV (September 14, 1961),
16.
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America has lost one of the greatest of its judges.
Few certainly ever won more respect and admiration from 
the bench and bar than Learned Hand during his fifty-two 
years of service as a Federal judge— an exceptional 
achievement, whether measured by years, influence or 
distinction. . . . But he was far more than an eminent 
judge. He was a rare human being. His extraordinary 
gifts brought joy to all those fortunate enough to know 
him— gifts that also lent distinction to the way his deci­
sions were expressed. He was a philosopher, ever probing 
the easy assumptions of the unthinking with a passionate 
devotion to dispassionate truth. And with all his emi­
nence which he bore lightly, he was the best of company: 
warm, witty, engaging, with an appealing earthiness.
He will be missed as a judge and as a person of 
charm.61
From the Congress
On June 28, 1951, Hand responded to a request to appear 
before a Senate subcommittee investigating an unusually low 
state of public morals in the country. Senator Paul H. Douglas 
of Illinois, who presided over the meeting, introduced Hand as
a man respected by both lawyers and the general public for his
. . . 62 integrity.
From the general public
Among the many tributes paid to Learned Hand was a
note written in Italian by a man named Spéciale, Hand's old
friend and shoemaker. Hand prized this note which praised his
character and wisdom:
Illustrious Sir:
I read attentively your excellent speech given at 
Central Park ["What is the Spirit of Liberty?"].
August 19, 1961, p. 16.
^^"Morals in Public Life," in The Spirit of Liberty,
p. 171.
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You do not know how excellent you are, but people 
should tell you of your qualities, and I would like to 
tell you how well suited you are to govern this great 
republic. You are a great judge, philosopher and philan­
thropist. You lack nothing in knowledge and intelligence, 
and you understand the needs of the people.
I hope that you who are of such great caliber and have 
such an excellent character will live many many years on 
this earth, and forever in the hearts of the people.
I remain your humble shoemaker,
M. Spéciale®^
From the bar, bench, literary world. Congress and 
general public came those contributions which created the image 
of Learned Hand as a man. Not a dissenter can be found who 
will deny that Hand hammered out as compact and solid a life 
as he could, made it first rate, put into it all that he had, 
and felt the great forces behind every detail. But the "think­
ing man" had yet another side to him which is equally a part of 
his image.
The Gregarious Man 
Perhaps a less compact and less solid aspect of Hand's 
image, but nevertheless an inseverable part, pertains to his 
escapades and eccentricities. Much as with the "thinking man" 
Hand put into this side of his personality "all that he had," 
and at times the "gregarious man" went to excess.
Examination of the many sides of Hand's personality 
reveals that he was a gifted mimic, a fabulous talker, a fine 
storyteller, and a respected singer of folk songs who further 
gained repute for being unscrupulously honest and dedicated.
^^In Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," p. 114.
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Judge Thacher summarizes Hand's escapades and eccentricities
by calling him
inimitable at any evening party— gay, charming, bright, 
scintillating and full of devilment and fun. He can tell 
a story with perfect mimicry; he might have been a marvel­
ous actor if he^had not been wedded to the law and in love 
with metaphysics. He knows large portions of Gilbert and 
Sullivan by heart, loves music and has a fairish singing 
voice. He loves all sorts and kinds of people and partic­
ularly children, and they love him. He is extremely socia­
ble, calls himself gregarious, dreads solitude, but will 
not ride in the subway.64
As a gifted mimic Hand played the role of William 
Jennings Bryan addressing a political meeting in Jersey City. 
Felix Frankfurter found him "fantastically good" at this.^^ 
Frankfurter also found Hand to be a "fabulous talker" who 
delighted his listeners. "Through his humor and fancy and 
range he became the center and circumference of every party. 
Public gatherings as well as private individuals experienced 
his ability as a talker. Harrison Tweed of the American Law 
Institute recalls formal and informal meetings where "contri­
butions from him of philosophy and poetry are probabilities, 
and wisdom and profanity certainties."^^ "He is an indefati­
gable memorizer of railroad timetables . . . and can talk for 
hours on the comparative speeds of the Twentieth Century and 
Broadway L i m i t e d . " I n  former years," according to Bill
^^Thacher, "Judge Learned Hand," pp. 194-195.
^^In Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 128.
^^Frankfurter, "Learned Hand," p. 3.
^^In "Proceedings of a Special Session . . .," p. 12.
68Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," p. 113.
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Davidson, "he enjoyed discussing Freud and Shakespeare with 
such characters as Fiorella La Guardia, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and a shoemaker named M. Spéciale, who repaired the Judge's 
shoes and taught him Verdi's operas and the mysteries of 
spaghetti-making.
From talker to storyteller was an easy transition for 
Hand who enjoyed telling a good story particularly to his 
daughters.
The Judge would often reward them with an episode from 
Br'er Rabbit. "Lippity-lop, lippity-lop," he would say, 
hopping across the room. Or he might recount a chapter in 
the history of a blowzy character called Marge, a figment 
of his imagination. Marge, who has been involved in out­
rageous encounters with the law for more than 30 years, 
is well-meaning but cannot avoid trouble. These days 
[1946], she is in constant demand by the Judge's grand­
children, who also like to watch him place a wastebasket 
over his head and leap around the room like an Indian.70
When Marge is not the center of a story. Hand portrays the
Crooked Mouth Family. "He lights a candle and, taking the part
of each member of the family, from the largest to the smallest
Crooked Mouth, tries to blow it out.
If not in demand as a mimic or storyteller. Hand's
friends prevailed upon him to sing. In particular he enjoyed
Gilbert and Sullivan lyrics and American folk music. Hand once
convulsed Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the United
72States Supreme Court with a collection of "ribald sea songs." 
G^lbid.
^^Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 128. ^^Ibid.
^^Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand," p. 113.
44
After leaving Holmes, "Hand turned to Frankfurter and said, 'I
73fear the old man thinks I am a mere vaudevillian.'" "Mere 
vaudevillian" or not his ballad singing was sufficiently popu­
lar that the Music Division of the Library of Congress agreed 
to have him sing two old ballads, "Phil Sheridan" and "The Iron 
Merrimac," for a record later made available to the public.
Hand's escapades and eccentricities were not reserved 
for entertainment purposes. Some even contributed to the aura 
of honesty built up around the Man. Confused by the language 
of the income tax laws and unsure of the tax exceptions to 
which he was entitled, he took none. "The words of such an 
act as the Income Tax merely dance before my eyes in a mean- 
( ingless procession," he c h a r g e d . O n  another occasion Hand 
was so loyal to our customs laws that upon returning from
Europe he declared a pair of old shoes which had been resoled 
75in Rotterdam. "When writing to another judge he deliberates
whether the matter is primarily business or personal in order
76to decide whether to frank the envelope or affix a stamp."
Learned Hand regularly walked the four miles in one 
hour from his Manhattan home to the United States Court House. 
"Several of the other judges of the Circuit Court occasionally 
go along on the walks, but few men can survive the sheer speed
^^Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 128.
^^In Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand," p. 106.
^^Ibid.
76Ross, "The Legend of Learned Hand," p. 106.
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of the journey. The other judges have been known to drop out
of line, one by one, and jump into cabs while Judge Hand
77ploughs ahead without so much as a glance behind." "'I shall
continue the practice,' he has told a friend, 'until that final
morning when, fittingly, I shall fall backward head over heels
78down the courthouse steps.'" He dedicated himself to ex­
cesses in play as well as at work. Judge Thacher recalls:
One morning I met him to take the usual walk and found him 
in the depths of depression. He had dined the night before 
with friends and after dinner the company engaged in play­
ing charades. In the course of the evening he and one of 
the ladies presented the murder scene from "Othello." He 
entered into the spirit of the thing with such vigor that 
he broke the lady's nose, and, in a state of complete moral 
and mental disturbance, he . . . had to go and see the 
lady. I always wondered how he got along in court that
day:79
Summary
Learned Hand possessed a goodly heritage. His forma­
tive years, which gained initial strength from his heritage, 
included wide reading, close companionships, broad formal 
training at Harvard, dissatisfying experiences with private 
law practice and politics. The climax of this period of his 
life came when his judicial potential attracted the attention 
of President Taft who appointed him a federal district court 
judge.
As Learned Hand grew, so, too, did his image grow with 
him. Through his perceptions of himself and professions of
^^Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 118. ^^Ibid.
"Judge Learned Hand," p. 194.
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beliefs he contributed to his image. He perceived himself to 
be a skeptic faced with the inevitable uncertainties of life. 
Blessed with humility, he demanded caution of himself in the 
use of self-possessed authority. Beliefs which professed the 
worth of the individual, the temporariness of answers to life's 
problems, the virtues of doubt, caution, and skepticism, and 
"the spirit of liberty which is not too sure that it is right" 
came forth from the Man to shape his image.
Learned Hand's contemporaries saw him as both a "think­
ing" and as a "gregarious" man. They respected him for his 
pursuit of the truth, for his tolerance, for his human quali­
ties and his understanding of human nature, for his discontent 
withvdogmas, for his respect for freedom, and for his high 
ethical standards. Independent of those other traits which 
brought him eminence as a judge, these attributes of the Man's 
character made him a rare human being. However, Hand, although 
constituted of such solid qualities, was not without memorable 
escapades and eccentricities which enlivened and added vigor 
to the sterner stuff of which he was made.
Francis Biddle, lawyer, author, and former United 
States Attorney General, has summarized Learned Hand with viv­
idness, rare insight, and devotion. Such perception makes the 
following a fitting conclusion to an understanding of the Man:
Learned Hand was endowed with so many talents of heart 
and mind that it is difficult to choose those which were 
most characteristically his. First of all it must be said 
that he was thoroughly normal in his gusto for living, 
excellently balanced. As a skeptic he discarded the com­
forting magic of absolutes, and stood alone facing the
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adventures of life, while he felt its mysticism and 
asserted its values. Like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
whom he greatly admired, he was never cynical, because 
life without values seemed to him intolerable. He did 
not believe that his values were eternal, but they were 
his— courage, a sense of humor that kept things relative, 
the spirit of liberty which "is not sure that it is right," 
and seeks to understand the lives of others. Above all he 
was tolerant. Yet his tolerance never touched indiffer­
ence, and he was passionate in his beliefs as well as his 
feelings. I shall never forget what he said at a meeting 
of the Law Institute in Washington in May, 1941, putting 
aside his prepared address, trying to make us realize what 
the fall of France meant to civilization with an eloquence 
that made us ashamed that we had not felt as deeply about 
it as he felt.
To Learned Hand his friends were dear, and they felt 
his love. He was gay, and could be very funny. He was 
more companionable, more sharing than anyone I k n e w . 80
pA
"Learned Hand," New Republic, CVL (September 11,
1961), 5.
CHAPTER III 
HAND— THE JUDGE 
Introduction
Learned Hand's image as a man only partly fills the 
once "nearly empty vessel." An understanding of Judge Hand's 
career on the bench and the image which he created and which 
contemporaries attributed to him both as a deliberative, con­
scientious judge and as a judge who freely deviated from the 
staid expectations of judicial performance further contributes 
to filling the "vessel." Consequently this chapter looks first 
at Judge Hand's judicial career and then considers those per­
sonal and contemporary contributions to the image of the Judge.
A Career on the Bench 
A crucial period in the development of American law 
coincided with Judge Hand's illustrious career on the federal 
bench. That one was the sole cause of the other would be a 
conclusion unsubstantiated in fact. That each contributed to 
the other seems a certainty. The developing law undoubtedly 
benefited from having a judge of Hand's caliber to guide its 
growth and progress. Judge Hand's opportunity to attain emi­
nence on the bench undoubtedly benefited from a developing
48
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legal system which provided those necessary opportunities for 
the Judge to grow and progress.
The Anglo-American legal tradition has had few judges
equal to Learned Hand. His long judicial career which spanned
fifty-two years culminated in tribute that proclaimed him to
be "preeminently the judge's j u d g e . O f  Judge Hand's more
than two thousand opinions, some became models for law school
instruction, some made him known as a leading liberal, and some
built his reputation as a master of the English language. "His
incisive opinions, clear and eloquent, contributed much to the
2
country's law heritage." Nevertheless, his opinions and 
public utterances still defy the key by which one can classify 
Judge Hand. "He belongs to no school of jurisprudence; he is 
old-fashioned enough to believe in legal principles and modern 
enough to recognize as a fact the creative activity of the 
judiciary in moulding the law to fit new circumstances and in 
shaping its growth in accordance with the drive and movement 
of the t i m e s . T o  understand better how Judge Hand "moulded 
the law" and "shaped its growth" the following considers from 
appointment to retirement his service on federal courts and 
the breadth and depth of his opinions.
^Robert Samuel Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence and Polit­
ical Thought of Learned Hand" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
Dept, of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1954), 
p. 32.
2
New York Times. August 19, 1961, p. 1.
^Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence . . .," p. 33.
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The Bench Yields Up Its Star
With President William Howard Taft's appointment of 
Learned Hand as a district judge for the Southern District of 
New York, Judge Hand's career on the bench began. The American 
Bar Association Journal recalls that as a district judge 
"struggling with the great volume of irun-of«-mine work which 
afflicts such a judge, he was vastly industrious, fearless, 
painstakingly fair, and skilful in dispatch of business."^ He 
garnered respect and confidence from practitioners in various 
specialties of the law. Charles C. Burlingham contends, how­
ever, that Judge Hand's "fifteen years on the district bench 
brought him slight satisfaction. Twice a junior in service 
was preferred to him and promoted to the circuit court of 
appeals."^ Nothing auspicious had yet occurred in his career. 
However, "when in 1924 President Coolidge made him a circuit 
judge, he came into his own, for in the conferences of the 
appellate court there was discussion and a clash of minds.
For this Judge Hand was well suited. On the circuit court he 
handed down decisions for thirty-seven years. His prestige 
increased virtually with each case and each year of service. 
However, elevation to the circuit court ended his advancement.
^"Learned Hand; Senior Circuit Judge— Second Circuit," 
XXXIII (September, 1947), 870.
^"Judge Learned Hand," Harvard Law Review. LX (Febru­
ary, 1947), 331.
^Ibid.
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Promotion to the next and the highest echelon of federal judi­
cial service, the Supreme Court, exceeded his destiny.
Judge Hand's failure to be elevated to the Supreme 
Court, the zenith in accomplishment for an American jurist, 
remains unexplained even after his death. How could he with 
his ability have missed appointment to this judicial citadel?
The reasons offered are almost as numerous as those who qualify 
to speculate. Judge Charles E. Wyzanski sums up the specula­
tion, all or most of which together may have tolled Hand's 
fate:
Luck, says Justice Frankfurter. Political distrust, say 
the die-hards who crushed the Progressive wing of the 
Republican Party. Geographical accident say those who 
recall that Hughes, Stone, and Cardozo, all from New York, 
sat in Washington when Hand was ripe for appointment. When 
two of them had gone, F.D.R., mindful of his specious argu­
ment at the time of the court-packing bill, felt compelled 
to conclude that "B [Hand] has just the right intellectual 
age; can't you do anything about his chronological age?"
That was an insurmountable question.7
Justice Holmes, says Felix Frankfurter, believed that Hand's
proper place, even while he was still a district judge, was in
Washington. Frankfurter further claims that he spent not a
little part of his life promoting that end. However, he now
insists "with deep conviction that he [Hand] was lucky in not
0
having won out in that strange lottery." Frankfurter ration­
alizes that
to bemoan that the turn of the wheel did not put him on
the Supreme Court grossly underestimates what he accomplished
^"Learned Hand," Atlantic. CCVIII (December, 1961), 57-58.
®"Tribute to Learned Hand," Reporter, XX (April 30,
1959), 4.
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off it. . . . It is extremely doubtful whether on the 
Supreme Court, with its confined area of litigation, he 
would have influenced the course of law in its widest 
reaches as much as he did from the Second Circuit and 
through the Law Institute. In this regard and others, 
he would have found himself much more circumscribed on 
the Supreme Court than where he was. . . .  In any event 
it is a fact that in his later years he was not only 
reconciled to have missed the place natural for him but 
came to believe that the Fates were wiser in this disposi­
tion of him than he had at one time desired for himself.
Be this as it may, one thing is indubitably clear. Learned 
Hand's career vindicates a standard of excellence applied 
in performance that evokes universal esteem unconfused by 
show of place.9
Wyzanski is not as certain as Frankfurter that Hand satisfac­
torily reconciled his permanent relegation to the circuit 
court. "Some felt," reports Wyzanski, "that, while Learned 
Hand outwardly accepted his situation with calm, 'the trophy 
of Miltiades would not let him sleep. ' Nevertheless, "to
most American jurists, and to the legal profession that over 
the years expressed amazement that he had never thus been 
rewarded. Judge Hand remained 'the tenth Justice of the Supreme 
Court.'
Having completed forty-two years of devotion to hard 
work on the federal bench and possessed with the feeling he 
had "hammered out as compact and solid a piece of work as one 
can," Judge Hand requested retirement. On May 15, 1951, he 
wrote the following letter to President Harry S. Truman:
Q
"Learned Hand," Harvard Law Review, LXXV (November,
1961), 4.
"Learned Hand,"p. 58.
11New York Times. August 19, 1961, p. 17.
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Having attained the age of more than seventy years, 
and having served as United States Circuit Judge for the 
Second Circuit for more than ten years continuously, I 
wish to avail myself, and do hereby avail myself, of the 
privilege granted me by section 371 of Title 28 of the 
United States Code "to retain" my "office but retire from 
regular active service." My retirement will take effect 
on June first, 1951.12
On May 23, 1951, the President responded from the White House;
Your impending retirement fills me with regret, which 
I know is shared by the American people. It is hard to 
accept the fact that, after forty-two years of most distin­
guished service to our Nation, your activities are now to 
be narrowed.
It is always difficult for me to express a sentiment 
of deep regret; what makes my present task so overwhelming 
is the compulsion I feel to attempt, on behalf of the 
American people, to give in words some inkling of the place 
you have held and will always hold in the life and spirit 
of our country.
Your profession has long since recognized the magnitude 
of your contribution to the law. There has never been any 
question about your pre-eminent place among American ju­
rists— indeed among the nations of the world. In your 
writings, in your day to day work for almost half a cen­
tury, you have added purpose and hope to man's quest for 
justice through the process of law.
As judge and philosopher, you have expressed the spirit 
of America and the highest in civilization which man has 
achieved. America, and the American people, are the richer 
because of the vigor and fullness of your contribution to 
our way of life.
We are compensated in part by the fact that you are 
casting off only a part of the burdens which you have born 
for us these many years, and by our knowledge that you will 
continue actively to influence our life and society for 
years to come. May you enjoy many happy years of retire­
ment, secure in the knowledge that no man, whatever his 
walk of life, has ever been more deserving of the admira­
tion and gratitude of his country, and, indeed of the 
entire free world.13
Judge Hand's technical retirement after forty-two years 
on the bench initiated other tributes to his mind, spirit, and
12In Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, ed. Irving 
Dilliard (New York: Vintage Books Inc., 1959), p. xxi.
13Ibid., pp. xxi-xxii.
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overall competence. One such tribute, undoubtedly one of the 
greatest ever paid to an American jurist, occurred on April 10, 
1959, in recognition of his fiftieth year on the federal bench. 
Judges, justices of the Supreme Court, government officials, 
and lawyers from across the country gathered in the Federal 
Court House in New York City to honor Judge Hand. The follow­
ing year President Eisenhower paid tribute to Judge Hand by 
appointing him to the President's Commission on National Goals. 
The letter transmitting the report of the commission cited 
Hand for his "wisdom and cooperative temper [which] made his 
participation extremely v a l u a b l e . S t i l l  other tributes 
came his way. The New York State Bar Association and the 
Council of the Harvard Law School Association recognized Judge 
Hand for distinguished service. In the same year, 1960, he 
was a recipient of the Great Living American Award of the 
United States Chamber of Commerce. Indeed, the bench had 
"yielded up its star." In typically modest tones the "star" 
described his work as a judge: "'HumphJ' he said. 'I'm not
a scholar at all. I've spent a lifetime of utter drudgery, 
shoveling smoke. . . . ' Whether the career embraced "utter
drudgery" or devoted enthusiastic participation, and the con­
sequence was "shoveled smoke" or lasting contributions to our 
civilization, the career of Judge Hand was neither unrecognized 
nor unrewarded.
^^In New York Times, August 19, 1961, p. 17.
^^In Ernest Haveman, "On a Great Judge's Death: A 
Moving Memoir," Life. LI (August 25, 1961), 38.
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The Ablest Court
Few men had the opportunity to study the panorama of 
American life more intimately or longer than Judge Hand. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals (C.A.2) afforded the Judge the 
preponderance of occasions for this opportunity. C.A.2, cre­
ated in 1891 to relieve the Supreme Court of an overload of 
appeals cases, has been praised by various critics. In 1951, 
the year of Hand's retirement. Professor John P. Frank of the 
Yale Law School declared of the court in which Judge Hand 
vested his talents: "Were courts rated like baseball teams,
no expert in judging could be found to rank the Supreme Court 
first, if only because of the number of rookies on its nine.
And while at least four federal courts of appeals have claims 
to great distinction, most expert judges would choose the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit as the ablest court in the 
U.S."iG
In 1957, Philip B. Kurland, a University of Chicago 
law professor, spoke of C.A.2 as "a strangely magnificent court 
dedicated to administer justice under the law." He described 
the court by recalling that:
Once upon a time, but not so long ago, there was a 
great appellate court in this country. It sat not in 
Washington but in New York. Its senior member was Judge 
Learned Hand. . . . The court was called "the Second 
Circuit."
The Second Circuit was a strange court. Every member 
of the court respected every other member of the court. 
Although disagreements in judgments were frequent, none
^^"The Top U.S. Commercial Court," Fortune. XLIII 
(January, 1951), 92.
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accused another of treachery to a cause, intellectual 
dishonesty, chicanery or venality. None was jealous to 
occupy the middle chair, nor ambitious for high political 
office, nor eager to lead the whole. If some were hopeful 
for appointment to the Supreme Court, the chosen path was 
by proof of capacity to fill the post and not by appeal to 
the electorate through the instrument of judicial opinions 
or public speeches. . . .  Of the judges of this Second 
Circuit, vintage 1941-1951, some were wise, and, at times, 
some were foolish. But they all measured up to a high 
standard of judicial capacity and they were all dedicated 
to the job which each had undertaken to perform: to admin­
ister justice under law. It was indeed a strange court, 
and we are not likely to see its equal for many a year.17
Both Learned and his cousin, Augustus, served together
on C.A.2. Other judges sometimes facetiously referred to them
18as "the right hand and the left hand." But judges and lawyers
alike respected and admired them both as men of "strong charac-
19ter, wide knowledge and utmost integrity." Frank calls the
Hand team the "pride of the C.A.2" and believes that each drew
qualities from the other. "Learned may be a little quicker on
ideas and more effective in expression. Augustus helps keep
20the family's feet on the ground." As Burlingham puts the 
matter: "Learned [was] brilliant and speculative— Augustus
wise and unwavering. With their associates they made the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit . . . the best
21court in the United States."
"Jerome N. Frank: Some Reflections and Recollections
of a Law Clerk," University of Chicago Law Review, XXIV (Sum­
mer, 1957), 661.
^®New York Times, August 19, 1961, p. 17. ^^Ibid.
20
"The Top U.S. Commercial Court," p. 110.
^^"Judge Learned Hand," p. 331.
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C.A.2 reviews district courts within its jurisdiction.
The district courts in turn attempt to decide cases as they
believe C.A.2 would decide them. Since only a few cases go
up on appeal to C.A.2, the leadership offered by this or any
other circuit court to the courts below is a function of prime
importance. When Judge Hand became chief judge of C.A.2 in
1939, "by his character and leadership he quickly restored the
confidence of the bar and the public in the integrity of the
administration of federal justice in this circuit," thus con-
22tributing measurably to making C.A.2 the "ablest court."
Breadth and Depth in Hand's Decisions 
Judge Hand's more than two thousand federal court opin­
ions span an extensive range of subjects. "In every legal 
province— contracts, torts, equity, conflict of laws, criminal 
law, evidence, admiralty, patents, copyrights, trade-names, 
taxation, statutory interpretation— he has shaped or reshaped
the important doctrines. Everywhere in the judicial domain
23you can trace his handiwork." An interesting consequence 
of his longevity on the bench and the breadth and depth of his 
decisions was that when he obeyed certain Supreme Court deci­
sions he was actually supporting decisions "based on rules of 
his m a k i n g . M o r e  often than those of any other jurist, the
22 "Remarks of J. Edward Lumbard, Chief Judge, at the 
Opening of the Term of the Court of Appeals— September 25,
1951," New York State Bar Journal, XXXIII (December, 1961),
410.
^^Frank, "Some Reflections . . .," p. 681. ^^Ibid.
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25Supreme Court quoted Judge Hand's opinions. Thus, "when he
whistles a Supreme Court tune, frequently it is really his own.
26Even the English House of Lords has been known to follow him."
Cases of consequence
Judge Hand fought for civil liberties and against
monopolies. Particularly in these two areas the impact of
his decisions in behalf of great causes placed him in the
center of public attention.
When during World War I the Postmaster General banned
from the mails a pro-Bolshevik magazine. The Masses, for
attempting to interfere with operation of the military. Judge
Hand found for the magazine because suppression of the press
"is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political
agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free govern- 
27ment." Many people when they think of Judge Hand also remem­
ber him as the judge who upheld conviction of certain Communist 
leaders under the Smith Act for "wilfully conspiring to teach
and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the government
28by force and violence." Jerome Frank says of this decision 
which involved the limits of free speech: Hand "believed that
the courts should never treat non-procedural provisions of the
^^New York Times, August 19, 1961, p. 17.
^^Frank, "Some Reflections . . .," p. 681.
27Masses Publishing Company v. Patten, 244 F.(2d) 533
(1917)
Dennis v. United States. 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
^^United States v. Dennis, 183 F.(2d) 201 (1950);
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Bill of Rights as judicially enforcible commands. Possessed
of that belief, it was pretty much a foregone conclusion that,
if he possibly could, he would sustain the constitutionality
of any federal statute interfering with free speech, no matter
29how undesirable he thought that interference."
As a trust buster Judge Hand found monopolies in the
Corn Products Company case,^^ the Associated Press case,^^ and
3 2the Aluminum Company of America case. The influence of these 
decisions on the history of anti-trust law has been considera­
ble.
Less frequently recognized as the work of Judge Hand
but still of considerable consequence was one of the most
influential cases in the tax field. In this 1934 case, Helyer-
inq y. Gregory. Hand held that "any one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury;
33there is not eyen a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." 
"With courtesy and good humor. Hand later fought a battle 
against the Supreme Court in a series of decisions that so
OQ
"Some Reflections . . .," pp. 594-695.
964 (1916).
^^United States
(1943).
^^United States
F.(2d) 416 (1945)
^^69F.(2d) 809,810 (1934).
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dramatized what he regarded as the higher body's tax errors 
that Congress changed the law to accord with his views.
Judge Hand's opinions were not always fraught with 
immeasurable consequence. When a lower court refused citizen­
ship to a woman because of her allegedly bad moral character, 
he reversed the refusal and ruled: "A continued illicit rela­
tionship is not inevitably an index of bad moral character.
A person may have good moral character even though he has been 
delinquent upon occasion in the past; it is enough if he shows
that he does not transgress the accepted moral canons more
3 5often than usual." In yet another citizenship case, handed
down in 1961, Judge Hand wrote the opinion unanimously agreed
on by C.A.2 "that ignoring parking tickets was not a serious
3 6enough offense to bar a man from citizenship."
Thus, Judge Hand utilized his penetrating insight, 
shrewd intellect, and exhaustive experience on cases involving 
civil liberties, monopolies, taxes, citizenship, and those from 
a host of other areas. All served to enlarge the legal uni­
verse .
The Judge's criminal law cases
Inevitably a half century on the federal bench exposed 
Judge Hand to numerous criminal cases requiring disposition.
^^Frank, "The Top U.S. Commercial Court," p. 96.
^^In New York Times. August 19, 1961, p. 17.
^^Ibid.
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More than one hundred alleged violations of the criminal law 
resulted in opinions written by him. Concurrent with the 
handing down of these decisions the philosophy of criminal law 
relative to procedural rules for prosecution and punishment 
changed markedly. The Criminal Code had just been enacted 
when Hand received his initial appointment to the federal 
district court in 1909. The expansion of federal criminal 
jurisdiction which was to continue throughout Judge Hand's 
tenure had just begun. "New and speedier methods of communi­
cation and transportation rendered imperative the passage of 
federal law tailored to combat a new type of crime and a new 
type of criminal. In the work of adapting the old and cumber­
some rules of procedure to the needs of a faster and more effi-
3 7cient age. Judge Hand played an important part." Not only 
did he improve upon archaic procedural rules but he also influ­
enced interpretation and advancement of the substantive law 
of federal crimes.
Primarily through his judicial opinions the Judge
38exercised his influence. These opinions in such diverse
substantive areas as narcotics, espionage, treason, mail fraud,
and price control invaded virtually every aspect of criminal
law. In United States v. Rosenberg. Judge Hand upheld the
39constitutionality of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Law. He 
3 7Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence . . . p. 273.
38Orrin G. Judd, "Judge Learned Hand and the Criminal 
Law," Harvard Law Review, LX (February, 1947), 405.
^^251 F. 963 (1918).
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sustained an indictment under the Espionage Act of 1917 in
United States v. Nearing. T h e  requisite two witnesses to an
act of treason not being present he directed a verdict for the
41defendant in a 1919 treason trial. As a protector of the
gullible he supported the mail-fraud statute; and as federal
jurisdiction expanded to encompass new crimes. Judge Hand
actively administered new laws such as the World War II
Emergency Price Control Act.^^
The varied procedural aspects on which Judge Hand's
criminal decisions touched can be considered in six groups;
sufficiency of indictments, harmless error, search and seizure,
43evidence, contempt, and juries.
Sufficiency of indictments
The first three reported criminal cases with Judge 
Hand presiding involved attacks upon indictments. These 
attacks provided the defendant with an opportunity to take
advantage of technical errors in the wording of the indict­
ments.^^ Overruling demurrers in these cases. Judge Hand 
clearly demonstrated that he would not tolerate insubstantial
4°252 F. 223 (1918).
^^United States v. Robinson, 259 F. 685 (1919). 
^^United States v. Arrow Packing Co.. 153 F.(2d) 669
^^Judd, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," pp. 406-417.
^^United States v. White et al., 171 F. 775 (1909); 
United States v. Franklin, 174 F. 161 (1909); United States v. 
Franklin. 174 F. 163 (1909).
(1946)
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defenses. He pursued this point in later cases persistently 
resisting defense counsel attacks on indictments by regarding 
the attacks as demands for needless formalism.
Harmless error
Although some appellate judges interpreted harmless 
errors (those which do not effect the substantial rights of 
litigants) as impediments which justified reversal for mere 
technicalities. Judge Hand was not so inclined. Orrin Judd, 
author, lawyer, and former law clerk to the Judge, believes 
that Hand "brought to the appellate court the same emphasis 
on reasonableness and fair play rather than legalism that 
characterized his decisions on demurrers to indictments as 
a district j u d g e . H i s  awareness of harmless errors avoided 
that interference by appellate courts which he believed "would 
weaken the responsibility of trial judges.
Search and seizure
Any violation of Constitutional rights turned Judge 
Hand into a protector of defendant's interests. United States 
V. Kirschenblatt. one of his most frequently cited criminal 
law opinions, involved documents seized by authorities in
^^United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (1913); United
States V. Rosenbercf, 251 F. 963 (1918) ; United States v. Near­
ing et al., 252 F. 223 (1918); United States v. Garsson et al.,
291 F. 646 (1923).
"Judge Learned Hand . . . , " p. 408.
47ibid.
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48connection with a lawful warrant and arrest. But Hand held 
that the Fourth Amendment limits the power to search to the 
"tools and fruits of the crime." The Constitutional protection 
extended, according to the Judge, to indiscriminate ransacking 
of the defendant's house and rummaging among his papers. 
Lancaster declares that opinions such as the Kirschenblatt case 
demonstrate that the Judge understood "the history behind the 
Fourth Amendment" and sought "to realize those historic values 
in his judicial life."^^
While Judge Hand exhibits his characteristic judicial 
balance in handling cases under the Fourth Amendment, a 
study of his opinions indicates that in weighing the social 
interest in preventing crimes and apprehending criminals 
against the social interest in preserving rights to privacy 
and immunity from police intrusion, rights to privacy often 
tip the beam. It is clear, too, that he understands that 
the historical background of the Amendment affords the key
to its interpretation.50
Evidence
Judge Hand was a protector of the privilege which frees 
one from testifying against himself. In United States v. 
Andolschek he contended that one need not claim such a privi­
lege.^^ Demonstrating a belief in "fair play," in the 
Andolschek case. Judge Hand also denied to the government the
right to claim official reports as privileged when basing pros-
52ecution on a transaction related to the reports.
4Gl6 F.(2d) 202 (1926).
^^Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence . . .," p. 145.
^°Ibid.. p. 122. ^^142 F.(2d) 503 (1944).
^^Ibid.. p. 506.
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In particular, one of the Judge's decisions on the 
admissibility of evidence provoked extended law-review debate. 
In Pi Carlo v. United States a witness, challenged for bias, 
made prior, consistent statements which Hand allowed to be
53admitted subject to the jury's assessment of their weight.
The controversy then ensued.
Contempt
Judge Hand pioneered the application of the doctrine 
of criminal contempt to evasive answers which block inquiry.
In United States v. Appel he set forth his position:
The rule, I think, ought to be this: If the witness' 
conduct shows beyond any doubt whatever that he is refusing 
to tell what he knows, he is in contempt of court. That 
conduct is, of course, beyond question when he flatly 
refuses to answer, but it may appear in other ways. . . .
If a court is to have any power at all to compel an answer, 
it must surely have power to compel an answer which is not 
given to fob off inquiry. Nevertheless, this power must 
not be used to punish perjury, and the only proper test is 
whether on its mere face, and without inquiry collaterally, 
the testimony is not a bona fide effort to answer the 
questions at a l l . 5 4
Juries
Judge Hand displayed confidence in the jury system.
"His refusal to reverse for insubstantial error can be traced 
in part to a confidence in the jury's ability to reach a fair 
decision on the merits, without being led astray by incomplete 
evidence or inconsistencies in the judge's c h a r g e . I n
^^6 F.(2d) 364 (1925). ^^211 F. 495,495-496 (1913).
^^Judd, "Judge Learned Hand," p. 415.
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United States v. Strewl the Judge placed the jury system in the
legal scheme: "Trial by jury, certainly for the graver crimes,
has a high place in our traditions; around it cluster many
memories of freedom won at large cost; its surrender is not
to be lightly imputed to the accused.
Orrin Judd contends that "Learned Hand has been a
'strong' judge in criminal cases, and his opinions have fre-
5 7quently been 'strong' medicine." What made him "strong" and
what gave his opinions this imputed "strength"? Perhaps, at
least a partial explanation lies in the combined explanations
of Judge Wyzanski, law professor Seymour, and attorney Judd.
Judge Hand, according to Wyzanski, brought to criminal law
a mind informed by experience, deepened by erudition, and 
sensitized by awareness of the struggle for liberty. . . . 
When a plainly guilty man had had a fair trial. Hand was 
not quick to discover error. Even when he cared little for 
a particular prohibition or penalty, he did not evade the 
law's mandate. Yet he was no friend of barbaric police or 
ruthless prosecutors. The squalid huckster whose Constitu­
tional rights had been violated had no better guardian.
Seymour sees in Hand "a deep concern for justice according to
the rules . . . [as] the thread that unites all his opinions.
In criminal cases, he has avoided sentimentality over those who
are convicted, but has insisted that they be fairly tried.
Judd concludes the reaction of the three by claiming that
SGgg F.(2d) 474,478 (1938).
^^Judd, "Judge Learned Hand," p. 410.
^^"Learned Hand," p. 55.
^^Whitney North Seymour, "Tribute to the 'Old Chief' 
of the Bench," New York Times Magazine (April 5, 1959), p. 17.
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Judge Hand is neither a "hanging judge" nor a "defendant's 
judge." He has provided, not a one-sided approach to the 
criminal law, but a wise and impartial judgment which 
balances the public interest in prompt and efficient pros­
ecution with the individual interest (which is not without 
its social importance) of each defendant in a fair trial. 
During the important period in federal criminal law which 
has marked his service on the bench, he has made a major 
contribution toward making the law an effective instrument 
of justice.60
Creation of an Imacre
Judge Learned Hand felt deeply about his decision­
making responsibility. Publication of the opinion did not 
necessarily end his anxiety over a case. Expressed uncertainty 
before rendering an opinion did not become for him assuredness 
once he uttered the opinion. "I have known him to brood dis­
quietly over decisions he rendered several years earlier," 
recalls Jerome F r a n k . O n c e ,  distraught about a decision, he 
told his law clerk; "Now when I die you can perform an autopsy 
on my body. When you get to my heart you will see a scar, and
if you lift that scar you will find underneath the words 'Hatch 
6 2
V. Morosco.'" Not only did Judge Hand feel deeply about his 
immediate responsibility, but he also felt deeply about those 
many ingredients which constitute the judicial process. He 
deliberated about the nature of law, the responsibilities of 
the legal profession, and the traits of the judge. These
^^Judd, "Judge Learned Hand," p. 422.
^^"Some Reflections . . .," p. 670.
^^In Herman Finkelstein, "A Memoir of Judge Learned 
Hand (1872-1961)," Bulletin of the Copyright Society of the 
U.S.A., IX (October, 1961), 3.
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contributions to his image, espoused by the Judge, pervade his 
writings, public utterances, and judicial opinions. The char­
acteristics of the Judge in court and in preparing his opinions 
complement the image of the "deliberating" Judge as seen at 
work by those near him. Other contemporaries, not necessarily 
closely associated with the Judge, contributed to his image 
from their vantage points as members of the bench, bar, and 
general public. Not all spoke consistently of him solely as 
a "deliberating" judge. In fact some of these same critics 
saw him as a fun-loving, witty, companionable creature who 
would deviate on occasion from his deliberative qualities, 
swerve a little left or right of that narrow norm ascribed to 
judges, and show that he was not afraid to be a wholly human 
individual. Thus, as a "deliberating" and as a "deviating" 
judge, both Learned Hand and the contemporaries who knew and 
sought to understand him contributed to the image of the Judge.
The Deliberating Judge
Contributions from the Judge
Learned Hand during his lifetime wrote no formal trea­
tise on the purpose and function of law, the responsibilities 
of the profession, or the inherently necessary qualities for 
judgeship. Though not a legal theorist or philosopher, his 
essays, speeches, and legal opinions contain the image-building 
contributions which he left behind. His characteristics at 
work, preserved by those who knew him intimately, provide the 
remainder of his personal contributions.
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Hand on the nature of law
Because Judge Hand did not write a definitive treatise 
on the law does not mean that he did not possess definite deep- 
felt ideas about the nature of the legal process. "Many stu­
dents of Judge Hand's work feel that his public addresses and 
articles in law journals have been among his greatest contri­
butions. In them he has given expression to some of his deep­
est feelings on law. . . . One such public address, which
Judge Hand presented over the C.B.S. radio network, dealt 
specifically with the nature of law;
Law does not mean then whatever people usually do, or 
even what they think to be right. Certainly it does not 
mean what only the most enlightened individuals usually 
do or think right. It is the conduct which the government 
. . . will compel individuals to conform to. . . . If this 
is true, there must be some way to learn what is this con­
duct. The law is the command of the government, and it 
must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced 
at all.
The only way in which its will can be put is in words, 
and in modern and civilized societies these are always 
written. They are in the form of statutes enacted formal­
ly, or they are in books which report what has been decided 
before by judges whom the government gave power to decide.64
Sometime later at a Boston gathering the Judge expanded
on his conception of law, this time referring to the respect
men feel for that customary law imbedded in their nature.
We accept the verdict of the past until the need for change 
cries out loudly enough to force upon us a choice between 
the comforts of further inertia and the irksomeness of 
action. Through the openings given by that disposition,
^^Philip Hamburger, "The Great Judge," Life, XXI 
(November 4, 1946), 126.
^^"How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision," 
in The Spirit of Libertv. pp. 80-81.
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the common law has been fabricated bit by bit without 
express assent and under the ministrations of those who 
have always protested that, like the Bourbons, they learn 
nothing and forget nothing.65
Just as Judge Hand possessed a conception of the law he also
understood those conditions indispensable to applying the law
to the pursuit of justice:
The law must have an authority supreme over the will of 
the individual, , . . Thus, the law surpasses the deliv­
erances of even the most exalted of its prophets; the 
momentum of its composite will alone makes it effective 
to coerce the individual. . . .  It [the law] must be 
content to lag behind the best inspiration of its time 
until it feels behind it the weight of such general accept­
ance as will give sanction to its pretension to unques­
tioned dictation. Yet with this piety must go a taste 
for courageous experiment, by which alone the law has been 
built as we have it, an indubitable structure, organic and
living.66
But, the Judge cautioned about the application of these con­
cepts to attain justice: "Justice, I think is the tolerable
accommodation of conflicting interests of society . . . and I
don't believe there is any royal road to attain such accommo­
dations concretely.
Judge Hand's notions on the nature of law insofar as 
law is "the command of the government" included an outspoken 
belief about the proper role of the courts when enforcing the 
Bill of Rights. With deep conviction the Judge believed that 
judicial review, the power of the courts to declare statutes
^^"The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to 
Civilization," in The Spirit of Liberty, p. 120.
p. 12.
"The Speech of Justice," in The Spirit of Liberty,
^^In Hamburger, "The Great Judge," pp. 122-123,
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unconstitutional, should be exercised with great restraint and 
then only on the rarest of occasions. From the days of his 
endorsement of Bull Moose philosophy, which included the recall 
of judicial decisions, throughout his career on the federal 
bench, "he held to his traditional position . . . criticizing 
the Supreme Court for exercising what he regarded as too broad 
a supervision over legislative decisions, functioning in effect 
as a 'third legislative chamber.' For the courts to pass on 
the merits of legislation, he asserted, is a 'patent usurpa­
tion' of p o w e r . T h e  1954 Supreme Court decision outlawing 
school segregation exemplified the judicial review he opposed. 
Only once did he hold unconstitutional a federal statute not 
involving p r o c e d u r e . E v e n  then Supreme Court decisions, not 
personal conviction, apparently controlled his decision.
To Judge Hand the law was a living organism. Written 
words, he believed, in the form of statutes or court reports 
constituted the ascertainable command of the government. The 
merits of legislative compromise gave a virtue to legislative 
supremacy which obligated the courts to discover legislative 
intent rather than to legislate judicially and become a "third 
legislative chamber." The Judge saw the importance of popular 
support for the law but refused to ignore the necessity for
^®New York Times, August 19, 1961, p. 17. ^^Ibid.
^^United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation. 
76 F.(2d) 617 (1935) .
^^Frank, "Some Reflections . . .," p. 690.
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"courageous experiment." Accordingly, he refused to subscribe 
the law to legal dogmas parading as eternal absolutes. "To 
him the law is an instrument for the solution of legal contro­
versies in accordance with certain principles of procedure and 
substance which the profession has developed over the course
72of a long period of time for the achievement of social order."
Hand on the responsibilities of the legal profession
Judge Hand warned the legal profession what each mem­
ber must feel and do if respect and growth were to result. He 
assessed the responsibility solely to the profession and in­
sisted that the present caretakers as guardians of a cherished 
legal system must pass this heritage on to the future with 
reverence and pride. Hand said:
When our lights burn low, when we seem to stand futile 
and without meaning, used up in the senseless strife of 
interest and passion, concerned with nothing better than 
to get for others what perhaps they should not have, let 
us look up to the great edifice which our forebears have 
built, of which we are now the guardians and the crafts­
men. Though severally we may perhaps be paltry and 
inconsequent, for the present it is we who are charged 
with its maintenance and growth. Descended to us, in some 
sort moulded by our hands, passed on to the future with 
reverence and with pride, we at once its servants and its 
masters, renew our fealty to the L a w . 73
For the lawyer to protect his public esteem and avoid 
degeneration in the eyes of a disrespectful society Judge Hand 
charged the profession with the responsibility to understand
72Lancaster, "The Jurisprudence . . .," p. 308.
p. 69.
"To Yale Law Graduates," in The Spirit of Liberty,
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the social will.^^ "The profession of the law," avowed Hand,
"is charged with the articulation and final incidence of the 
successive efforts toward justice; it must feel the circulation 
of the communal blood or it will wither and drop off, a useless 
member.
The Judge believed that the legal profession was the
determiner of its own fate, a fate the attainment of which
requires that the profession
continue to represent a larger, more varied social will 
by a broader, more comprehensive interpretation. The 
change must come from within; the profession must satisfy 
its community by becoming itself satisfied with the com­
munity. It must assimilate society before society will 
assimilate it; it must become organic to remain a living 
organ. No political mechanism designed to accomplish this 
by fear will succeed, if the inward disloyalty of purpose 
remain. The lawyer must either learn to live more capa­
ciously or be content to find himself continuously less 
trusted, more circumscribed, till he becomes hardly more 
important than a minor administrator, confined to a monot­
onous round of record and routine, without dignity, inspir­
ation, or respect. There can be no ambiguity in the answer 
of those who are worthy of the traditions and the power of 
a noble c a l l i n g . 76
Thus, Judge Hand reasoned that without grasping and 
adjusting to the social will the prestige of the lawyer is in 
jeopardy for the consequence is espousal of shallow scholasti­
cism which society will value accordingly.
Hand on the traits of the judge
Long service on the federal bench well prepared Judge 
Hand to discuss the judge's traits. If not through philosophical
p. 14.
^^"The Speech of Justice," in The Spirit of Liberty. 
^^Ibid.. pp. 11-12. ^^Ibid.. p. 15.
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precept, at least through experience he qualified himself to 
be heard on the subject:
What the judge is. Judge Hand was frank, outspoken, 
and perhaps prone to over-generalize about those character­
istics which describe the judge. Hand claimed:
Individually, we are diffident, pious, occupied, preju­
diced, averse to ideas and reasoning, and suspicious of 
change. We must be won by some honorific apparatus, by 
the conversion of those among us whom the others hold in 
high repute. Once that is done, being human, we scruti­
nize, accept, espouse, and finally sanctify the new ideas. 
Last stage of all we persecute and ostracize critics among 
whom yesterday perhaps we were ourselves.77
The Judge drew upon his personal experience when he recalled
that
a judge's life, like every other, has in it much of drudg­
ery, senseless bickerings, stupid obstinacies, captious 
pettifogging, all disguising and obstructing the only 
sane purpose which can justify the whole endeavor. These 
take an inordinate part of his time; they harass and befog 
the unhappy wretch, and at times almost drive him from 
that bench where like any other workman he must do his 
work. If that were all, his life would be mere misery, 
and he a distracted arbiter between irreconcilable ex­
tremes. But there is something else that makes it— anyway 
to those curious creatures who persist in it— a delectable 
calling. For when the case is all in, and the turmoil 
stops, and after he is left alone, things begin to take 
form. From his pen or in his head, slowly or swiftly as 
his capacities admit, out of the murk the pattern emerges, 
his pattern, the expression of what he has seen and what 
he has therefor [sic] made, the impress of his self upon 
the not-self, upon the hitherto formless material of which 
he was once but a part and over which he has now become 
the master. That is a pleasure which nobody who has felt
it will be likely to u n d e r r a t e . 78
77 "Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the 
Teaching of Law," American Law School Review, V (March, 1926), 
629.
78"The Preservation of Personality," in The Spirit of
Liberty, p. 33.
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The judge comes from that part of the bar "which has
distinguished itself in the field of action," contended Hand.
Possessed of "strong will, set beliefs, and conventional ideals"
these men "are almost inevitably drawn from the propertied
class and share its assumptions" and blessings of equilibrium
79in preserving the long past of the law. However, Judge Hand
further explained that judges proceed to make those changes
which do not shock the inertia or existing prejudices of the
80time, going as far as their moral authority will allow. Also 
they must not shock existing expectations about "manners, acu­
men, and style," which he claimed, "count for much in a judge;
81far more than we are prepared to admit."
What the judge should be. Judge Hand recognized that
"men ask more than scholarship . . .  of a judge . . . for while
scholarship may clear the thickets it can build little. In the
end, and quite fairly, a judge will be estimated in terms of
82his outlook and nature." Wide reading and sensitive under­
standing combined with an outlook not conditioned by ignorance 
or class prejudice were his prescriptions to the judge. He 
indicated how such an "outlook and nature" might be achieved
^^"Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five," in The Spirit 
of Liberty, p. 19.
"Have the Bench and Bar . . .," p. 522.
p 1
"Thomas Walter Swan," Yale Law Journal, LVII 
(December, 1947), 170.
ft 9"Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five," in The Spirit 
of Liberty, p. 21.
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by a judge passing on questions of constitutional law. Other
questions are probably no less demanding. Hand said:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge 
called upon to pass on a question of constitutional law, 
to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and 
Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, 
Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne 
and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with 
the books which have been specifically written on the 
subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the 
spirit in which he approaches the question before him.
The works he must construe are empty vessels into which 
he can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather 
figs of thistles, nor supply institutions from judges whose 
outlook is limited by parish or class. They must be aware 
that there are before them more than verbal problems; more 
than final solutions cast in generalizations of universal 
applicability. They must be aware of the changing social 
tensions in every society which make it an organism; which 
demand new schemata of adaptation; which will disrupt it,
if rigidly confined.83
Just one year later the Judge told the Yale Law School 
graduates about the mental and moral qualities which contribute 
to the "outlook and nature" of the judge. In this address he 
proposed that a judge should be aware of the difficulty and 
the hazards of his duty; be hesitant in what he imputes to any 
law since its policy "may inhere as much in its limits as in 
its extent"; be capable of historically reconstructing the 
"setting which evoked the law; the contentions which it 
resolved; the objects which it sought; the events which led 
up to it"; be free in his mind and will from "those personal 
presuppositions and prejudices which almost inevitably invade
83 "Sources of Tolerance," in The Spirit of Liberty, 
p. 63. Justice Felix Frankfurter claims that although "Learned 
Hand has made these exactions for others . . . they are the 
best commentaries on his judicial labors." See "Judge Learned 
Hand," Harvard Law Review. LX (February, 1947), 328.
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all human judgments"; and be cautious to remain detached from
84preconceiving what the outcome of a proceeding should be.
What the judge should do. Judge Hand expressed special 
concern that a judge perform his work responsibly in two par­
ticular ways. When introducing innovation into the law and 
when working with words, he charged the judge with understand­
ing the importance of the function and exercising the caution 
essential to performing these judicial duties.
Reconciling the structure shaped by generations of 
judges with the changing needs of a heterogeneous society is 
a judicial task of major importance. Judge Hand urged that 
the judge "must preserve his authority by cloaking himself in 
the majesty of an overshadowing past; but he must discover some 
composition with the dominant trends of his time" or fail to
obtain "that tolerable continuity without which society dis-
8 ^solves." On one hand he argued for greater freedom for the 
judiciary to indulge in human convictions and on the other he 
demanded that the judge act with great self-restraint. But in 
the end Judge Hand showed confidence that judges satisfactorily 
accomplish a composition of the traditional old and the inno­
vated new when he said:
To compose inconsistencies, to unravel confusions, to 
announce unrecognized implications, to make, in Holmes' 
now hackneyed phrase, "interstitial" advances; these are
Q A
"Thomas Walter Swan," pp. 171-172.
p. 99.
®^"Mr. Justice Cardozo," in The Spirit of Liberty,
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the measure of what they may properly do, and there is not 
indeed much danger of their exceeding this limit; rather 
the contrary, for they are curiously timid about innova­
tions. A judge who will hector the bar and browbeat the 
witnesses and who can find a warrant in the Fourteenth 
Amendment for stifling a patently reasonable legislative 
experiment, will tremble at the thought of introducing a 
new exception into the hearsay rule. And . ; . in the end 
things work out very well as they are, for the advantage 
of leaving step by step amendments of the customary law 
in the hands of those trained in it, outweigh the dan­
gers .
Judge Hand believed that a satisfactory composition 
of the old and the new in law depends on the interpretation 
of words. He regarded the interpretation of words which may 
cover diverse unforeseen circumstances as the greatest part 
of a judge's work. These words, chosen from common speech by 
legislators and judges and without possibly being fitting for 
every contingency, must be interpreted to find out the will 
of their users, according to Hand. He speculated on how the 
judge proceeds:
Although at times he says and believes that he is not doing 
so, what he really does is to take the language before him, 
whether it be from a statute or from the decision of a 
former judge, and try to find out what the government, or 
his predecessor, would have done, if the case before him 
had been before them. He calls this finding the intent 
of the statute or of the doctrine. This is often not 
really true. The men who used the language did not have 
any intent at all about the case that has come up; it had 
not occurred to their minds. . . . Thus it is not enough 
for the judge to use a dictionary. If he should do no 
more he might come out with a result which every sensible 
man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what was 
really intended; which would contradict or leave unful­
filled its plain p u r p o s e . 87
^^"The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary," in 
The Spirit of Liberty, p. 121.
87 "How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?" 
in The Spirit of Liberty, p. 82.
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Caught in a contradictory position and attracted by opposite
forces, the plight of the judge, said Hand, is that
on the one hand he must not enforce whatever he thinks 
best; he must leave that to the common will expressed by 
the government. On the other, he must try as best he can 
to put into concrete form what that will is, not by 
slavishly following the words, but by trying honestly to 
say what was the underlying purpose expressed.®®
Therefore, Judge Hand described the judge as a wholly 
human person who though plagued by the shortcomings and pit­
falls shared by all mankind finds himself in a "delectable" 
and rewarding calling. He possesses qualities which his 
critics deny to him, and critics brand him with qualities 
which he denies possessing. Judge Hand urged all judges to 
read widely, understand with sensitivity, and view their work 
without prejudice. Performance of this work, cautioned Hand, 
should be done with respect for the exercise of self-restraint 
when innovating and for the importance of words when inter­
preting.
Hand at work
No treatment of Learned Hand's image as a judge would 
be complete without considering the Judge's characteristics in 
court and in his opinion writing. In these situations his 
vigorous personality became evident. Many who were near the 
Judge relate these characteristics in stories which they tell.
Characteristics in court. Judge Hand might have been 
thinking of himself when in a tribute to Robert Patterson, his
®®lMd. , p. 84.
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late colleague on the federal bench, he doubted
whether the work of a judge of first instance is to be 
best appraised by that part which is recorded; and at any 
rate the other part must be reckoned a close second, if 
not an equal: I mean that which takes place in the court­
room and either slips away into anonymity or remains only 
in the transient recollections of those who may be pres­
ent. 89
The "recollections of those who may be present" reveal Judge
Hand to have been a physically imposing figure on the bench
consonant with the popular concept of what a great judge should
look like. One look at him in court made apparent that he
started with an enormous advantage. Stocky, robust, with a
massive head and bushy eyebrows, his glance had a piercing
90quality, stern and incorruptible. "He looks like a great
judge," said lawyer Whitney North Seymour about him when Hand
was in his fiftieth year on the bench. "It is a noble face—
powerful, arresting, mobile. When Hand sits, counsel watches
that face with hope and fear— will it remain in repose, while
the mind absorbs the argument, or will it show quick scorn and
91produce a devastating question to sear a bad argument?" "A 
broadening intellectual experience often with shattering over­
tones," recalls Hamburger, referring to testimony from those
92who appeared before the judge. Lawyers who insisted that the 
case at bar possessed unique aspects of the law or was open and
p. 202.
90
QQ
"Robert P. Patterson," in The Spirit of Liberty,
New York Times, April 11, 1959, p. 12. 
91"Tribute to the 'Old Chief' . . .," p. 17,
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shut based on established doctrine prompted the "shattering
overtones." "Judge Hand resists both tendencies with the air
of a tolerant schoolmaster. As long as the argument remains
germane, he listens attentively, putting on and removing heavy
tortoise-shell glasses and leaning across the bench. But let
the argument wander or become diffused in mists of rhetoric
93and he begins to wriggle and twist."
Broad generalizations leave him in a cold intellectual 
fury. Lawyers who attempt to impress him by reminding the 
court of "those eternal principles of justice ringing down 
the ages" do so only once. His broad jaw drops in anguish. 
His bushy gray eyebrows rise in horror. His face, a moment 
ago as serene and inquiring as Cardozo's, becomes as fierce 
as Daniel Webster's at the height of a peroration. The 
courtroom echoes with a sharp crack as he slaps a hand to 
his brow and leans far back in a tall leather arm chair. 
"RubbishJ" he shouts, almost disappearing from view behind
the bench.94
If "rubbish" did not sufficiently describe his anguish, he 
clapped his hand to his forehead and bellowed, "enough, enough, 
I can't take any morei"^^ When a lawyer humbled himself with 
the appeal, "as the distinguished court is well aware," yet 
another flash radiated from the Judge: "We are aware of noth­
ing! You're here to enlighten us."^^ Counsel rarely missed 
the point.
Although the force of Hand's judicial wrath thundered 
down and terrified the boldest counsel and his lightning
^^Ibid. , p. 118. "^^ Ibid. , p. 117.
^^In Irwin Ross, "The Legend of Learned Hand," Reader's 
Digest (July, 1951), p. 105.
S^In ibid., pp. 105-106.
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questions and comments "short-circuited" many arguments, after­
wards he became penitent for any suffering incurred. "Sometimes 
he apologized from the bench, but always he begged forgiveness 
of his colleagues and he usually found some way of making 
amends to counsel. He always took great care to seek out any
possible merit in points which he had summarily brushed aside
97in the courtroom."
Judge Hand had both dramatic and sensitive character­
istics in court. However, in his routine work on the bench, 
sound judgment, keen perception, and respectful courtesy were 
more apparent characteristics than irritability.
Characteristics of opinion writing. Consideration of 
the preparation and style of Judge Hand's legal opinions pro­
vides insight into the image of the Judge at work. Many of 
his more than two thousand opinions possessed what from other 
judges might have been meaningless. But the Hand preparation 
and the Hand style made them moving and persuasive. His opin­
ions took shape as he wrote into them elements of personal 
charm, keen perception, abundant humor, ready appreciation of
the other man's point of view, dislike of affectation and sham,
98and gentle cynicism.
In preparing opinions, frequently "he sat with his legs 
upon the desk, a drawing board spread across his knees. On
97 "Remarks of J. Edward Lumbard . . .," p. 410.
98George Wharton Pepper, "The Literary Style of Learned 
Hand," Harvard Law Review, LX (February, 1947), 334.
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yellow sheets he scribbled, crossed out, and interwove well-
nigh undecipherable symbols. As he said, he 'thought with 
99his fingers.'" Before writing, however, he studied briefs 
and blueprints, paced the floor, and thought for hours. "For 
me," he said, "writing is like having a baby."^^^ When he 
finally did write, he prepared three to four drafts of every 
opinion. This was done with "my life's blood," he would say.
"I suffer, believe me, I s u f f e r . T h e  Judge rarely dictated 
an opinion, but he did think aloud the general pattern of his 
decision to his law clerk.
Judge Hand's meticulous preparation of opinions result­
ed in what Frankfurter describes as a "muscular, ruminative,
and eloquent" style which "it can surely be said . . . was the 
102man." This powerful and graceful style Seymour found to
be "the reflection of a cultured m i n d . T h e  self-revelation
of Hand's cultured mind came forth in his decisions. For
instance, the form with which he clothed his thoughts
was a faithful mirror of his manner of speech. Latin tags 
were part of his normal system of thought. Literary allu­
siveness reflected the overflowing pressure of his constant 
reading. And the odd turns he sometimes gave a compressed 
phrase was the revelation of his personality, not the
^^Wyzanski, "Learned Hand," pp. 56-57.
^^^In Bill Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand: Titan of the
Law," Coronet, XXVI (September, 1949), 112.
^^^In Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 120.
^^^"Learned Hand," p. 2.
103"Tribute to the 'Old Chief . . . ," p. 116.
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contrivance of an artificial man. . . .  A Hand opinion 
is comparable to a sonnet: a distillation of thought,
prepared within limits strictly defined by convention, 
but emanating an afflatus beyond the established bound­
aries .
Jerome Frank supports the belief that Judge Hand's style of 
writing mirrored his manner of speech and thought. Frank 
claims the Judge wrote in an English, not an American, style; 
and this was fitting because he spoke in English, not American, 
and therefore thought in English. "Stylistically, his opinions 
might have been written by the best literary artists on the 
English bench," alleges Frank. "Like Cardozo, he resorts often 
to metaphors. But Hand's metaphors quicken the thought, do 
not impede it as Cardozo's frequently did. You can tell much 
about a man from the metaphors he keeps. . . . Learned Hand's 
are alive and zesty.
Therefore, in clear and memorable language, "the 
wisdom, wit and moral fervor which are the mark of his great­
ness" revealed the man through his s t y l e . A s  a literary 
craftsman he performed in
a style characterized by the compassion, the poignancy, 
the balance, the diction of a sonnet. Some there are—  
the impatient and the superficial— who regard this style 
as no more than the artifice of an accomplished man. They 
would be better pleased if for every line he had substi­
tuted a page; for every haunting phrase, a clear, ungar­
nished paragraph. Others of more discrimination see in 
Judge Hand's choice of form the subtle revelation of his 
conception of office. The rigorous limits he imposes on
^^^Wyzanski, "Learned Hand," p. 57.
^*^^"Some Reflections . . . , " p. 674.
^^^Ross, "The Legend of Learned Hand," p. 107.
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his own expression acknowledge that the justice he admin­
isters is under law. . . . His use of allusion and sug­
gestion, his scorn of didacticism disclose the detachment, 
skepticism, and tolerance which are for him cardinal 
virtues of the judge.10?
That Judge Hand could write is an uncontroverted fact. One
need only briefly peruse a sample of his opinions to see how
well he did it. He lacked the sometimes obscure quality of
Holmes and the ornateness of Cardozo. In plain but picturesque
language Judge Hand dispelled any doubt about what he was
after. The "very pungent clarity" of his style carried persua-
s i o n . 1 0 8
Contributions from contemporaries
If the anecdotal expressions of the bench, bar, and 
general public are valid criteria for measuring Judge Hand's 
contributions to his profession, he must be ranked among those 
who have achieved the very highest distinction among American 
judges. The final evaluation on Judge Hand probably will not 
differ considerably from the content of these anecdotal contri­
butions. In the words of rarely extravagant former Justice
Frankfurter, "he is headed straight for the glories and the
109danger of a legend." The bench, bar, and general public all
contribute to this legend and hence the image.
^^^Charles E. Wyzanski, "Judge Learned Hand's Contri­
butions to Public Law," Harvard Law Review. LX (February,
1947), 369.
108 "Learned Hand: Senior Circuit Judge . . .," p. 871.
109In "A Great Judge Retires: American Law Institute
Honors Learned Hand," American Bar Association Journal, XXXVII 
(July, 1951), 503.
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From the bench
The acclaim Judge Hand received from the bench fre­
quently bordered on the extravagant. An introductory sampling 
of this acclaim is indicative of what these and other judges 
espoused in detail about the Judge. For instance, judge and 
author Jerome Frank dedicated his book. Courts on Trial, to 
Hand with this comment: "To Learned Hand, our wisest judge.
A distinguished member of the federal bench, John J. Parker, 
said: "All of us know that he is not only one of the greatest
judges of this generation, but he is one of the greatest judges 
that has ever sat on a court of the United S t a t e s . W h e n  
on request Justice Benjamin Cardozo selected the greatest 
living American jurist he named Hand by stating that the
112"greatest living American jurist isn't on the Supreme Court." 
Judge Thacher of the New York Court of Appeals contended that 
Hand's beliefs "clothed him with true humility and with a 
conscience which spares him never. Couple these with his
113learning and his craftsmanship and we have a great judge."
And the highly esteemed Felix Frankfurter while on the Supreme 
Court regarded Judge Hand as "one at whose feet I sat almost 
from the time I came to the bar and at whose feet I still
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1949), p. V.
^^^In "A Great Judge Retires . . .," p. 502.
112 In Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," p. 108.
^^^In "Judge Learned Hand: Honored by Harvard Law
School," American Bar Association Journal, XXXIII (May, 1947), 
476.
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s i t . T h e  foundation for these exalted tributes becomes 
apparent by considering more extensively contributions from 
these and other members of the judiciary.
From Judge Frankfurter. When Judge Hand retired from
the bench in 1951, Frankfurter reflected on his personal gain
from Hand's departure; "Hereafter I shall feel freer to act 
on my belief that a decision of the Circuit Court of the Second 
Circuit might give occasion for review by the Supreme Court, 
and I might even perchance at times feel that an opinion which 
he wrote might be w r o n g . F r a n k f u r t e r ' s  sentiments arise 
from his belief that what Pepys wrote of Clarendon particularly 
fits Hand: "I am mad in love with my Lord Chancellor, for he
do comprehend and speak out well, and with the greatest easi­
ness and authority that ever I saw man in my life . . . his 
manner and freedom of doing it, as if he played with it, and
was informing only all the rest of the company, was mighty
p r e t t y . P e r h a p s  the "easiness and authority" with which 
he spoke out so well is traceable to what Frankfurter described 
as the demonstration which Hand gave "of the fact that moral
influence, achievement of excellence, [and] the fertilization
117of thought are not dependent on place."
^^"^Burlingham, "Judge Learned Hand," p. 326.
1 1 RIn "A Great Judge Retires . . .," p. 503.
^^^In Burlingham, "Judge Learned Hand,"p. 3 29.
117 "Tribute to Learned Hand," The Reporter, XX (April 
30, 1959), 4.
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On April 10, 1959, at the fiftieth-anniversary celebra­
tion of Learned Hand's appointment as a federal judge. Frank­
furter delivered a tribute. He recalled that Hand had summed 
up his life as "uneventful, unadventurous, easy, safe, and 
pleasant"; and he chided that five more inadequate adjectives 
to summarize Hand's life could not have been selected:
Uneventful— if events take place merely in the world 
of action and not in the arena of the mind.
Unadventurous— if adventure requires the scaling of 
Mt. Everest and crossing Antarctica, and if there be no 
adventures of thought.
Easy— can it really have been easy for him all these 
years to interpret the mysteries and the mumbo-jumbo of 
the nine Delphic oracles, and, at pain of a spanking, find 
clarity in darkness?
Safe— has life been safe, secure? He, safe and secure, 
who has been buffeted and battered by the largest self­
doubt of any human being I have ever encountered?
And then he says "pleasant!" Well, he has something 
there, but it is a sly bit of truth. Would he have had 
as much pleasure in life if he hadn't been there?^^°
Frankfurter then offered his own five adjectives: "daring,
romantic, antediluvian, sophisticated, and lucky."
Daring— of course, daring. In a world in which the 
pressures for conformity are so on the increase, he has 
dared to be gaily and solemnly himself. He has dared to 
challenge passion, prejudice and intolerance, even when 
parading in the name of patriotism and supported by the 
voice of the multitude.
Romantic— isn't the man a romantic, the windows of 
whose mind are open to every wind of doctrine and who is 
ready to find the Holy Grail in the most unlikely places?
Antediluvian— is not our Judge antediluvian, who is 
guided by the reason of which he is the trustee and the 
delegate, and not the inventor, who deems his duty limited 
as a judge's duty should be limited and does not feel 
empowered to remold the world according to the heart's 
desire?
Sophisticated— is a man not sophisticated who doubts 
his own basic premises and yet is guided by them until he 
discovers better ones?
^^^Ibid.
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Lucky— . . . [in] a happy marriage [and] . . .  in his 
failures. When years ago he offered himself to the elec­
torate of New York, they declined to send him to Albany.
Now, hasn't he had a better time in New York than he could 
possibly have had in Albany? . . .
Finally— . . . he was lucky in not having drawn a 
successful ticket in that odd lottery by which men are 
picked for the Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
He would have found himself more contained within the 
curtilage of the court and, thus, we would have been 
denied the moral leadership, the great influence of his 
courageous and eloquent free spirit all these years. . . .
But luckier have we been that he was endowed with 
these gifts and has put them to the uses to which he has 
put them.119
Justice Frankfurter, who put Judge Hand on an eternal
pedestal for all to see, concluded that he "belongs to that
very select company of judges in whom one does not find great-
120ness in order to justify merely personal preference."
From Judge Hofstadter. Judge Hofstadter believes that 
in Judge Hand's utterances one could almost hear the peal of 
the Liberty Bell " carrying its message of hope to peoples 
everywhere that man's immemorial aspiration for freedom will 
be realized through the rule of law. In ringing tones he has 
declared his faith: America is the guardian of spiritual
values which cannot flourish in a totalitarian climate. He
121has 'made justice clairvoyant' by truth which makes men free!" 
Hofstadter lauds his skeptical and doubting qualities which
^^^Ibid.
1 on
"Judge Learned Hand," p. 3 29.
1 91Samuel H. Hofstadter, "A Justice's Faith," New York
Times Magazine (April 19, 1959), p. 47,
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combined with a cautious use of power. He calls him "the
122embodiment of the rule of law— continent, serene, civilized."
From Judge Frank. Judge Frank, who sat on the circuit 
bench with Judge Hand, paid his colleague a remarkable tribute 
when in 1957 he wrote to him;
No one else I've known has excited in me such admira­
tion and affection. You are my model as a judge. More, 
you have influenced my attitude in incalculable ways 
towards all sorts of matters, intellectual and others.
For your eminence lies not-alone in the singular nature 
of your mind, but in the manner in which you infuse your 
ideas with emotions both noble and humorous. You are, 
par excellence, the democratic a r i s t o c r a t .^23
Judge Frank's privately expressed admiration for Hand over­
flowed into his publicly expressed opinion writing when in 
dissenting to Hand's majority report in United States v. Robin­
son he announced: "I have the very highest respect for Judge
Hand. To sit with him is an inestimable privilege, a constant 
source of education. Consequently, I usually suspect my own 
tentative opinions, when they vary from his."^^^
Frank extended to the Judge the ultimate in praise when 
upon comparing him with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes he grant­
ed Hand the higher rating. Frank explained that "Hand has been 
more generous, more outgoing, more easily accessible to others, 
always interested in the events of the day, while Holmes led
I T p
Letter to the editor. New York Times, April 10,
1959, p. 28.
1 p-3
"Some Reflections . . .," p. 658.
F.(2d) 915,920 (1945).
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an essentially cloistered life, and boasted of not reading
the newspapers. And Hand has been more willing to admit mis- 
125takes." His humility and self-skepticism, claimed Frank,
which allowed him to admit mistakes is fortunate "in one who 
has such wide influence."
From Judge Parker. Judge John J. Parker knew Judge
Hand as an honest man with an understanding heart who did not
know how to act in a merciless way. He called him "a man whose
heart has beat in sympathy with the great masses of humanity
as he has shaped the rules of law which will shape, in turn,
their lives. He has done justly, he has loved mercy, he has
walked humbly before God. He has been given God's greatest
127gift to man, a wise and understanding heart." Consequently,
Parker contended that Hand's written opinions, the work of "a 
great jurist, a great lawyer, a great master of our English
128tongue," would guide our jurisprudence for many years to come.
From Judge Lumbard. Through his example and his wis­
dom, according to Judge J. Edward Lumbard, Hand taught and 
encouraged two generations of federal judges in his circuit.
The accomplishments of these two generations was in large part 
traceable to Judge Hand, claimed Lumbard. Federal and state 
courts, he reported, cited Hand's opinions as often as those
^^^"Some Reflections . . .," pp. 669-670. ^^^Ibid.
1 97
In "A Great Judge Retires . . . p. 502.
128ihid.
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of any other judge. "Indeed," said Lumbard, "most of the
briefs filed in this court cite Learned Hand, whether it be a
majority or dissenting opinion and— I might add— whether or
129not the quotation is in point." He concluded. Judge Hand
"belongs not only to us of the law but also to all men every­
where who believe in justice under law and who hope that by 
reason, tolerance, patience and good will the races of men m ^  
yet find some way of living together.
From Judge Wyzanski. Judge Wyzanski assigned Hand to 
the race of the giants— Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo. Wyzanski 
called Hand the "judge's judge" who "remains a manifestation 
of the Athenian pattern of authority, the indirect leadership 
of individual men of insight and u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e  
disdained the judge who assumed the center role as one who 
betrayed his trust, recalled Wyzanski. "He was commissioned 
for a different part— a leader of the Greek chorus, interpret­
ing and appraising the drama. The artistry, the forbearance 
in judgment, and the faithfulness with which Learned Hand has 
performed that part are his principal contributions to the 
public law.
1 9Q
"Remarks of J. Edward Lumbard . . . p. 410.
^^°Ibid., p. 411.
^Wyzanski, "Judge Learned Hand's Contributions 
. . .," pp. 347, 348.
^^^Ibid.. p. 369.
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From the bar
If the source were anonymous, whether an anecdotal 
contribution came from the bench or the bar would be in many 
cases difficult to discern. However, contributions from the 
bench tend to emphasize many of those qualities resulting from 
the special concerns of the judiciary while the bar reflects 
the special concerns of the lawyer. These concerns provide a 
design for analysis. Repeated in anecdotal form they dwell 
on Judge Hand's judicial philosophy which the bar believes to 
reflect a regard for craftsmanship, a belief in reason, a doubt 
as to the absolute validity of any conclusion, an understanding 
of human nature, and a dedication to truth and justice.
Craftsmanship. As a master of his craft. Judge Hand,
"with impressive and genuine dignity . . . conducts smoothly
and surely the business which comes before him," according to
133attorney Stephen Philbin. More specifically, George Wharton
Pepper cites the craftsmanship demonstrated in his subtle
134accommodation to the susceptibilities of his audience.
Judge Hand's craftsmanship is brought into clearer focus by
lawyer Whitney North Seymour, who says of Hand:
As a judge, he has been bold and imaginative; a genuine 
architect of the law. His opinions suggest a builder try­
ing to fit each stone into its proper place but also con­
cerned that the resulting edifice will not offend esthetic 
taste. He claims that the actual process of decision has
133 "Judge Hand and the Law of Patents and Copyrights," 
Harvard Law Review, LX (February, 1947), 403.
134',The Literary Style . . . , " p. 335.
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always been hard for him. But his doubts are firmly 
resolved before he renders his opinion; there is nothing 
amateurish about his dressing and fitting of the stones.135
A belief in reason. The opinions of Judge Hand serve 
as models of "judicial reasoning" and deserve more than casual 
attention. Attorneys John Cound and Carroll C. Hincks typify 
acknowledgements of Judge Hand's use of his mental processes in 
decision-making. Cound calls Hand's mind so unique that anyone 
who talked with him at length could not "come away with his 
own philosophy unscathed."1^^ However, as he further points 
out, the Judge "had no illusion that the law is 'nothing else
13 7but reason,' divorced from a world of past and present facts."
Cound stresses that "concerned as he was with the pattern of
the law. Hand did not accept the notion that a judicial opinion
is only a rationalization for a result otherwise reached. That
he had a pride of style is obvious. But as nearly as he could
make them do so, I believe, his opinions reflected the mental
138processes by which he had reached his result."
Hincks recognizes Judge Hand's fine mind but contends 
that it was only the "foundation of his equipment" which com­
bined with curiosity, understanding, and capacity for research 
to produce "an incomparable capacity for analysis";
135"Tribute to the 'Old Chief' . . .," p. 17.
136"Learned Hand," Minnesota Law Review, VIL (December, 
1961), 217.
^^^Ibid., p. 218.
^^^Ibid., p. 219.
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His reputation as perhaps the greatest judge ever to 
grace the Second Circuit Bench— indeed as one among the 
greatest of all American jurists— derived not from the 
accident that by inheritance he had acquired merely a 
splendid mind. This was only the foundation of his 
equipment. For he also had an intellectual curiosity 
which led his mind, nurtured in literature and the liberal 
arts, into the sciences and the far reaches of the history 
and the nature of men and of nations. And his mental 
equipment was coupled with a sturdy physique which gave 
him the strength for incredible labor and research. The 
fusion of these characteristics produced an incomparable 
power of analysis which rested not solely on his own acute 
personal observations but also on the impact of the sweep 
of history upon the whole contemporary scene.139
Doubt about absolutes. Although Judge Hand reasserted
his final convictions, attorney and close friend John Lord
O'Brian commends him for the courage constantly to question
the validity of his own conclusions. Archibald Cox believes
that Hand's conception of man's final dependence on arbitrary
preferences made him "skeptical of those who rush to save the
world with sure solutions; but because of it he does not put
his own conclusions beyond question, and so is willing to try
out the views of o t h e r s . T h i s  tolerance toward the views
of others, says Hincks, combined in him with a humility which
142allowed him to admit his limitations and fallibility.
139Carroll C. Hincks, "Resolution in Memory of Learned 
Hand," New York State Bar Journal, XXXIII (December, 1961),
412.
^^^In "Proceedings of a Special Session to Commemorate 
Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service by the Honorable 
Learned Hand," 264 F.(2d) 8.
"Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of 
Statutes," Harvard Law Review, LX (February, 1947), 392-393.
"Resolution in Memory of Learned Hand," p. 413.
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An understanding of human nature. Former attorney 
general of the United States Tom Clark contends that a "pro­
found understanding of human relationships" made Judge Hand's 
"judicial pronouncements a cherished heritage. Hincks 
offers an explanation for this insight: "Perhaps more than
anything else, it was his thirst for friendship and his appe­
tite for the exchange of experiences with his companions that 
gave him the insight into human nature and the undertaking of 
human societies that helped to make him a great j u d g e . T h e  
Judge's approach to the problems of human nature not only 
depended on experience with his fellow men but on maintenance 
of an open mind which through application to great themes 
"enabled him to speak with a voice of overwhelming authority" 
on the nature of mankind.
Dedication to justice and truth. Judge Hand's partic­
ular ability to avoid sentimentality over the guilty combined 
with an insistence that they be fairly tried prompts attorney 
Seymour to praise Hand's "deep concern for justice according 
to the rules" as the thread which unites all of his opinions. 
"By his restraint and refusal to twist the law to suit his
143"The Honorable Learned Hand," Federal Bar Journal, 
VIII (January, 1947), 151.
^^^"Resolution in Memory of Learned Hand," p. 413.
^^^John Lord O'Brian in "Proceedings of a Special 
Session . . .," p. 8,
l^^In ibid., p. 33.
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personal philosophy," recalls attorney Hincks, "as well as by 
his alacrity, when proper occasions permitted, to recognize 
and protect individualism, he made an invaluable contribution 
to the cause of justice under the law.
Committed to intellectual skepticism the Judge sought 
truth wherever it might be found. O'Brian calls him "not so 
much a finder of the truth as a humble-minded searcher for
1 Ag
truth." Cox confirms Hand's "search for the truth" as a
149complement of his "deep-seated" tolerance. This search made
his court an inspiration, recalls Philbin, as Hand pursued only 
"truth and right" in applying the reason and the spirit of the 
law. 150
Tom Clark fittingly summarizes the reaction of the bar 
to Judge Hand with the words; "His rare faculties as a schol­
ar, a great jurist and a gentleman of wit, charm and broad 
culture are legend in the profession which he has bettered with 
them."151
From the general public
Judge Hand's image like his reputation grew over the 
years mostly through the opinions of lawyers whose cases he
1^^"Resolution in Memory of Learned Hand," p. 413.
148In "Proceedings of a Special Session . . .," p. 7.
149 "Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of 
Statutes," p. 392.
15®"Judge Hand and the Law . . .," p. 403.
151"The Honorable Learned Hand," p. 151.
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decided, judges and lawyers who read, assimilated, and followed 
his decisions, and members of the general public, interested 
enough because of their specific calling, to react to the Judge 
and to the response of the judges and lawyers who evaluated 
the Judge and his work.
Such public reaction was particularly prevalent on two 
occasions. Judge Hand's retirement in 1951 and his death in 
1961. News of his retirement from the bench produced apprais­
als of his career and his contributions. In an editorial 
comment the New York Herald Tribune observed:
It will be difficult, indeed, to think of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals without him. With his cousin, 
Augustus Hand, he has brought to that court, the second 
highest in the land, a distinction all its own; his 
particular wisdom and style have marked many of its most 
notable opinions. Beyond the judge, whom lawyers hold to 
be among the most illustrious this country has produced, 
there has been a radiant sense of life's adventure. The 
law, said Burke, sharpens the mind by narrowing it; but 
in a few of our great judges the law has lifted the mind 
to a level of comprehension and has kindled a degree of 
human ardor unsurpassed in any other profession. Judge 
Learned Hand has been among these few. . . .152
On his death the New York Times commented editorially:
He was a superlative judicial craftsman. His opinions 
were studied and quoted by judges far beyond the limits of 
his own jurisdiction. Because the Court of Appeals of this 
circuit over which he presided for twenty-two years included 
the heart of America's financial and business interests his 
impact on the conduct of the country's economic affairs was 
profound. Of powerful effect also was the devotion to 
human liberty that his decisions r e v e a l e d . 153
The extraordinary respect granted to Judge Hand did
not result from the novel results he reached in his opinions.
IS^May 17, 1951, p. 12. ^^\ugust 19, 1961, p. 16.
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The respect was not for his skill at innovation but rather for 
what he brought to the process of judging. His character, 
understanding of human nature, and astute reasoning ability 
are among the frequently cited qualities perceived in Judge 
Hand by the general public. These perceptions are conspicu­
ously similar to those contributed by the bench and bar.
Lancaster asserts that when the final verdict is in
and all the facts assimilated "it is the character of the Judge
that counts the most":
Certainly many experiences, much reading and hard study, 
a deft and sure feeling for the law as a functioning social 
force, a skeptic's knowledge of the nature of human kind, 
a philosopher's understanding of the strength and weakness 
of man in society have all contributed toward producing 
the judicial character that is Learned Hand. The most 
pronounced trait of this judicial character is a capacity 
for objectivity, for detachment. Of all the arrows in 
the judge's quiver this is probably hardest to come by and 
yet the most indispensable.154
Others note that even when the Judge admonished vigorously from 
behind the bench the bluster merely covered a warmly human 
personality that made him "one of the best-loved men on the 
b e n c h . N o t  only did his personality enable him to function 
more smoothly on the bench, but it enabled Judge Hand, as a 
sensitive observer of human nature, to understand the individu­
alistic and habitual tendencies of mankind:
Although Judge Hand is at heart an individualist, he 
knows very well that the individual is a social animal and 
in spite of the strong individualistic strain that charac­
terizes his thinking, there is the realization that man
154",phe Jurisprudence . . . ," p. 306.
^^^Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," p. 109.
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requires patterns of conduct and established folkways in 
order to express himself as an individual and make his 
imprint upon the clay of time.156
Besides depending on his character and insight into 
human nature for bringing to bear his full powers on revelation 
of a decision, Judge Hand could call upon his reasoning ability. 
He could get behind rules and lay bare their supporting founda­
tions. "Seldom is he content with merely announcing a rule of 
law; the rule must be founded in reason and Hand, the most
reasonable of judges, is not content until the reason is 
157exposed." The Hand method of getting behind problems 
existed not simply in reason but in reason dominated by an 
ever present desire to arrive as close to truth as the frail­
ties of mankind will allow. The New York Times realized this 
when they told their many readers:
More than anything else Judge Hand symbolizes a method 
— the judge's endless striving for truth by means as dis­
passionate and as dedicated as man can achieve.
He might have been speaking of himself when he wrote 
that the qualities that clear the path to truth are 
"skepticism, tolerance, discrimination, urbanity, some—  
but not too much— reserve toward change, insistence upon 
proportion, and above all, humility before the vast 
unknown."158
Eight %ears before the celebration of Judge Hand's 
fiftieth year on the bench President Truman accepted his 
retirement in a letter of praise and recognition for a job well 
done. On the date of the fiftieth-year celebration Attorney
156"The Jurisprudence . . .," p. 244.
IS^ibid.. p. 128.
^^®April 11, 1959, p. 12.
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General William 0. Rogers read another letter which contributed
'' j
more Presidential praise:
Dear Judge Hand:
On the occasion of the 50th year of your judicial 
service to the Nation, it is a privilege to send you my 
congratulations and long felt thanks.
For half a century as a Federal Judge, you have stood 
for excellence and temperament essential to the achievement 
of equal justice under law. The integrity which you bring 
to your work, your learning, and your dedication to our 
system of jurisprudence are an inspiration to your col­
leagues in the law and in the community at large. You 
contribute greatly to the strength of the American judicial 
system which preserves undiminished, the vital role of the 
courts in safeguarding the rights and liberties of each 
citizen.
I am grateful that even in retirement you continue to 
serve us with your heart and mind.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower-*-^^
Many tributes made by those off the bench and unaffil­
iated with the practicing bar came to Judge Hand. One that 
epitomizes such tributes appeared on a Harvard citation confer­
red upon Hand with the Doctor of Laws degree. This citation 
described him as "a judge worthy of his name, judicial in his 
temper, profound in his knowledge; a philosopher whose deci­
sions affect a nation.
The Deviating Judge 
The escapades and eccentricities which were a part of 
the "gregarious man" found their counterpart in the "deviating 
judge." An appreciation of this esteemed judge's image would
^^^In "Proceedings of a Special Session . . .," pp.
16-17.
160In The Spirit of Liberty, p. 102.
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be incomplete without recognition of his variations from the 
expected norm for judicial conduct. "Strait-laced, cloistered, 
and tied to the rigors of research, reasoning, and reporting" 
would hardly be a description consonant with some stories now 
handed down from fact and folklore. Judge Hand, who mastered 
profanity as well as the law, enjoyed life, knew how to irri­
tate harmlessly and more important when to irritate, and inter­
jected into what might have been an otherwise drab life that 
much needed spice which proved him to be a wholly human person. 
The spice was likely to come almost anytime, such as in prepar­
ing opinions, in the opinions, in court, in memos, in debate, 
in his chambers, or in public. All are worthy of mention for 
their contribution to the composite image of the Judge.
Judge Hand worked on cases with his law clerks who 
were mostly former editors of the Harvard Law Review. While 
he discussed a case with a clerk, they paced back and forth 
in opposite directions passing each other about every thirty 
seconds.
"My feeling," the Judge will say, "is that plaintiff has 
suffered a grievance for which there should be a remedy.
. . ." Then, as he whizzes by the clerk: "Sonny! We have
come to a parting of the ways. I smell Spearmint again. 
Throw out that gum! . . . But amendment of the copyright 
law is not urged here. Come now, what do you think?
If the clerk did not respond with an opinion when asked what
he thought, the Judge, who treated the clerk as an intellectual
^^^Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 120.
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equal, would threaten "to dock his pay, something which both
162of them know is completely impossible."
Once the Judge reduced his thoughts to a written opin­
ion there was no certainty that his lighter side would not 
emerge. In 1930, he produced what Bill Davidson calls a 
"masterpiece" when he was faced with deciding whether the play, 
"The Cohens and the Kellys," was stolen from "Abie's Irish 
Rose."^^^ In the opinion he said: "There are but four char­
acters common to both plays, the lovers and the fathers. The 
lovers are . . . loving and fertile; that is really all that 
can be said of them, and anyone else is quite within his rights
if he puts loving and fertile lovers into a play of his own.
..164
Because certain sounds detracted from his meditation 
over the law. Judge Hand constantly feuded with telephones and
dogs. Telephones to the Judge were "the rudest instrument ever
invented by m a n . H e  had even less respect for barking dogs, 
particularly one called Jiggs. Twenty-four floors below and 
three blocks beyond the Judge's office near a Chinatown saloon 
lurked this barking white bulldog. His canine sounds filtered 
up through the noise of the street and into the Judge's sensitive
162Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," p. 112.
lG3ibid.
^^^Nichols V. Universal Pictures Corporation et al..
45 F.(2d) 119,122 (1930).
^^^Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," p. 113.
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ears. For years he feuded with the mutt. On one occasion he 
sent an assistant "down to plead with Jiggs to shut up even 
going so far . . .  as to attempt to buy him."
In court this judge, warm and kindhearted in the eyes 
of some, was most irritable in the eyes of others. When a 
thirty-nine-year-old-bachelor applicant for citizenship failed 
to obtain citizenship on the grounds of bad moral character 
occasioned by admitted relations with unmarried women, counsel 
said to the bench: "'You wouldn't . . . want your daughter to
marry such a man.' Snapped Hand, 'I wouldn't want her to marry 
a man of thirty-nine who hadn't had the impulse.' This 
attorney was not the only one who ever had his composure shat­
tered by Judge Hand from the bench. In fact "only the most 
hardy retain their composure, and once, during a Yale Law 
School moot court at which he presided, a prize student rose 
to address him, took one look and promptly keeled over in a 
dead faint.
Both in and out of court Judge Hand gained a reputation 
for his note-writing. Confronted by an attorney enamored over 
the sound of his own voice the Judge would "occasionally scrib­
ble a note of protest and slip it to a colleague on the bench. 
'John Marshall once said,' read one of them, 'that among the 
qualities of a great judge was the ability to look a lawyer
IGGlbid.
^^^Frank, "The Top U.S. Commercial Court," p. 95.
^^^Hamburger, "The Great Judge," p. 120.
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straight in the eye and not hear one word he was saying.'
Out of court his memos circulated among colleagues contained 
eight different, and all uncomplimentary, ways of referring 
to the Supreme Court.
But Judge Hand could give credit when it was due. He
came into his own in the give and take of battle at the council
table. Although fierce in battle, "even the neophyte soon
perceived that this most royal warrior, while valiant, was
never spiteful, mean or petty. And what a triumph it was for
any professor or junior judge to have the great Hand admit, as
he so readily did when there was occasion, 'a hit, a palpable 
171hit.'" On one hand through expressed appreciation he
appealed to another's vanity and on the other he humbly shunned 
anticipated expressions of appreciation. Davidson relates a
story about how far the Judge would go to avoid praise:
In 1938, an elderly woman came to his chambers after
a lower Federal court had ordered her evicted from her
farm. She asked Hand to sign a stay until her case came 
up for appeal. While his law clerk, Archibald Cox, looked 
on in amazement. Judge Hand berated the old lady. He 
yelled at her for not having her attorney present, and 
then excoriated the attorney for having made out the 
papers incorrectly.
Finally, the Judge ceased his denunciation and handed 
his visitor a legal document. "Here's your stay," he 
said. "I did your lawyer's job and wrote up a new set of 
papers while we were talking."
IG^i b i d .
^^^Frank, ."The Top U.S. Commercial Court," p. 95.
^^^Wyzanski, "Learned Hand," p. 57.
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The old lady cast a tearful look at Hand, seized the 
paper and fled. The Judge then caught Cox's bewildered 
stare. "Oh," he said to his clerk, "I don't like people 
blubbering over me in appreciation."172
Particularly in leisure conversation the public esca­
pades and eccentricities of the Judge came up for discussion. 
Sessions of the Law Institute provided Hand's law clerks with 
opportunities to tell a tale or two about his deviations. The 
conversation would go: "Do you remember the year the court
had to pass upon the patent for a Kiddie Kar? The judge put 
himself astride the toy and rode around the Post Office Build­
ing, calling on one after another of his brethern." Or, "Do 
you recall how Learned Hand wouldn't let his law clerks give 
the Harvard Law School a painting of him, and how he finally 
agreed to a bust by Eleanor Platt, 'who made Brandeis look like
Loki.' Then when the sculpture was finished the judge said it
173was too grand for any place but a bowling alley."
Judge Hand lived his life and performed his work as 
best he knew how. His deviations were as much a part of his 
life as his deliberations. Even after some of his opinions 
pass from the memory of man the harmless, frequently humorous 
idiosyncrasies, as deviations from the norm of popular expect­
ancy, may give cause for those who reminisce to summon back 
and restructure the total image of the Judge.
1 79Davidson, "Judge Learned Hand . . .," pp. 109-110.
1 70
Wyzanski, "Learned Hand," p. 57.
107
Summary
Judge Learned Hand's career on the bench involved him 
in a multitude of legal controversies. However, he will be 
remembered not so much for the number of opinions he wrote as 
for their quality and what he brought to the court that 
contributed to their quality. Although the Supreme Court never 
benefited from his competence and overall judicial ability as 
a member sitting on the highest bench, his contributions to 
the Circuit Court of Appeals undoubtedly made the work of the 
Supreme Court easier. These contributions of insight, intel­
lect, and experience emerged as the Judge assumed the role of 
a devout pleader for tolerance, caution, truth, justice, and 
constructive thinking.
Expressions of his devotion to the betterment of the 
legal process came forth not from a theorist or philosopher 
writing legal treatises but from a teacher delivering speeches 
and writing essays and legal opinions. The lessons on which 
he expounded frequently dealt with some phase of the nature of 
law, the responsibilities of the legal profession, and the 
traits of the judge. He saw the law as a living organism which 
periodically necessitated cautious updating. He saw the func­
tion of the judge limited by imperative moderation and re­
straint. The Judge urged those who would interpret statutes 
to look for the social purposes behind legislation and derive 
the intent of the legislators from the cultural, political, 
and social context of the words used. To accomplish judicial
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interpretation satisfactorily and apply the law properly he 
charged judges with the responsibility to read widely, under­
stand with sensitivity, and view their work without prejudice. 
Through expressions supporting these beliefs he built his 
image. Through the reaction and reiteration of contemporaries 
of the bench, bar, and general public who reflected on Judge 
Hand's deliberations and deviations, the image of the Judge 
became more distinct.
Judge Hand's career on the bench, dedicated to search­
ing for truth, dealt not with the abstract, but with the con­
crete issues of American life. "If the virtues which he held 
worthy were those of his own generation, his conviction that 
life was change and growth enabled him to meet the problems 
of law— which are but reflections of life— with an open mind 
and consistent o b j e c t i v e n e s s . I n  meeting the problems of
law he left "presidents shocked, lawyers weak, and colleagues
I law- 
..176
p r o u d . A l l  this by one who paradoxically dreaded "a w­
suit beyond almost anything short of sickness and death.
^^^Francis Biddle, "Learned Hand," New Republic, CXLV 
(September 11, 1961), 5.
1 7 c
Warren Wright, "The Rhetoric of Learned Hand in 
Selected Civil Liberties Cases: A Method for Analysis of Judi­
cial Opinions" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of 
Speech, University of Illinois, 1960), p. 17.
^^^Hand in Ross, "The Legend of Learned Hand," p. 108.
CHAPTER IV
CONCEPTS OF ETHICAL PROOF
Introduction
Rhetoricians agree that the impact of the speaker's 
character or personality is vital to inducing acceptance of 
belief. Aristotle, however, contends that the audience's prior 
concept of the speaker's character and personality, an inartis­
tic achievement, should not influence evaluation of the speak­
er's artistic skill in establishing his credibility in the 
speech. What the audience thinks of the speaker prior to the 
speech is not, in itself, a part of the art of rhetoric accord­
ing to Aristotle. Ethical persuasion, he believes, depends for 
rhetorical purposes solely on how the audience receives the 
speaker through the speech. Alleging artificiality in the 
Aristotelian limitation on ethos, others claim that how the 
audience perceives the speaker before he speaks is inseparable 
from how the audience reacts to the speaker through the speech. 
Support of this concept may exist "if we conceive of ethical 
proof as an artistic creation brought about by the speaker's 
skill in asserting his intelligence, revealing his probity.
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and accommodating himself to his hearers."^ But this study 
does not propose to resolve this dispute or further enter into 
it. It does propose to draw upon the Aristotelian distinction 
in order to designate the emphasis of this study, namely the 
use of ethical proof as an artistic creation brought about by 
a judge's recommendation of his credibility in his legal opin­
ions. The term "ethical proof," therefore, will pertain to 
the artistic introduction of Judge Hand's personality and char­
acter into his opinions. Whether the Judge's image or reputa­
tion existed in the mind of the critic, as inartistic ethos, 
before exposure to Hand's opinions cannot be conclusively 
established. Although the emphasis of this study is on 
"ethical proof" in the opinions, prior development of Hand's 
image and reputation (Chapters II and III) and treatment of 
concepts of inartistic ethos (Chapter IV) both assist detection 
and understanding of the "ethical proof" (artistic ethos).
Ethical Proof in Rhetoric
Rhetoricians from ancient to modern times have 
respected the impact of the speaker's character in effecting 
persuasion. Ethos is the term many of them have assigned to 
the proof found in the character of the speaker. This form of 
proof allegedly makes the utterance more believable because 
of the force inherent in the authentic and credible manner in 
which the speaker recommends himself as worthy of being
^Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 385.
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believed. However, all rhetoricians have not shared similar 
interpretations, detected the same ingredients, and placed the 
same emphasis on ethos. Therefore, a concise overview of the 
relevant history of the rhetorical concept of ethos is neces­
sary to become better acquainted with this subject as approached 
by various writers.
Pre-Aristotelian 
Although the first definitive statement of ethos came 
from Aristotle, the concept has roots in early rhetorical 
theory and practice. Corax and Tisias, ancient Sicilian rheto­
ricians, introduced ethos into their rhetoric through the 
doctrine of "probability." They regarded "probable" arguments 
as those which appeared to conform to the truth, that is, what 
the audience believed. The identification of that believed 
with the truth meant that to be convincing the successful 
speaker had to use "probable" arguments, thus appearing as a 
truthful speaker. In this sense, ethos, though not identified 
by name, made an early appearance. Also, Corax divided speeches 
of persuasion into five parts. The first part, the proem, 
possessed material to create goodwill toward the speaker.
Though apparently not designed for direct persuasion, this 
initial division served to conciliate the hearers in prepara­
tion for subsequent persuasion. Both Corax and Tisias appear
2
to appreciate the value of the speaker's character. Thus,
2
William Martin Battler, "Conceptions of Ethos in 
Rhetoric" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of Speech, 
Northwestern University, 1941), p. 15.
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through the use of "probable" arguments and conciliatory proems, 
ethos, though not identified by name, made an appearance in 
early rhetorical concepts.
Ethos was not merely a theoretical subject during its 
formative period. Some orators used ethos as an actual topic 
of persuasion. For example, Greek logographers with their 
client and the audience firmly in mind composed speeches which 
showed their client as faithful, honest, and respectful of 
Athenian laws and customs. In this manner they sought to 
display qualities of character which would garner audience 
respect. Lysias was such a logographer who invested speakers 
with means of proof through character.^ He considered traits, 
habits, and customs, as well as race, family, age, principles, 
lot, and pursuits of his client in depicting him as just, 
benevolent, and praiseworthy. Although some of these are not 
moral qualities, Sattler notes that they do "affect the speak­
er's life and actions. They are qualities peculiar to the 
particular individual and in the broad sense, they are part of 
his e t h o s . T h u s ,  the logographers in preparing speakers to 
win in the courts sought to invest them with characteristics 
which indicated their character.
Plato attacked Athenian rhetoric because it practiced 
deception and ignored the true interest of the state. Sattler
^George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963),
p. 91.
^Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos . . .," p. 19.
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contends that the failure of rhetorical theory to embrace 
specifically the concept of ethos induced Plato's indictment 
of rhetoric. Subsequent development of the concept by later 
writers, claims Sattler, is due partly to Plato's criticism.
His attacks aided an understanding of ethos.^ In his writing 
Plato did not use the term ethos but employed the conceptual 
equivalent in what Sattler calls "many of its more important 
aspects: (a) the speaker should possess good character; (b)
the speaker should be intelligent and informed; (c) the speaker 
should adapt his arguments to the audience; (d) the speaker 
should consider the goodwill of the audience."^
The only extant rhetorical treatise depicting Greek 
sophistic rhetorical theory as it existed prior to Aristotle
7
is the Rhetorics Ad Alexandrum. This work stresses audience 
analysis to uncover those arguments which adapt to audience 
pleasures: "If you wish to write a pleasing speech be careful
as far as possible to adapt the character of your speech to 
that of your public. You will achieve this, if you observe
p
their character— noble, petty, or ordinary." Also recognized 
is the persuasive effect of good character and the observance 
of accepted beliefs: "Righteous conduct is to follow the
^Ibid.. p. 329. ^Ibid.. p. 66.
^Doubt exists about the exact date of this treatise.
For purposes of organizational convenience in this study it 
appears under the "pre-Aristotelian" sub-section with recogni­
tion that this assignment has no verifiable basis in fact.
g
Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, tr. H. Rackham (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1937), 1434^.
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common customs of the state, to obey the laws, and to abide by
Q
private contracts [one's personal promises]." Such advice 
seems to follow the notion condemned by Plato that the only 
necessity is a favorable impression of "appearing" to act in 
the best interest of the state. However, unlike the writers 
of rhetorics of "appearances," this author appreciates the 
persuasive importance of a speaker possessing real moral quali­
ties when he says: an orator must "be careful not only about
one's speech but also about one's personal conduct, regulating 
it by the principles that have been stated, because one's 
manner of life contributes to one's powers of persuasion as 
well as to the attainment of a good reputation.
In summary, several observations about ethos result 
from the pre-Aristotelian period. For logographers such as 
Lysias, for the author of the Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, and 
Corax and Tisias, ethos, though yet unnamed and unsystematized, 
constituted a form of proof. The "appearance" of good charac­
ter through conformity to custom, the persuasiveness of the 
"moral" speaker, and the importance of the proem for concili­
atory purposes all received attention and support.
Aristotelian
At the time Aristotle wrote his Rhetorica ethos still 
lacked formal systematic treatment. Aristotle not only provides 
ethos with a formal treatment but offers a rationale for its
^Ibid.. 1447b. 10Ibid., 1445b.
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worthy use. The rationale emerges from his belief that a case 
should be fought only with facts, external matters such as 
emotional appeals and ethos being extraneous. However, he 
reasons that "other things affect the result considerably, 
owing to the defects of our h e a r e r s . T h u s ,  Aristotle recog­
nizes that rhetoric depends on more than factual data. Sanction 
is given those devices which assist in winning audience approval 
and which can be applied to contingencies.
Aristotle recognizes three modes of artistic proofs
which belong to the art of rhetoric. Ethos is one of these.
Ethos, says Aristotle, is an artistic proof because the speaker
constructs and supplies it. He defines ethos and describes its
persuasive values when he claims:
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character 
when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him cred­
ible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than 
others: this is true generally whatever the question is,
and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible 
and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like 
the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, 
not by what people think of his character before he begins 
to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their 
treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed 
by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persua­
sion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called 
the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.12
In addition to defining ethos and describing its 
persuasive values Aristotle elaborates on good sense, good 
moral character, and good will, which he regards as ingredients
^^Rhetorica, tr. W. Rhys Roberts, in The Works of 
Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946),
XI, 1404a.
^^Ibid.. 1356^.
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of ethos and calls "things which inspire confidence in the 
orator's own c h a r a c t e r . G o o d  sense and good character 
inhere in the possession of certain virtues. He believes that 
a consideration of these virtues enables an understanding of 
how to make hearers take the required view of the speaker's 
character.
The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, 
magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, 
prudence, wisdom. If virtue is a facility of beneficence, 
the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful 
to others, and for this reason men honour most the just and 
the courageous. . . . Justice is the virtue through which 
everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the 
law and in obedience to its commands; . . . Temperance is 
the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical 
pleasures are concerned; . . . Liberality disposes us to 
spend money for other's good; . . . Magnanimity is the 
virtue that disposes us to do good to others on a large 
scale; Magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in 
matters involving the spending of money. . . . Prudence 
is that virtue of the understanding which enables men to 
come to wise decisions about the relation to happiness of 
the goods and evils that have been previously mentioned.14
These virtues, therefore, mark the virtuous man. The virtuous
man, perceived to possess intelligence and character, can
better gain the confidence of the audience. But, Aristotle
cautions, "do not let your words seem inspired so much by
intelligence . . . as by moral purpose: e.g. 'I will this;
aye it was my moral purpose; true, I gained nothing by it,
still it is better thus.' For the other way shows good sense,
but this shows good character; good sense making us go after
what is useful, and good character after what is noble.
^^Ibid. . 1378 .^ "^^ Ibid. , 1366^. ^^Ibid. . 1417*.
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Aristotle describes the third ingredient of ethos, good 
will, as a function of friendship, an element conducive to 
procuring favor. He defines friendship and friendly feeling 
as wishing for another "what you believe to be good things, 
not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far 
as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who 
feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who
think they feel thus towards each other think themselves 
f r i e n d s . A r i s t o t l e  then takes up an analysis of those 
character traits which as signs of good will may create a 
favorable audience response. He alleges that we have friendly 
feelings toward those who share our feelings of good and evil; 
who are friendly or unfriendly toward the same people; who have 
treated us well; who we think wish to treat us well; who are 
enemies to those whose enemies we are; who are willing to treat 
us well where money or our personal safety is involved; who 
work for their living and do not live off others; who are 
temperate because they are not unjust to others; who mind their 
own business; who are not too ready to show us our mistakes and 
are not cantankerous and quarrelsome; who have the tact to make 
and take a joke; who praise such good qualities as we possess; 
who do not reproach us with what we have done amiss to them or 
they have done to help us, for both actions show a tendency to 
criticize us; who do not nurse grudges but behave toward us 
as we find them behaving to everyone else; who are aware of
^^Ibid., 1381®.
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neither their neighbor's bad points nor our own, but of our
good ones only, as a good man always will be; who have some
serious feelings toward us, such as admiration for us, or
belief in our goodness, or pleasure in our company, especially
if they feel like this about qualities in us for which we
especially wish to be admired, esteemed, or liked; who are
like ourselves in character and occupation; who desire the same
things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share
them together; who we help to secure good for themselves,
provided we are not likely to suffer by it ourselves; who are
honest with us, including those who will tell us their own weak
points; and who do not frighten or make us uncomfortable.^^
Through choices which the speaker makes, Aristotle sees
the speaker's intelligence, character, and good will revealed
to the audience. In restating the effect of ethical argument
on persuasion he observes that "we shall learn the qualities
of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate
acts of choice; and they are determined by the end that inspires 
..18them.
Choices which show ethos, he claims, manifest themselves
19in matters of invention, arrangement, and style. About inven­
tion Aristotle says that the speaker presents arguments as
l^Ibid.. 1381^-1381^. ^®Ibdd., 1366*.
19Aristotle also says that choices involving ethos 
occur in matters of delivery (1417^). However, development of 
this aspect of ethos is irrelevant to a study of ethical proof 
in written discourse.
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examples, enthymemes, and maxims. These forms of argument in
order to produce ethos must reflect intelligence, character,
and good will. Consequently the maxim, as a general and
accepted statement about conduct, is particularly important
because it indulges in a moral principle. The maxim enhances
ethos for the speaker can identify himself and his cause with
ethical principles which can induce persuasion. Aristotle
says of the maxim; "It is a statement; not about a particular
fact, . . . nor is it about any and every subject . . . but
only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct
20to be chosen or avoided."
In regard to arrangement Aristotle treats each of the
speech parts. So the audience does not ignore a worthy cause
for lack of respect for the speaker's authority and integrity,
in the proem, he claims, "you may use any means you choose to
make your hearer receptive; among others giving him a good
impression of your character, which always helps to secure his 
21attention." About the narration he says:
You may also narrate as you go anything that does credit 
to yourself . . .  or discredit to your adversary. . . .
The narration should depict character; to which end 
you must know what makes it do so. One such thing is the 
indication of moral purpose; the quality of purpose indi­
cated determines the quality of character depicted and is 
itself determined by the end pursued. . . . This end will 
. . . be gained by describing the manifestations of various 
types of character. . . .22
Still under arrangement Aristotle urges reliance upon character 
^°Ibid.. 1394^. ^^Ibid.. 1415^. ^^Ibid.. 1417®.
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in the absence of strong arguments: "Now if you have proofs
to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse
as well; if you have no enthymemes, then fall back upon moral
discourse: after all, it is more fitting for a man to display
23himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner."
Aristotle commits the epilogue to making "the audience well- 
disposed towards yourself and ill-disposed towards your oppo­
nent. " He tells the speaker:
Having shown your own truthfulness and the untruthfulness 
of your opponent, the natural thing is to commend yourself, 
censure him, and hammer in your points. You must aim at 
one of two objects— you must make yourself out as a good 
man and him a bad one either in yourselves or in relation 
to your hearers.24
Concerning style Aristotle lays stress on the importance 
of appropriate language to successful persuasion. He finds one 
element of appropriateness in the way language can express 
character:
This aptness of language is one thing that makes people 
believe in the truth of your story: their minds draw the
false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact 
that others behave as you do when things are as you describe 
them; and therefore they take your story to be true, whether 
it is so or not. . . .
Furthermore, this way of proving your story by display­
ing these signs of its genuineness expresses your personal 
character. Each class of men, each type of disposition, 
will have its own appropriate way of letting the truth 
appear. . . .  If, then, a speaker uses the very words 
which are in keeping with a particular disposition, he will 
reproduce the corresponding character; for a rustic and an 
educated man will not say the same things nor speak in the 
same way.25
Aristotle, therefore, holds that style establishes speaker
^^Ibid. , 1418^. ^"^Ibid. . 1419^. ^^Ibid. . 1408*.
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sincerity. "Naturalness," he claims, "is persuasive, artifi­
ciality is the contrary; for our hearers are prejudiced and 
think we have some design against them. . . . "  Sattler 
fittingly summarizes Aristotle on the ethos producible through 
style: "The orator suggests truth and sincerity by using terms
appropriate to himself and his subject. In like manner, current 
terms conform to custom, which itself is an element of impor­
tance in evaluating ethos. Finally, style may be judged on an
ethical basis since the use of current terms suggests a simple
27regard for truth rather than artifice."
Thus, Aristotle provides the concept of ethos with its 
first complete and comprehensive treatment. He stresses that 
justice naturally prevails over injustice, and he contends that 
a speaker who offers worthy proposals through a rhetoric imbued 
with a moral purpose will more readily succeed than one who 
speaks without revealing a moral purpose. Treating ethos as 
one of the three modes of persuasion, Aristotle recommends its 
importance because audiences place confidence in morally trust­
worthy men. But, he cautions that ethos embraces more than 
moral qualities, for audiences also judge speakers on other 
traits. Aristotelian ethos is, therefore, founded on the 
speaker qualities of intelligence, character, and good will.
A speaker blessed with moral character without the amoral trait 
of intellectual competence would possess a deficiency in his
^^Ibid., 1404^.
^^"Conceptions of Ethos . . .," p. 100.
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ethical appeal. Aristotle describes various virtues which 
when demonstrated by the speaker produce audience confidence 
in him and reflect the choices of an intelligent man. Whether 
the end of speaking be the honorable, the expedient, or the 
just, the choices made will influence acceptance of the speaker. 
Choices made in invention, arrangement, and style affect audi­
ence estimation of the speaker's intelligence, character, and 
good will.
Roman
Roman rhetoricians offered their impression of the 
28"ideal orator." This ultimate in man was the end product of 
philosophical knowledge and speaking skill. He possessed 
concern for ethics and a reputably good character. Like 
Aristotle, he understood ethos to embrace all things which 
induce approval of the speaker, whether moral or amoral. He 
knew a bad character would impair his effectiveness; and if 
Quintilian were his critic, he also knew that unless he pos­
sessed good character he could not even call himself an 
"orator."
28See Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, 
tr. C. D. Yonge (London: George Bell and Sons, 1913), IV,
383; Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, tr. John Selby Watson 
(London: George Bell and Sons, 1891), I, preface; Longinus,
On the Sublime. tr. Benedict Einarson (Chicago: Packard and
Company, 1945); St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, tr.
Sister Therese Sullivan, in "S. Aureli Augustini, Hipponiensis 
Episcopi, De Doctrina Christiana, Liber Quartus" (Published 
Ph.D. dissertation. Catholic University, 1930), pp. 57-59.
123
Both Cicero and Quintilian delved into the nature of 
ethical persuasion and contributed to its understanding.
Cicero, referring to the forensic orator, prescribed;
A potent factor in success . . .  is the characters, 
principles, conduct and course of life, both of those who 
are to plead cases and of their clients, to be approved, 
and conversely those of their opponents condemned; and for 
the feelings of the tribunal to be won over, as far as 
possible, to goodwill towards the advocate. . . . Now 
feelings are won over by a man's merit, achievements or 
reputable life, qualifications easier to embellish, if 
only they are real, than to fabricate where non-existent. 
. . .  It is very helpful to display the tokens of good 
nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty and a disposition that 
is pleasing and not grasping or covetous, and all the 
qualities belonging to men who are upright, unassuming and 
not given to haste, stubbornness, strife or harshness, are 
powerful in winning goodwill. . . . And so to paint their 
[those whose interests are being determined] characters in 
words, as being upright, stainless, conscientious, modest 
and long-suffering under injustice, has a really wonderful 
effect; and this topic . . . is . . . often to be worth 
more than the merits of the case. Moreover so much is 
done by good taste and style in speaking, that the speech 
seems to depict the speaker's character. For by means of 
particular types of thought and diction . . . speakers are 
made to appear upright, well-bred and virtuous m e n . 29
Quintilian applied his comment to all types of speaking as he
attempted to precisely develop the "force" of the term ethos.
He believed that ethos is
recommended above all, by goodness, being not only mild and 
placid, but for the most part pleasing and polite, and 
amiable and attractive to the hearers; and the greatest 
merit in the expression of it, is that it should seem to 
flow from the nature of the things and persons with which 
we are concerned, so that the moral character of the 
speaker may clearly appear, and be recognized as it were,
in his discourse.30
29De Oratore, tr. E. W. Sutton (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1942), I, 327-329.
^^Institutes of Oratory, VI, 423-424.
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Thus, in essence, Cicero and Quintilian endorsed 
Aristotelian ethos. They called it "character," but Quintilian 
occasionally used the word ethos. Cicero and Quintilian essen­
tially agreed about ethos and, in part, credited the success 
of the "ideal" orator to use of morally commendable arguments 
and establishment of good character, both vital to winning 
audience approval.
Medieval
Writers in the early medieval period substituted
"ethical," "character," "propriety," "the becoming," and
31"decorum" for ethos as Aristotle knew it. Although Capella,
Julius Victor, Cassiodorus, and Alcuin discussed ethos, they
gave it no particular emphasis as a mode of proof. Propriety
in style and delivery was the acceptable way to produce audi-
3 2ence approval of ethical qualities. In the late medieval
period the rhetoric of dictamen with attention to the importance
of the exordium and to the adaptation of style to the reader
touched on traditional aspects of ethos. Also, tractates on
preaching during this period insisted on nobility of character
and the value of ethical persuasion in invention through the
33use of the Scriptures.
^^Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos . . .," p. 232.
^^Ibid., p. 334.
^^Ibid., p. 233.
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Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
Treatises on rhetoric during this period either followed 
the classical tradition or the stylistic practice which empha­
sized tropes and figures. By following Aristotle or Roman
restatements, Erasmus, Melanchthon, Bacon, Penelon, and Lamy
34referred to ethos as a mode of proof. On the other hand, the 
figurative devices employed by those who advocated a rhetoric 
of tropes and figures involved ethos in the choices made by 
the speaker. Sherry, Peacham, Fraunce, Hoskins and others 
offered "devices which evince good traits of character. Ethos 
is applied both in figures which are concerned with invention 
and in the devices which evince sincerity through style and 
delivery.
Modern
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed 
development of the classical concept of ethos. Both English 
and American writers described in more lucid terms the constit­
uents of ethical persuasion. In England, Mason, Sheridan,
Burgh, Scott, Knox, and Austin limited their treatment of ethos 
to characteristics in delivery which showed the speaker to 
possess sincerity. However, Ward, Campbell, Blair, Whately, 
Witherspoon, and Adams did not limit their treatment of ethos 
to delivery and instead relied upon ethos in the Aristotelian
'^^ Ibid. . pp. 247-251.
^^Ibid.. p. 337.
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sense. "Briefly stated, the entire doctrine of Aristotle 
appears, ethos as a mode of proof, ethos as adaptation to the 
audience, and ethos evinced in style and delivery. In fact, 
the threefold basis of ethos in the Rhetoric is fully 
explained.
John Ward in a work published in 1759 claimed that a 
speaker will lose respect if his arguments are inconsistent 
with his normal conduct. He went on to describe as ethical 
qualities essential to the orator: wisdom— because audiences
follow authority, not arguments, and for fear of being misled 
they confide in one who is competent; integrity— to supplement 
wisdom because knowledge without honesty implies deceit; benev­
olence— because without friendliness, wisdom and integrity are 
not enough; modesty— because boldness and confidence are not
as well received; and simplicity in style— because a speaker's
37disposition is discoverable in his use of words.
George Campbell, who revitalized the classical doctrine 
that the primary aim in rhetoric is persuasion, showed a pref­
erence for the Roman prescriptions about the ethical possessions 
of the "ideal" orator. Campbell attributed success in oratory 
to being a good man "for to be good is the only sure way of 
being long esteemed good, and to be esteemed good is previously 
necessary to one's being heard with due attention and regard.
^^Ibid.. p. 338.
System of Oratory (London: n.p., 1759), I, 140-
146.
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38Consequently, the topic hath a foundation in human nature."
Campbell is important for yet another reason, his use of the
word "sympathy" to mean approval of the speaker's character:
"Sympathy in the hearers to the speaker may be lessened several
ways, chiefly by these two: by a low opinion of his intellec-
39tual abilities and by a bad opinion of his morals." He
appears to evaluate ethos through a study of virtues:
One reduceth all the virtues to "prudence" and is ready to 
make it clear as sunshine that there neither is nor can be 
another source of moral good, a right-conducted self-love; 
another is equally confident that all the virtues are but 
different modifications of disinterested "benevolence;" a 
third will demonstrate to you that "veracity" is the whole 
duty of a man; a fourth, with more ingenuity, and much 
greater appearance of reason, assures you that the true 
system of ethics is comprised in one word, "sympathy."40
Probity, disinterestedness, candor, and other moral 
qualities contribute to the speaker's ethos, contended Hugh 
Blair, who seems to ignore his contemporary George Campbell's 
isolation of the singular most important aspect of ethos.
"These give weight and force to everything which he utters," 
claimed Blair, "they dispose us to listen with attention and 
pleasure; and create a secret partiality in favour of that 
side which he espouses. Whereas, if we entertain a suspicion 
of craft and disingenuity, of a corrupt, or a base mind in the 
speaker, his eloquence loses all its real e f f e c t . B l a i r
38Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1871), p. 119.
^^Ibid. '^ °Ibid. , pp. 146-147.
^^Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Edinburgh:
Bell and Bradfute, 1813), II, 427.
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then addressed himself to means for improving eloquence:
Nothing, therefore, is more necessary for those who 
would excel in any of the higher kinds of oratory, than to 
cultivate habits of the several virtues, and to refine and 
improve all their moral feelings. Whenever these become 
dead, or callous, they may be assured, that, on every great 
occasion, they will speak with less power, and less success. 
The sentiments and dispositions, particularly requisite for 
them to cultivate, are the following: the love of justice
and order, and indignation at insolence and oppression; the 
love of honesty and truth, and detestation of fraud, mean­
ness, and corruption; magnanimity of spirit; the love of 
liberty, of their country, and the public; zeal for all 
great and noble designs, and reverence for all worthy and 
heroic characters. . . .  A true orator should be a person 
of generous sentiments, of warm feelings, and of a mind 
turned towards the admiration of all those great and high 
objects, which mankind are naturally formed to admire.
Joined with the manly virtues, he should, at the same time, 
possess strong and tender sensibility to all the injuries, 
distresses, and sorrows of his fellow-creatures; a heart 
that can easily relent; that can readily enter into the 
circumstances of others, and can make their case his own.
A proper mixture of courage, and of modesty, must always 
be studied by every public speaker. . . . Every public 
speaker should be able to rest somewhat on himself; and 
to assume that air, not of self-complacency, but of firm­
ness, which bespeaks a consciousness of his being thoroughly 
persuaded of the truth, or justice, of what he delivers; a 
circumstance of no small consequence for making impression 
on those who hear.
Next to moral qualifications, what in the second place, 
is most necessary to an orator, is a fund of knowledge.
. . . Good sense and knowledge are the foundation of all
good speaking.42
Richard Whately in his early nineteenth century work. 
Elements of Rhetoric, is highly Aristotelian in his approach 
to ethos. He recognizes the qualities of good principle, good 
sense, and good will and says that "if the Orator can completely 
succeed in this, he will persuade more powerfully than by the 
strongest arguments. Whately alleges that the opinion of
AO^^Ibid.. II, 430-432.
(New York: William Jackson, 1834), p. 128.
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the audience about these traits, not the speaker's real charac­
ter, counts most. Ethos has particular significance for him 
because a typical audience "must, take into consideration the 
character of those who propose, support, or dissuade any meas­
ure" because they lack complete competence to judge independ­
ently.^^ In the manner of Aristotle, Whately holds that "noble, 
generous, and amiable sentiments" aimed at the truth best serve 
the speaker conscious of the value of ethical persuasion.
From America both John Witherspoon and John Quincy 
Adams wrote about the place of ethos in rhetoric and singled 
out integrity as prime evidence of character. Witherspoon 
demanded of the lawyer the same moral qualities of any other 
orator when he observed: "There can be no doubt that integrity
is the first and most important character of a man, be his 
profession what it will; but . . . there are many not so sensi­
ble of the importance of it in the profession of the law . . .
As an advocate of Aristotelian ethos, Adams called for endow­
ments of integrity, of the mind, and of good will as components 
of ethical proof. Without integrity all confidence in a 
speaker's discourse is lost, he claimed.
Writers of the modern period thus encourage those 
speaker qualities which can contribute to the speaker's ethical
44ibid. . p. 160. "^ I^bid. , pp. 130, 154.
"Lectures on Eloquence," in The Works of the Rev.
John Witherspoon (Philadelphia: William W. Woodward, 1802),
III, 570.
^^Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory (Cambridge: Hilliard
and Metcalf, 1810), I, 345.
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nature as a mode of proof. Most are suggestive of Aristotelian 
concepts of ethos when they emphasize intelligence, high char­
acter, and good will as constituents of ethical proof.
Contemporary
Contemporary writers of speech texts and researchers 
probing the unknown aspects of persuasion are keeping the 
subject of ethos alive. The former reassert the ethical 
concepts rooted in ancient Greece and Rome while the latter 
are performing experimental studies to amass new data from 
which they hopefully can affirm existing theory or formulate 
it anew.
Writers of speech texts in current usage such as Loren
Reid and Robert Oliver display the forceful influence of the
long history of ethical persuasion. In his text Reid tells
college speech students that "listeners feel that some speakers
48are more credible and believable than others." He then
proceeds to outline "the speaker's character" in remarkably
familiar terminology. Characteristics he recommends which
should induce a feeling of credibility and believability are
intelligence— which he labels "competence"; character— under
which he discusses integrity, sincerity, fairness, candor, and
courage; and good will— through which the speaker shows
49consideration for the views and needs of others. Reid's 
48First Principles of Public Speaking, 2d ed. (Columbia, 
Missouri: Artcraft Press, 1962), p. 276.
4QIbid., pp. 276-283.
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presentation of character concludes with a reminder about the 
speaker's ethical responsibilities. He urges the student 
speaker to "set standards of ethical responsibility for your­
self. Then when in later years you are confronted with ethical
problems, you will, from life-long habit, put yourself on the 
side of those forces of morality and integrity that should 
enlist us all. Oliver in his text on persuasive speaking
covers the same territory as Reid but in a more elaborate and
expanded m a n n e r . E t h o s  in the sense presented by the ancients 
permeates Oliver's treatment of the subject which he flavors 
with modern sociological and psychological terminology. He 
approaches ethical persuasion by considering the influence on 
the audience of the speaker's representative nature, qualities, 
attitudes, and adaptive ability. Underlying this approach is 
Oliver's belief that "the greatest single asset that a persua­
sive speaker can have is a character that is known to be beyond 
reproach.
Exploratory research into the rhetorical nature of 
ethos has become increasingly prevalent among contemporary 
scholars. Identifying new terms with the concept of ethos 
these researchers have developed modern experimental studies 
which may enable systematic analysis of the interaction among
5°lbid., p. 285.
^^The Psychology of Persuasive Speech, 2d ed. (New 
York: Longmans, Green and Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 62-91.
S^ibid., p. 70.
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variables believed to influence the use of ethical proof. They
speak in terms of communicator and source credibility, extrinsic
and intrinsic ethos, attitude shifts, prestige suggestion,
expertness, and trustworthiness. Exemplary of studies conducted
53have been those in "prestige suggestion," and "communicator 
c r e d i b i l i t y . T h o s e  concerned with communicator credibility 
have investigated how variations in credibility affect "the way 
in which the content and presentation are perceived and evalu­
ated" and "the degree to which attitudes and beliefs are 
55modified." Hovland, Janis, and Kelley in summarizing the 
available research evidence on this subject note "that the 
reactions to a communication are significantly affected by 
cues as to the communicator's intentions, expertness, and 
trustworthiness. The very same presentation tends to be judged 
more favorably when made by a communicator of high credibility 
than by one of low credibility." But they further conclude 
that, as yet, no one has been able "to disentangle the effects 
of the two main components of credibility— trustworthiness and 
expertness— but it appears both are important variables. 
Significant in their summary is the implicit admission that 
although verification of such existing theory about ethos has
53S. E. Asch, "The Doctrine of Suggestion, Prestige and 
Imitation in Social Psychology," Psychological Review, LV 
(1948), 250-276.
^^Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H.
Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale Univer­
sity, 1953), pp. 19-48.
S^ibid., p. 21. ^^Ibid., p. 35.
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been made, the formulation of new theory awaits further 
experimentation.
Summary
From pre-Aristotelian times to the present, ethical 
persuasion has been subjected to practice, theory, and more 
recently, experimentation. Although some display an anxious 
curiosity about the subject and eagerly seek to dispel our 
curiosity with new answers and more certain concepts, our 
present indebtedness for much of the knowledge we have about 
ethical theory goes back to Aristotle and the restatements and 
elaborations of the Romans. These early rhetoricians provided 
a more systematic explanation of ethos and a more direct advo­
cacy of the tenets of the concept than had previously existed. 
They treated ethical proof as one of three modes of persuasion 
and declared it important because audiences tend to confide in 
a morally trustworthy man. But they added that judgment of a 
speaker is not limited to his moral qualities and in addition 
to character, intelligence and good will received acknowledg­
ment as constituents of ethos. Elaboration on the application 
of this threefold bases of ethos to rhetoric came with the 
recognition that through choices made by the speaker he mani­
fests his intelligence, character, and good will.
Rhetoricians from the Aristotelian era to the present 
have concerned themselves with the importance of choices made 
by the speaker as they affect his acceptance or rejection by 
the audience. Choices as to the ends of speaking, whether to
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the honorable, the expedient, or the just, and choices made in 
invention, arrangement, and style are said to affect audience 
estimation of the speaker's intelligence, character, and good 
will. Whether called "virtues" or "personal qualities," choices 
as described by rhetoricians can be categorized according to 
the threefold bases of ethos. A speaker is intelligent when 
he shows a familiarity with the needs, interests, and beliefs 
of his day, has zeal for great and noble designs, establishes 
his authority based on personal experience, demonstrates a 
knowledge of history, and uses common sense. A speaker pos­
sesses high character when he associates himself with the 
virtuous and elevated, links those who offend with that which 
is not virtuous, creates an impression of sincerity, shows 
consistency through expressions in keeping with his character 
and conduct, displays admirable courage, is indignant at inso­
lence and oppression and opposes fraud and debasing qualities, 
maintains a responsible though disinterested attitude, serves 
as an honest messenger of truth, and shows good taste and 
modesty. A speaker conveys good will when he uses tact and 
moderation, identifies his wants with those of his audience, 
is cautious and tolerant, has warm feelings and tender sensi­
bilities to the sorrow of others, acts to benefit society, 
favors justice, order, and fairness, and is benevolent and 
loyal. Thus, rhetoricians claim that a speaker's utterance is 
more believable because of the force inherent in the authentic­
ity and credibility resulting from his choices which show
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intelligence, character, and good will and recommend him as 
worthy of being believed.
Ethical Proof in the Judicial Opinion 
K. N. Llewellyn, lawyer and educator, declares: The
judge "is not merely human . . .  he is, as well, a lawyer . . . 
and as such skilled in manipulating the resources of persuasion 
at his h a n d . T h i s  manipulation takes place within a judicial 
opinion with a rhetorical nature which provides opportunity for 
the judge to recommend his credibility. An analysis of both 
the rhetorical nature and the opportunity shed light on 
Llewellyn's claim.
The Judicial Opinion: a Rhetorical Instance
Among their many duties federal court judges appoint 
receivers for bankrupt businesses, preside at jury trials, and 
admit aliens to citizenship. Primarily, however, they make 
decisions, issue orders, and write opinions. Peacefully they 
attempt disposition of conflict and construction of rules which 
affect others than those immediately interested. Whether the 
federal judge sits on a district court finding the facts and 
applying the rules or on an appellate court caring little about 
the facts but finding mistakes made in applying the rules, 
similar concerns confront him. He must work with precedents 
and underlying principles to which he must give appropriate
57,The Bramble Bush (New York: Oceana Publications,
1951), p. 45.
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direction. His activity involves him in the group struggle 
about which he must make choices which he reflects in a written 
opinion. The prestigious nature of federal judges and the 
belief that they reflect and influence public opinion makes 
their judicial opinions a potent force in the group struggle.
Although a single opinion may have no wide-spread 
consequence, it still has persuasive implications. When the 
opinion has extensive consequence, it may affect all branches 
of government, the bar, and the people in general. "In either 
case," says Warren Wright, "the judge is engaged in the same 
general process. He is defending his judicial choices, and
58rhetoric provides the instrument for stating that defense."
His choices may inevitably become entangled in controversy for
as part of the public forum, a judge's opinion is always 
subject to attack and defense. The interests which it 
thwarts may be expected to respond. The interests which 
it supports may be expected to come to its defense. As 
an entry in the public forum, it will be explained and 
discussed. If it is not a statement on a controversial 
issue, it may be a statement on an issue which it will 
cause to become controversial. The judge knows these 
things and he knows that his opinion must clearly repre­
sent his reasoning and his judgment and that it must be 
persuasive enough to face verbal battle.59
Judge Joseph Hutcheson frankly states that when he 
renders an opinion it must be written so as to "pass muster
^®"The Rhetoric of Learned Hand in Selected Civil 
Liberties Cases; A Method for Analysis of Judicial Opinions" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of Speech, University 
of Illinois, 1960), p. 60.
S^Ibid.. p. 75.
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with his c r i t i c s . S u c h  an admission prompts the question:
Who are these critics the judge must influence favorably? They
are the lawyers who represent litigants, the lawyers who teach
and write, and the lawyers who supply the bench and bar with
arguments. They are the law reviews of the law schools, the
journals of the bar associations, and the many professional
books on law. They are the peers on the bench who affirm,
dissent, and overrule. And, they are the general public who
depend upon lawyers to translate the meaning and significance
of judicial pronouncements. Thus, the range of the judge’s
audience may extend from
immediate litigants and counsel to the nation at large.
The rhetoric which he employs is probably influenced by 
years of background in the profession and its subject 
matter, formed by the attitudes, practices, and traditions 
of the law and the men who deal in law. His rhetoric may 
be found in part by his awareness of an audience, whether 
the audience be local or national. While he may not speak 
to the popular audience as directly as the members of the 
other branches, the nature of the audience to which he 
does speak is such that his opinion may be expected to be 
an influence on the public forum.
Wright in his incisive analysis of judicial rhetoric 
makes relevant conclusions about the function and nature of 
judicial rhetoric. He finds the function couched in the neces­
sity to persuade a critic-audience of the soundness of a deci­
sion rendered in the best interest of society. The decision 
bare of rhetorical assistance may fail to provide a stimulus
60"The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch'
in Judicial Decisions," Cornell Law Quarterly, XIV (April,
1929), 285.
75-76,
^^Wright, "The Rhetoric of Learned Hand . . .," pp.
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for present obedience or precedent for future application.
"Whether the decision is of local or national import," Wright
concludes, "the function of judicial rhetoric is to make the
opinion clear and persuasive in order that the decision may be
plainly understood and willingly o b e y e d . H e  finds the
nature of judicial rhetoric to rest in
neither the impassioned cry of a Patrick Henry, nor . . . 
the vehement argument of a Daniel Webster. It is not the 
rough-and-tumble rhetoric of the legislative chamber and 
the election campaign. Rather, it is the studied, delib­
erate argument of a referee, whose profession severely 
circumscribes his rhetorical activity. It is the restrain­
ed, yet persuasively oriented statement of the American 
judge as he goes about his daily business of adjusting 
disputes. Judicial rhetoric is the studied contribution 
of the American judge to the public forum, made with a 
knowledge of the judicial opinion's function, its audi­
ence, and its potential import.63
Judges, therefore, despite their stature and granted 
power, do not possess restrained dictatorial freedom. As Judge 
Hand recognized, they are dependent on the force of popular 
support. To insure needed support and to avoid being overruled 
at a higher level the judicial opinion is the judge's only 
medium to justify his choices and state his case. To deny his 
pronouncements a persuasive function and nature is to ignore 
realities and to relegate the judge to the mechanistic status 
of one lacking human qualities.
The Judicial Opinion: an Opportunity for Ethical Proof
Throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth 
century the accepted theory was that good judges decide cases
^^Ibid.. p. 63. ^^Ibid., p. 78.
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by rules and reasoning controlled through the unwavering and 
purely objective application of logic. Only those who spoke 
in bad taste or in a joking manner mentioned the human charac­
teristics of the judge. Studies showed that the bench and bar 
disdained having their attention directed to "the extent to 
which judging is affected by temperament, training, biases and 
predilections of the respective j u d g e s . A s  recently as 
1949, Judge Frank noted: "And when, not very long ago, some
few of us ventured to violate that tabu, a considerable part 
of the legal profession called us subversive, enemies of good
^ e
government, disturbers of 'law and order.'" Indeed, acqui­
escence in the tabu against personal involvement of judges in 
their decisions would clearly appear to preclude use of the 
opinion as a persuasive medium, as a medium for revealing those 
personal qualities which constitute ethical proof. After all, 
a mechanical disposition of a case is some consolation to a 
defeated litigant who winces at the thought of his rights being 
exposed to the uncertainties of humanly influenced judgments. 
For some the desire fathers the thought. Intelligent analysis 
of the opinion for what it is accedes to the preferred suppres­
sion of realities.
Two theories about the function of the judge have 
persisted in the Anglo-American law-making process. Under one
^^Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: 
Brentanos's, 1930), p. 115.
^^Courts on Trial (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1949), p. 146.
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the presence of ethical proof in a legal opinion would be 
unreasonable, alarming, and destructive to justice. Under the 
other such presence would be reasonable, unavoidable, and 
blessed with the virtues of frankness and sincerity.
The "mechanical" theory says that the judge seeks truth 
by arriving directly at a judgment from discovered principles, 
without deviation or turning. Arbitrariness will only result 
when the judge allows himself to be affected by the circum­
stances of the case before him. With the general acceptance 
of this view (called by some the "slot machine" theory), atten­
tion focuses away from individual views and preferences to 
precedents, the "real" authoritative basis of the law. The 
undependable human element is not to be trusted in administer­
ing justice.Stringent limitations on opinion-writing require 
temperance in language. Judges "are to phrase their decisions 
and explain them in a technical language which conceals any
subjective element and makes the decision appear to be control-
67led by the law." Acceptance of the "mechanical" theory 
encourages neither expectations of ethical proof in legal 
opinions nor an admission that the proof is there even if such 
a conclusion appears reasonable.
^^Charles Grove Haines, "General Observations on the 
Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the 
Decisions of Judges," Illinois Law Review, XVII (May, 1922), 
96-98.
^^Jack W. Peltason, Federal Courts in the Judicial 
Process (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1955), p. 21.
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The other or "free legal decision" theory says that a 
judge "gathers his conclusions from his own concepts and con­
science influenced largely as these are by his training and 
experience, and by the social and economic conditions surround­
ing him and the litigants whose controversies are to be 
s e t t l e d . C o n s c i o u s  frankness in opinion-writing, this 
opinion says, is preferable to insincere, unrealistically 
rigid arguments. The New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized 
an inescapable fact when it held: "Judges are men, and their
decisions upon complex facts must vary as those of jurors on 
the same facts. Calling one determination an opinion and the 
other a verdict does not . . . make that uniform and certain 
which from its nature must remain variable and uncertain. 
Variability and uncertainty dictate varying courses of action 
about which choices must be made if judges are to render deci­
sions. Recognition that judges as human beings make these 
choices and seek to influence other human beings about their 
choices invites expectancy that the personal characteristics 
of the judge who responds frankly and sincerely will emerge as 
ethical proof in his written opinions.
Disciples of the "human" theory about judges are 
increasingly numerous and their observations realistically 
tolerant. They tend to recognize those stimuli working on the 
judge which expose him to certain forces, condition him through
^®Haines, "General Observations . . .," p. 96.
^^In Frank, Courts on Trial, p. 180.
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his experiences, and demand of him choice-making. These recog­
nitions dictate to those who endorse the "human" theory that 
the judge cannot eliminate the personal element from his work. 
Each force is worthy of separate analysis for the probability 
it introduces that judges are not "slot machines" and do inter­
ject themselves into their work.
His state of health, his momentary temperament, and
his advocacy of a point of view are all stimuli which can
induce the judge's self-involvement. As the French essayist
Montaigne pointed out: "When Justice So and So leaves his
house suffering from the Gout, from jealousy or resentment
against his valet who has been robbing him, his whole soul dyed
and steeped in anger, we cannot doubt that his judgment will
70be warped accordingly. . . . "  Judge Frank's comments show 
that this notion has changed little since Montaigne's day:
Of course, no one, except jocularly, has ever proposed 
explaining all or most decisions in terms of the judge's 
digestive disturbances. Yet, at times, a judge's physical 
or emotional condition has marked effect. No one denies 
that a witness may have made a serious mistake about what 
he saw or heard because of acute indigestion or a sleepless 
night. Why refuse to admit the same as to a trial judge 
when functioning as a witness of the witnesses??^
Yet another stimulus indicated by Justice Cardozo is the
eccentricities of judges. Cardozo acknowledged that "one judge
looks at problems from the point of view of history, another
from that of social utility, one is a formalist, another a
latitudinarian, one is timorous of change, another dissatisfied
7°In ibid.. p. 163. ^^Ibid., p. 162.
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72with the present. . . Thus, the judge is an active
spokesman for a particular philosophy or, at least, a silent 
advocate of a point of view. Regardless of the nature of these 
forces, whether health, temperament, or advocacy, each is a 
stimulus to involving the judge personally in his work.
Still other stimuli condition the judge and influence 
his responses. All constitute the peculiar personality of the 
particular judge sitting, for "the great tides and currents,"
according to Cardozo, "do not turn aside in their course,
73and pass the judges by." These conditioners include emotions,
traits and habits of behavior, and background. This prompted
Judge Bok to call the law unscientific "in the sense of a
science whose rules are impersonal and beyond the reach of
human emotions or behavior. Emotion and behavior are the raw
materials from which the law is distilled in one way or another.
. . . There is no plea to be made except to keep the law
p e r s o n a l . C a r d o z o ,  although he generally ignored the impact
of personal influences on fact-finding, reinforced Bok when he
said: "Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes
and dislikes, the predilections and prejudices, the complex of
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make
75the man, whether he be litigant or judge." Other conditioners 
72Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 177.
^^Ibid.. p. 168.
^^In Frank, Courts on Trial, p. 176.
^^In ibid., p. 179.
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in the judge's background receive Frank's attention. Speaking 
of the judge's personality he calls it "a product of numerous 
factors, including his parents, his schooling, his teachers 
and companions, the persons he has met, the woman he married
(or did not marry), his children, the books and articles he
76has read." These additional forces, admitted by eminent 
members of the bench, complement those already mentioned to 
further detract from the notion that a judge can keep his human 
characteristics aloof from his judicial duties.
But at least one more important personal involvement 
of the judge in the judicial process is apparent to those who 
regard judges as something more than mechanical manipulators 
of legal machinery. Wright reports on this facet when he says, 
"Probably all rhetoric reveals some ethical components or 
overtones. A judge gives indication of his intelligence and 
character when he selects judicial methods, when he chooses 
one argument over another, when he gives his reasons for his
choices. . . . Thus, ethical appeal plays a part in judicial
77rhetoric." Attorney Theodore Schroeder sees these choices
as "fragments of an autobiography" of the judge;
Every judicial opinion necessarily reveals a variety 
of choice. There is a choice of materials from that 
offered in evidence, as well as among possible precedents 
and arguments. A choice is made in that which is approved 
as well as that which is ignored, or expressly disapproved. 
There is a choice of material brought in by the judge and 
not a matter of record. There is choice in all that is
^^Ibid.. p. 152.
^^"The Rhetoric of Learned Hand . . .," pp. 64-65.
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emphasized, slighted or distorted. A choice is evinced in 
the very words by which these other choices are e x p r e s s e d . 78
Deductive logical devices are useless to the judge confronted 
with these choices. Rather than a point from which the judge 
begins, the law in this respect becomes his conclusion. As 
such the personal element is inescapable and the responsibility 
for critical self-scrutiny and cautious exercise of authority 
is properly trusted to those whose personality best suits the 
function. Frank describes Learned Hand as the type of self­
demanding judge who can make these choices without having the 
"personal element" of which he is aware lead him into arbitrar­
iness and detraction from the "true nature of the judging 
79process."
Ethical Proof in This Study
The image of the Man and the Judge has been presented 
along with the nature of ethical proof and the likelihood of 
its occurrence in rhetorically oriented legal opinions. With 
Judge Hand's belief in mind that a good judge is an artist who 
blends into his work that which to others is "delectable and 
tolerable" the unexplored territory of the Judge's criminal 
law opinions will be analyzed and synthesized to ascertain the 
ethical proof contained therein. The following chapter will 
reflect consideration of 118 opinions from which emerge examples
78
"The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions,"
California Law Review. VI (January, 1918), 97.
^^Courts on Trial. p. 412.
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of ethical proof, categorized with subordinate examples combined 
with their like types and positioned under the five headings 
most descriptive of how the Judge recommended his credibility.
The five categories which constitute the organizational 
pattern for Chapter V are; (1) appearing to act in the best 
interest of a free society governed by law; (2) demonstrating 
an understanding of human nature; (3) displaying expertness in 
the use of reasoning; (4) exercising caution; and (5) identify­
ing with trustworthy virtues.
CHAPTER V
JUDGE HAND RECOMMENDS HIS CREDIBILITY 
Introduction
Recalling Judge Hand's comparison of the good judge 
with a chef who adds those ingredients to his dishes which 
make them appealing to the fancy of his guests, Felix Frank­
furter adds: "Like a good chef he makes the best dish when
he uses the best materials. At any rate he avoids stale and 
underripe materials, and certainly noxious ingredients."^
What, then, are the "best" ingredients which make the legal 
opinions appealing; and, more important, what were they to 
Judge Hand? One need not search far in Hand's recorded 
thoughts to uncover at least some of the indispensable ingre­
dients without which the opinion suffers loss of an appealing 
flavor. "In the end, and quite fairly," contended Hand, "a 
judge will be estimated in terms of his outlook and his nature,
He cannot evade responsibility for his beliefs, because these
2
are at bottom the creatures of his choice." The exercise of
^"Judge Learned Hand," Harvard Law Review, LX (Febru­
ary, 1947), 327.
2
"Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five," in Learned Hand, 
The Spirit of Liberty, ed. Irving Dilliard (New York: Vintage
Books Inc., 1959), p. 21.
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choice in manifesting beliefs and revealing his nature is not 
only unavoidable responsibility for any judge but an act which 
exposes him to estimations about his intelligence, character, 
and good will. This act, the responsibility for which Judge 
Hand understood so well, caused the Judge to employ ethical 
proof as he chose to act to benefit society, to understand 
human nature, to display intelligent reasoning and possession 
of knowledge, to exercise caution, and to identify with truth 
and honesty. Each ingredient made the "dish" more palatable 
as the Judge recommended his credibility and worthiness for 
being believed. Each ingredient deserves separate analysis for 
appreciation of the Hand technique of integrating ethical proof 
into the judicial opinion.
Acting in the Best Interests of a 
Free Societv Governed by Law
In his criminal law opinions Judge Hand both directly 
and indirectly demonstrated concern for the well-being of 
society. He gave his support to the Constitutional rights of 
litigants and to the authority of judges. Expediency, he 
believed, had a place in the judicial process and harmless 
error and legal formalism were not to overturn otherwise just 
decisions. Once justice and fairness had been assured, he 
freely linked an offending litigant with debasing qualities.
In each instance Judge Hand sought to benefit the general and 
not the special public, to serve the popular and not the selfish 
interests of his day as he fought oppression and acted to
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benefit a society governed by law. As constituents of ethical 
proof, through these choices the Judge recommended his intelli­
gence, character, and good will to his audience.
Demonstrated Concern for the Well-Being of Society
Judge Hand demonstrated concern for the well-being of 
our society when he affirmed the conviction of defendants 
indicted for conspiracy to obtain money by the use of force, 
violence, or coercion. Their crime, he said, "struck at the 
heart of civilized society; its very possibility is a strain 
upon our jurisprudence."^ He also spoke out for our form of 
government, for realism about sex, and for litigants' rights.
For our form of government
The Judge through his opinions became an articulate 
spokesman pledged to defend the freedom assured by a form of 
government about which he possessed deep convictions. He 
conveyed these beliefs when he reversed Judith Coplon's convic­
tion for attempting to deliver defense information to a citizen 
of a foreign nation and for conspiring to defraud the United 
States. The defendant's telephone wires had been tapped and 
recordings made. The trial judge held that the inadmissible 
recordings had not led to any evidence at the trial but he 
denied defense counsel the privilege of examining the informa­
tion recorded by the tappings. Judge Hand considered the 
defendant's act as secondary in harm to the judge's refusal.
^United States v. Compagna, 146 P.(2d) 524,529 (1944).
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"A society which has come to wince at such exposure of the 
methods by which it seeks to impose its will upon its members," 
he held, "has already lost the feel of freedom and is on the 
path towards a b s o l u t i s m . I n  the must publicized Dennis case 
he again supported the democratic form of government as he 
chose to speak and decide in its behalf. Judge Hand upheld 
convictions for violation of the Smith Act by conspiracy to 
organize the Communist Party of the United States. He cited 
the American Communist Party as a wide-spread, ruthlessly 
disciplined body committed to doctrinal orthodoxy and the 
absorption of existing governments. "Our democracy," Hand 
proclaimed, "like any other, must meet that faith and that 
creed on the merits, or it will perish; and we must not flinch 
at the c h a l l e n g e . F a c e d  with chosing between abridging 
absolutely free speech and striking down a "clear and present" 
danger to his form of government he preferred the latter. 
"True," he concluded, "we must not forget our own faith; we 
must be sensitive to the dangers that lurk in any choice; but 
choose we must, and we shall be silly dupes if we forget that 
. . . just such preparations in other countries have aided to 
supplant existing governments when the time was r i p e . I n  
time of war when confronted by military hostilities Judge Hand
^United States v. Judith Coplon. 185 F.(2d) 629,638
(1950).
(1950).
6
^United States v. Dennis et al.. 183 F.(2d) 201,212
Ibid.. p. 213
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was equally as active in offering protection to his country 
as when confronted by ideological hostilities in time of peace. 
During World War II certain parties bought forged meat ration 
"cheques" for which an indictment resulted when they made 
fraudulent statements to the wartime Defense Supplies Corpora­
tion. In upholding a conviction of these defendants under the 
indictment the Judge cited "their sordid contribution toward 
breaking down the collective effort to conserve our national 
resources" as "morally removed only a step from giving aid and 
comfort to the enemies of their country.
For realism about sex
Judge Hand minced few words in setting forth his notion
that tests for obscenity should be geared to the best interests
of society at large and not those most easily corrupted. In
the Kennerley case he questioned a test for obscenity which
protected a vulnerable few at the expense of many:
I question whether in the end men will regard that as 
obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate expres­
sion of innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe 
that truth and beauty are too precious to society at large 
to be mutilated in the interests of those most likely to 
pervert them to base uses. Indeed, it seems hardly that 
we are even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters 
or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treat­
ment of sex to the standards of a child's library in the 
supposed interest of a salacious few, or that shame will 
for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the 
most serious and beautiful sides of human nature.®
7
United States v. Central Veal and Beef Company et 
al.. 162 F.(2d) 766,772 (1947).
^United States v. Kennerley. 209 F. 119,120 (1913).
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Thus, the Judge contended that "to put thought in leash to the 
average conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to 
fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable
9
seems a fatal policy." Twenty-three years later Judge Hand
wrote another opinion on this subject when a trial judge applied
to advertisements an absolute obscenity standard independent of
any readers. In reversing the trial judge he claimed: "No
civilized community not fanatically puritanical would tolerate
such an imposition. . . . "  He continued, "The standard must
be the likelihood that the work will so much arouse the salacity
of the reader to whom it is sent as to outweigh any literary,
scientific or other merits it may have in that reader's hands. 
„10
For litigants' rights
A defendant's rights to a jury trial and to be free 
from oppression by the prosecution were upheld by Judge Hand 
as essential if society governed by law is to remain free by 
respect for individual rights. When one defendant waived a 
jury trial and defended himself the question certified to the 
appellate court for Hand's decision was whether under these 
circumstances the judge had jurisdiction to try the defendant.
In holding that an accused who is not a lawyer may not consent 
to be tried by a judge except on the advice of an attorney
^Ibid.. p. 121.
(1936).
l°United States v. Levine. 83 F.(2d) 156,157,158
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Judge Hand launched into his convictions about the merits of 
a jury trial:
The institution of trial by jury— especially in criminal 
cases— has its hold upon public favor chiefly for two 
reasons. The individual can forfeit his liberty— to say 
nothing of his life— only at the hands of those who, unlike 
any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or 
indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and 
melt anonymously in the community from which they came. 
Moreover, since if they acquit their verdict is final, no 
one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally 
disapprove; and this introduces a slack into the enforcement 
of law, tempering its vigor by the mollifying influence of 
current ethical conventions. A trial by any jury, however 
small, preserves both these fundamental elements and a 
trial by a judge preserves neither, at least to anything 
like the same degree.H
By checking the scope of all-inclusive provisions in indict­
ments Judge Hand sought to limit the oppression of litigants 
and in yet another way protect their rights. Consequently when 
defendants appealed from a conviction for conspiracy in operat­
ing illicit liquor stills, the question arose whether a seller 
of goods becomes a conspirator with or an abettor of the buyer 
because he knows that the buyer intends a criminal use for the 
goods. Hand held that the seller must promote the venture and 
make it his own to be a conspirator. He concluded that today 
"many prosecutors seek to sweep within the drag-net of conspir­
acy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever 
with the main offenders. That there are opportunities of great 
oppression in such a doctrine is very plain, and it is only by
^^United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams et al., 126 
F.(2d) 774,775-776 (1942).
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circumscribing the scope of such all comprehensive indictments
12that they can be avoided."
Recognition of the rights of the individual and the 
privileges and necessities of the group, both commendable 
virtues, served to recommend Judge Hand to his judicial audi­
ence as he wrote into his criminal opinions concern for our 
form of government, for realism about sex, and for protection 
of litigants' rights.
Protected Constitutional Rights 
Closely allied to Judge Hand's concern for the well­
being of society and worthy of separate mention for specific 
attention to the Constitution was the importance he attached 
to guaranteeing Constitutional rights. Even when the denial 
of a granted right seemed inconsequential he would overthrow 
a decision in respect for what might otherwise be sacrificed 
when the inconsequential became consequential in the future.
He felt, for instance, that the judge's refusal to allow Judith 
Coplon the opportunity to argue that inadmissible wire tap 
information led to her conviction handicapped her not the 
slightest. But, he avowed,
we cannot dispense with constitutional privileges because 
in a specific instance they may not in fact serve to pro­
tect any valid interest of their possessor. Back of this 
particular privilege lies a long chapter in the history of 
Anglo-American institutions. Few weapons in the arsenal 
of freedom are more useful than the power to compel a 
government to disclose the evidence on which it seeks to 
forfeit the liberty of its citizens. All governments.
(1940)
^^United States v. Falcone et al.. 109 F.(2d) 579,581
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democracies as well as autocracies, believe that those 
they seek to punish are guilty; the impediment of consti­
tutional barriers are galling to all governments when they 
prevent the consummation of that just purpose. But those 
barriers were devised and are precious because they prevent 
that purpose and its pursuit from passing unchallenged by 
the accused and unpurged by the alembic of public scrutiny 
and public criticism.13
The likelihood is high that such conviction about the 
importance of protecting Constitutional rights induced a feel­
ing of trust among Judge Hand's critics. However, he did not 
leave to inference his feeling of responsibility to act in this 
area. In applying the "clear and present danger" test to the 
First Amendment he stated that in each case the court must 
weigh the severity of the wrong to determine if such invasion 
of free speech is necessary to avoid danger. "In appreciation 
of such a standard," the Judge asserted in the Dennis case, 
"courts may strike a wrong balance; they may tolerate 'incite­
ments' which they should forbid; they may repress utterances 
they should allow; but that is a responsibility that they can­
not avoid. Abdication is as much a failure of duty, as indif­
ference is a failure to protect primal rights.
Judge Hand exercised the responsibility with which he 
charged the bench when in a treason case which lacked the two 
required witnesses he held: "There seems to me no question
whatever, that without disregarding the whole theory of the
(1950). 
(1950).
^^United States v. Judith Coplon, 185 F.(2d) 629,638 
^^United States v, Dennis et al., 183 F.(2d) 201,212
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Constitution I could not allow a verdict to stand if I received 
it. I must therefore direct it for the defendant. Even 
when the testimony of witnesses to an alleged crime was avail­
able he cautioned that "an easy complaisance in any plausible 
tale may deprive defendants of their constitutional rights.
The Judge was particularly concerned about "search and
seizure" violations of the prohibition contained in the Fourth
Amendment. When a question arose about an arresting officer's
power to search certain premises and seize, not only liquors
and bottling apparatus, but any incriminatory papers also found.
Judge Hand held:
Such constitutional limitations [on search and seizure] 
arise from grievances, real or fancied, which their makers 
have suffered, and should go pari passu with the supposed 
evil. They withstand the winds of logic by the depth and 
toughness of their roots in the past. Nor should we forget 
that what seems fair enough against a squalid huckster of 
bad liquor may take on a very different face, if used by 
a government determined to suppress political opposition 
under the guise of sedition.1/
In another "search and seizure" case officers searched 
the Brooklyn dwelling of a housewife after they smelled the 
odor of fermenting mash which grew stronger as they approached 
the house. The housewife, convicted for maintaining a still, 
did not protest against the conviction on the basis of her 
innocence but claimed that the officers procured evidence
^^United States v. Robinson, 259 F. 685,694 (1919).
l^Marsh v. United States. 29 F.(2d) 172,173 (1928).
(1926)
^^United States v. Kirschenblatt. 16 F.(2d) 202,203
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predicated not on a warrant for search but on the sensitivity 
of their noses. Demonstrating that he did not place the 
punishment of crime above the Constitutional rights of the 
defendant he reversed the conviction and admonished the author­
ities for not first obtaining a warrant. The claim that such 
an evil in Brooklyn could not be suppressed without such free­
dom for the officers did not move Judge Hand. "Perhaps so," 
he said, "any community must choose between the impairment of
its power to punish crime and such evils as arise from its
18uncontrolled prosecution." The Judge never left his choice 
in doubt. Undaunted in his loyalty to protection of Constitu­
tional rights, his audience could only know him as one with 
allegiance sworn to the "supreme law of the land."
Reinforced Authority Possessed by Judges
Judge Hand displayed a consciousness in his opinions 
that if the law were to be efficiently administered and respect­
fully obeyed, he had a responsibility to reinforce judicial 
authority. As one who would stand behind a colleague in need 
of support, he communicated loyalty, dedication, and under­
standing to his peers and promoted judicial harmony. Against 
the action of defendants, counsel, and witnesses his opinions 
gave support to needed authority for the bench and, in general, 
law and order.
In United States v. Bollenbach the defendant protested 
being brought to trial and repudiated assistance from an
^^United States v. Kaplan. 89 P.(2d) 869,871 (1937).
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attorney assigned to him. In court he refused to be quiet, 
became obscene, and undertook a verbal tirade for democracy 
and against the proceedings. From conviction on two criminal 
contempt charges the defendant appealed only to find the Judge 
firmly sympathetic with the needs of the bench. Hand said,
"This [persistent obstruction of the court's business] on top 
of the indecency of his original address, indicated a continu­
ing will to impugn the court's authority which certainly excused 
effective repression, if it did not demand it. . . . If in 
such circumstances we were to refuse to support a judge . . . 
we should weaken the rightful authority of all judges. . . . "
He concluded:
No judge can do his duty, if his power to maintain decorum 
and secure his authority from being flaunted, is subject 
to cavil and captious question; he must be able to repress 
disorders quickly and, if necessary, ruthlessly; and unless 
when he does so, he will be free from later question, he 
cannot effectively deal at first hand as he must with the 
lawless, the defiant, or the covertly contumacious. . . . 
Coming as the first outburst did . . . the judge would have 
been unfit for his office if he had not made use of those 
sanctions which the statute gave him.19
In another case not involving contempt Judge Hand gave further
support to the trial judge. Here, the appellants, under a
conviction for defrauding the United States of sugar in excess
of wartime regulations, objected to the propriety of admitting
a confession of one accused during a trial of joint parties.
Hand ruled that in the conduct of civil as well as criminal
trials "the admission of evidence should, as far as possible,
^^125 F.(2d) 458,460 (1942).
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lie in the discretion of the trial judge, for whose fairness
20and moderation nothing can ever be a substitute."
When counsel alleged error in the conduct of a trial
because the trial judge failed to charge the jury as requested,
the judge had no better defender than Learned Hand. He made
short work of appeals based on a judge's failure to grant one
of a multiplicity of charges. Providing the judge was not
plainly in error he treated denial of request to charge of
minor importance and subject to summary consideration. "We
will not," he wrote in one opinion, "reverse a case well tried
in the main, by rummaging through a wilderness of verbiage,
which serves no other end, however well meant, than to set
21hurdles for the judge to leap." In another case where the
appellants predicated an appeal on failure of the trial judge
to issue two of about 150 requests to the jury Hand said of
such multiplicity that it impedes the trial and entraps the
judge. The charges refused were to tell the jury to ignore
assumptions about what defense witnesses would have said if
called. In upholding the action of the trial judge Hand took
this opportunity to define the limits of a judge's authority:
A judge is not required to intervene here any more than 
in any other issue of fact. He must indeed, as he always 
must, keep the prosecution in a criminal case within 
bounds; he must not allow it by implication to invoke 
unsound legal doctrine . . . just as he must keep passion
20United States v. Gottfried et al., 155 F.(2d) 360,
367 (1948).
^^United States v. Rowe et al., 56 F.(2d) 747,750
(1932) .
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out of the debate and hold the parties to issues. But he 
is not charged with finding their non sequiturs; the jury 
are to find these for themselves.22
Judge Hand also reinforced the authority of a judge
who held a witness in contempt for failure to testify before
a grand jury. He acknowledged the power of the district court
in the Loubriel case to punish a witness who evaded his duty.
"The question," he held, "is no less than whether courts must
put up with shifts and subterfuges in the place of truth and
are powerless to put an end to trifling. They would prove
themselves incapable of dealing with actualities if it were
so, for there is no surer sign of a feeble and fumbling law
23than timidity in penetrating the form to the substance."
Therefore, Judge Hand reinforced the authority of 
judges forced to interact with defendants, counsel, and wit­
nesses. He displayed loyalty to those who required support of 
the same powers he insisted on for himself, dedication to 
preserving for the bench the respect without which it cannot 
function, and understanding of the judge's necessities which 
enable fulfillment of his duty. All were written into his 
opinions— all may have contributed to his credibility.
Recognized the Need for Expediency 
in the Judicial Process
Besides reinforcing the authority of judges. Judge 
Hand's recognition of the need for expediency in the judicial
(1932)
^^United States v. Cotter et al., 60 F.(2d) 689,692 
^^Loubriel V. United States. 9 F.(2d) 807,808 (1926).
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process further characterized him as an efficient administrator 
of the law. He applied this expediency to the work of prosecu­
tors and judges, to the fate of defendants, and to the drafting 
of pleadings.
The necessity for expediency in a prosecutor exercising 
the only reasonable alternative in order to serve the best 
interest of justice confronted Judge Hand in United States v. 
Cohen et al. The defendants objected to the conduct of the 
trial claiming that the evidence was so complex that it could 
only confuse the jury and detract the real issues from their 
attention. Hand stressing the importance of expediency, wrote 
that
if the objection is valid, a prosecutor, faced with such 
a web, will be forced to single out the most important 
malefactors and let the small fry escape; for the burden 
upon the witnesses and upon successive juries of repeated 
trials would be intolerable. . . .  We are dealing only 
with the chance, and chance alone it is, that a jury may 
fail to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent; 
and in deciding the importance of that chance we must not 
disregard the only available alternative.24
Similarly, prosecution of an alleged violation of the Emergency
Price Control Act of World War II vintage resulted in the claim
that the prosecutor made the trial unfair by complicating the
real issues with evidence which tended to prove defendants
guilty of other crimes. In affirming the conviction Judge Hand
held; "There would be an end to the punishment of many crimes,
if the most cogent proof possible were forbidden, because, in
case it did not prove as cogent as the prosecution honestly
^^145 F.(2d) 82,91 (1944).
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believed it should, it exposed the accused to the chance of
25conviction for something with which he had not been charged." 
The complaint of a defendant in another case that the prosecu­
tion prejudiced him by showing that his co-defendants had 
committed a kindred crime with other parties elicited a 
response from Hand based on expediency. To deny to the jury 
the "rudimentary power of discrimination," he held, "would make 
difficult any trial in which the number of accused was large.
. . . If we are to clutch at such shadows, the criminal 
prosecution of complicated crime becomes impossible, and the 
phantom of the innocent man convicted will prevent any effec­
tive enforcement of the l a w . D i s a l l o w i n g  objections in yet 
another case where such did not impair fairness and the alter­
native to which was to encumber the proceedings brought forth
the frank response from the Judge that "the practice adopted
27promoted dispatch."
Application of expediency to the function of the judge 
manifested Hand's sympathy for the judge's plight and the 
ultimate importance of the practical administration of justice. 
When a defendant protested that the trial judge did not read 
or explain to the jury those regulations under which the
25United States v. Glory Blouse and Sportswear Company 
Inc.. et al.. 158 F.(2d) 880,882 (1947).
^^United States v. Liss et al., 137 F.(2d) 995,999
(1943).
^^United States v. Cotter et al., 60 F.(2d) 689,690
(1932).
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indictment charged him with violations, the Judge called the
regulation "a very long one in twenty-four articles occupying
over twenty pages of agate print in the Federal Register, and
laying out with the greatest conceivable particularity the
whole system of rationing meat, fats, fish and cheeses." He
held, "We will not upset a conviction for such an omission, or
require a judge to befuddle a jury by reading pages of verbiage
28which for its comprehension needs hours of study." Defend­
ants have alleged a miscarriage of justice not only when the 
judge refused to read a regulation but when he failed to 
provide a detailed discussion of the facts in his charge to 
the jury. Judge Hand when confronted by such objection held:
If the judge had once embarked upon a consideration of the 
transactions in detail, he would have committed himself to 
a discussion of them all; otherwise he would surely have 
laid himself open to the charge of undue emphasis. On the 
other hand, to undertake such a Herculean task would not 
have helped the jury, but merely have added to the weight 
of verbiage that they had already been called upon to bear 
during twelve days of summing up by c o u n s e l . 29
Statutes, whether they confer power on the court to charge a 
jury in a particular manner or divide a district territorially 
for selecting jurors, can and need only be used "with approxi­
mate exactness" since the court "is engaged, not in a scholastic 
exercise, but in the practical administration of justice," said
28United States v. Center Veal and Beef Company et al., 
162 F.(2d) 766,771,772 (1947).
United States v. Cohen et al., 145 F.(2d) 82,92
(1944).
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Judge Hand.^^ To press an argument with what the Judge called 
"schoolman's logic" interfered with and encumbered the law. 
Although allegations in an indictment must be allegations of 
fact, expediency demanded, Hand believed, that mixed conclu­
sions (wherein facts for their truth depend on rules of law) 
must not be overthrown by "schoolman's logic.
Disdained Harmless Error and Legal Formalism
As an adjunct of the virtue of expediency Judge Hand 
disdained allowing harmless error or legal formalism to upset 
an otherwise just decision. Acting in this manner, which 
conveyed his concern for the best interests of law and society, 
he chose yet another way which evinced ethical proof in his 
opinions.
Judge Hand was not merely a silent adherent to Title 
28, section 391 of the United States Code which directs judges 
to "give judgment after an examination of the entire record 
before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, 
or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. " The Judge in his opinions expanded on and justi­
fied his application of this rule. He frequently exercised 
the discretion allowed in determining whether an error affected 
the "substantial rights" of a party. A strict interpretation
^^United States v. Gottfried et al., 165 F.(2d) 360,
365 (1948).
^^United States v. White et al., 171 F. 775,777
(1909).
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of "substantial rights" resulted in Hand's expressed approval
of fundamentally just decisions though confronted by what to
some might be reversible errors. His choice to uphold such
decisions and justify ignoring what he regarded as harmless
error produced the following passages which recommended his
credibility: "But like other rules for the conduct of trials,
it fa jury may not benefit from that not introduced in the
court room] is not an end in itself; and, while lapses should
be closely scrutinized, when it appears with certainty that no
harm has been done, it would be the merest pedantry to insist
3 2upon procedural regularity." "Possibly it is true that the 
trial judge showed some animus against him [defendant], but as 
there was no possible justification for an acquittal we will
not look jealously at what, in a case where there was any
33dispute, might detain us." "No judge in so extended a trial 
can avoid on occasion rulings that on reflection he will see 
to have been wrong; but, unless they cast off some really 
substantial aspect of the truth, or let in too distracting 
issues, they are not important. "No prosecution is tried 
with flawless perfection; if every slip is to result in reversal 
we shall never succeed in enforcing the criminal law at all.
528 (1944).
(1948).
United States V. Compagna et al., 146 F.(2d) 524,
United States V. Krakower, 86 F.(2d) 111,112 (1936)
'United States V. White, 124 F.(2d) 181,186 (1941).
’united States V. Sherman et al., 171 F.(2d) 619,624
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36 37 38Whether the prosecutor, the judge, the defendant, or a
39witness initiated the harmless error. Judge Hand refused to 
recognize the error when based on jural subtleties and sup­
ported what he deemed the purposes for which courts exist. He 
summarized his objection to allowing harmless error to upset 
an otherwise just decision when in a mail fraud case the 
appellants alleged errors in the conduct of the trial:
They suppose that we would reverse a judgment clearly 
justified by the evidence for trivial lapses made at trial. 
Substantially all were not errors at all, but, so far as 
any exist, they are inappreciable in the vast morass before 
us. Criminal prosecutions are not to test the trial 
judge's adeptness in answering questions of law, put to 
him in multitude, often in the heat of sharp dispute.
Trials are to winnow the chaff frdm the wheat; when the 
accused has had fair opportunity to answer the charge; 
when it has been lawfully proved, and fair men have found 
him guilty, our duties end. There can be no question that 
these conditions were here f u l f i l l e d .40
Appellant insistence on strict adherence to legal
formalities was one aspect of harmless error which received
Judge Hand's conscious concern. These demands for reversal
based on non-compliance of the pleadings or the judge with
^^United States v. Brown et al., 79 F.(2d) 321,324
(1935); United States v. Lotsch. 102 F.(2d) 35,37 (1939);
United States v. Berger. 73 F.(2d) 278,280 (1934).
3?United States v. Wexler. 79 F.(2d) 526,530 (1935);
United States v. Easterdav et al.. 57 F.(2d) 165,167 (1932).
38United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corporation, 241 
F.(2d) 925,935 (1957).
O Q
United States v. Garsson et al., 291 F. 646,648
(1923).
^^United States v. Cotter et al.. 60 F.(2d) 689,694
(1932).
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procedural technicalities motivated expressions of disapproval
from the Judge, who when confronted by such demands refused to
upset otherwise just decisions. The protection of society from
crime with preservation of fundamental rights to the accused
remained his goal. In United States v. Garsson et al. he said:
No doubt grand juries err and indictments are calamities 
to honest men, but we must work with human beings and we 
can correct such errors only at too large a price. Our 
dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. 
Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the 
innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we 
need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery senti­
ment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution 
of crime.41
Judge Hand was not subtle in his disapproval of appeals predi­
cated on formal errors. Reversals for such errors he called 
in Van Riper et al. v. United States "a crying scandal, which 
has brought the whole system into d i s r e p u t e , a n d  in United 
States V. Rebhuhn he condemned reversal on a formal defect as 
" a b s u r d . H e  paid tribute to procedural perfection but with 
insistence upon it he believed "few convictions could survive. 
Such perfection was occasionally demanded by appellants who 
contested what they regarded as inadequacies in the judge's 
charge to the jury. Tactfully but firmly Judge Hand put down 
such appeals by dissociating the judge's charge from a formal 
ritual. "Nothing," he held, "is more conducive to absurd
4^291 F. 646,649 (1923).
^^13 F.(2d) 961,968 (1926).
43l09 F.(2d) 512,516 (1940).
(1943)
^^United States v. Liss et al., 137 F.(2d) 995,999
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formalism, which even yet at times invades a criminal trial,
than to suppose that there is a ritual which must be repeated
if the charm is to work. We wish once more . . .  to repudiate
altogether any such putative requirement."^^ In other cases
the Judge denounced the elaboration of the judge's charge into
an "inexorable" ritual as an impediment to judicial inquiry^^
which overlooks "the actual determinants of a verdict and . . .
[mistakes] shadows for reality.
Judge Hand's refusal in the interest of law and society
to allow procedural inadequacies to overthrow an otherwise just
conviction of a guilty party seldom was more clearly stated
than in the Brown case:
When the very merits of the case are clear; when only one 
result can honestly emerge; and when the jury has in fact 
been satisfied, we no longer look upon criminal procedure 
as a sacred ritual, no part of which can be omitted without 
breaking the charm. Trial by jury is a rough scales at 
best; the beam ought not to tip for motes and straws.48
Showed Preference for Justice and Fairness 
As one who subscribed to the virtues of justice and 
fairness. Judge Hand further recommended his credibility. He 
directly identified himself with these virtues by saying that
45Becker et al.
(1924).
^^United States
^^United States
31 P.(2d) 229,234 (1929)
^^United States
(1935)
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he was just and fair and expected the same from others. The
court "is engaged, not in a scholastic exercise, but in the
practical administration of justice" he declared in the 
49Gottfried case. His insistence upon justice for the defend­
ant caused him in a bribery case "in the interests of justice 
to consider the matter upon its merits, rather than to subject 
the defendant to the possibility of suffering punishment for 
a crime which he could not c o m m i t . T h e  Judge assured other 
defendants, convicted of mail fraud, that "all the essentials 
of justice were accorded them. None of their multitudinous 
objections go to the heart of the matter; and while, like 
everyone else on trial for crime, they were entitled to what­
ever the established procedure gave, we have no disposition to
51stretch any points in their favor." But just as he assured 
justice to defendants he was as equally certain to condemn those 
who abused its application. "Justice is not a game," he warned 
one defendant, "there is no constitutional right to 'throw dust
52in a juryman's eyes, or hoodwink a judge who is not overwise.’" 
Through his criminal law opinions he discouraged the 
courts from bringing "odium upon the administration of justice
(1944).
'united States V. Gottfried et al.. 165 F.(2d) 360.
'united States V. Krichman. 256 F. 974.975 (1919).
United States V. Cohen et al., 145 F.(2d) 82.94
United States V. Paglia. 190 F.(2d) 445.447 (1951)
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in the minds of all sensible people"^^ and warned against that 
action which would result in a miscarriage of j u s t i c e . O n e  
case in particular, United States v. Marzano. characterized 
the Hand manner of displaying his devotion to the administra­
tion of justice. Marzano, convicted for unlawfully selling 
and conspiring to sell morphine, based an appeal on the offi­
cious interference of the judge in the trial proceedings. 
During the course of the trial the judge called as witnesses 
two confederates who had pleaded guilty and were awaiting 
sentence. Upon their refusal to implicate the defendant, the 
judge reminded them that he was the one who would sentence 
them and asked if they desired to change their testimony about 
Marzano. Judge Hand held this reversible error and recorded 
in his opinion:
The situation appears to us to be one in which . . . the 
judge did not analyze the evidence; he added to it. . . . 
Moreover, even if the jury were not as likely as seems to 
us to be the case, to have so understood what took place, 
the judge was exhibiting a prosecutor's zeal, inconsistent 
with that detachment and aloofness which courts have again 
and again demanded, particularly in criminal trials.
Despite every allowance he must not take on the role of a 
partisan; he must not enter the lists; he must not by his 
ardor induce the jury to join in a hue and cry against the 
accused. Prosecution and judgment are two quite separate 
functions in the administration of justice; they must not 
merge.55
S^United States v. Ehrgott. 182 F. 267,270 (1910). Cf. 
United States v. Falcone et al.. 109 F.(2d) 579,582 (1940).
^^United States v. Lekacos et al.. 151 F.(2d) 170 
(1945); Loubriel v. United States. 9 F.(2d) 807 (1926); United 
States V. Austin Bagiev Corporation et al.. 31 F.(2d) 229,234 
(1929).
5^149 F.(2d) 923,926 (1945).
171
Judge Hand on considering an appealed case charged 
himself "with the duty of regarding the justice of the result 
as a w h o l e . W h e n  a miscarriage of justice existed he 
noticed errors even though not raised by the d e f e n d a n t . E v e n  
after determining a miscarriage had not taken place he added;
"We might intervene if it appeared justice had gravely miscar­
ried; but it is apparent that it did not. . . .
Combined with his insistence upon justice and inherent 
in its fulfillment. Judge Hand demanded a fair and impartial 
trial for defendants. "Certainly," he said in the Dennis case, 
"we must spare no effort to secure an impartial p a n e l . H e  
concluded this case with the observation: "We know of no
country where they [defendants] would have been allowed any 
approach to the license here accorded them; and none, except 
Great Britain, where they would have had so fair a hearing.
About defendants charged with fraudulent statements to a federal 
agency during wartime. Hand reported: "The accused had a fair
trial; their guilt was manifest; their offense struck at the 
nation's protection in its hour of peril; if punishment is ever
SGyachuda v. United States. 21 F.(2d) 409,412 (1927).
^^Amendola v. United States. 17 P.(2d) 529,530 (1927).
S^united States v. Rappv. 157 P.(2d) 964,967 (1946).
^^United States v. Dennis et al., 183 P.(2d) 201,226 
(1950). Cf. United States v. Compacrna et al.. 146 P. (2d) 524, 
529 (1944).
^°Ibid., p. 234.
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justified, the sentences they received were j u s t . J u d g e  
Hand's assurance to the defendant that he not only knew the 
ingredients of a fair trial but that the defendant was a
recipient of the guarantee frequently occurred in the Judge's
. . 62 opinions.
Typical of those cases where a finding of fairness in
the proceedings disallowed reversal on the grounds complained
of was United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corporation. The
defendants, prosecuted for attempted income tax evasion,
protested that a newspaper story during the trial announcing
the indictment of another for income tax evasion prejudiced
fairness of the trial. Judge Hand held:
The press may at times so poison the surrounding atmosphere 
that it is impossible to have a fair trial at all and the 
guilty may escape; but it would be to the last degree 
undesirable to upset judgments, in all other respects just 
and reasonable, because of circumambient gossamers which 
not only the jurors said had had no influence upon them, 
but which would not have had substantial influence upon 
anyone who was capable of impartial j u d g m e n t . 63
Not all attention to fairness by the Judge resulted in his
denial of an a p p e a l . T y p i c a l  of cases where a finding of
^^United States v. Center Veal and Beef Company et al.. 
162 F.(2d) 766,772 (1947).
ft 2United States v. Cotter et al.. 60 F.(2d) 689,690 
(1932); United States v. Berger. 73 F.(2d) 278,280 (1934); 
United States v. Cohen et al., 145 F.(2d) 82,91 (1944); United 
States V. Allied Stevedoring Corporation. 241 F.(2d) 925,935 
(1957).
^^241 F.(2d) 925,935 (1957).
G^united States v. Matot. 146 F.(2d) 197,198 (1944); 
United States v. Dellaro et al.. 99 F.(2d) 781,783 (1938).
173
unfairness resulted in reversal was In re Guzzardi. From an
order sentencing a bankrupt to sixty days' imprisonment for
contempt of court the bankrupt appealed. The primary question
was whether the proceeding was obviously criminal from the
outset or early enough to advise him and protect his rights.
Judge Hand demonstrated an appreciation of fairness when he
reversed the lower court and held:
It is of at least some practical consequence to the 
respondent in such a proceeding to know whether he is 
charged with crime; the outcome may be severer, and the 
degree of proof is higher; his conduct may be governed 
accordingly. We do not say that this must be known at the 
outset; it is enough if it becomes manifest in season; but 
manifest it must be, and not for the first time on a p p e a l . 65
In addition to the defendant the Judge considered fair­
ness to the prosecution and to witnesses a necessary require­
ment. When a United States attorney presented to the jury a 
seemingly immoderate argument based on analysis of the evidence, 
the defendant objected. Judge Hand supported the propriety of 
the attorney's action by saying: "He is an advocate, and it
is entirely proper for him as earnestly as he can to persuade 
the jury of the truth of his side. . . .  To shear him of all 
oratorical emphasis, while leaving wide latitude to the defense, 
is to load the scales of justice; it is to deny what has always 
been an accepted incident of jury trials. . . ."66 Qn another 
occasion he called a prosecutor's comment about the public 
repercussion to an acquital "a fair counterweight to the
F.(2d) 671,673 (1935) .
GGpicarlo v. United States. 6 F.(2d) 364,368 (1925).
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personal appeals of the d e f e n s e . I n  the same case the 
defense complained that when the prosecution was cross-examin­
ing the witness he questioned him for purposes of impeachment 
about a letter which was not shown him. Ever mindful of the 
rights of a witness Hand contended "fairness usually does
require that the witness shall be told when and where he made
68the putatively contradictory statement. . . . "
Linked Offending Litigant with Debasing Qualities
Judge Hand demonstrably displayed his opposition to 
qualities which to him and to his society were morally debasing. 
By recognizing and stressing disapproval of these characteris­
tics he identified himself with their opposites and thus 
contributed to his credibility. The descriptive terminology 
which the Judge used to link debasing qualities with defendants 
conveyed value judgments which revealed attributes of his 
character. In his written opinions he accused defendants of
offering "silly" explanations,^^ of "pandering to lascivious
70cravings of their customers," of being "ruthless" and "grasp­
ing" conspirators engaged in blackmail of "wide scope, long 
duration, and vast r e t u r n s , o f  being "the chiefs of a
^^United States v. Billiard et al., 101 F.(2d) 829,
837 (1938) 
68
527 (1944).
Ibid.
^^Sharron v. United States, 11 F.(2d) 689,690 (1926). 
^^United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F.(2d) 512,516 (1940). 
^^United States v. Compagna et al.. 146 F.(2d) 524,
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wide-spread skein of mean and callous fraud; the plunder of
72simple people," of clothing themselves with dishonesty and
73"employing cheats as active assistants," of being "cunning"
and "audacious, and of indulging in "illicit, hazardous,
75and profitable" enterprises.
The Judge was particularly outspoken when detailing 
the lack of virtue in those who sought to swindle women, small 
investors, or their country. The trial of one defendant, 
convicted for fraudulently obtaining money by false representa­
tions to induce marriage, disclosed to Judge Hand "a potent 
swindler, who three times played upon the credulity of single 
women, fleeced them of all they had, and abandoned them." He 
concluded: "A jury who did not infer from this history that
the enticements were false by which he abused his victim's 
confidence, would be incompetent to serve at all. Other 
defendants, convicted of the fraudulent sale of mining stock, 
indulged in "the usual obligato of dishonest and lurid puffing, 
the common tactic which has so often proved successful with
(1944)
^^United States v. Cohen et al., 145 F.(2d) 82,94 
^^Van Riper et al. v. United States, 13 F.(2d) 961,
966 (1926).
^^United States v . Austin Bagiev Corporation et al..
31 F.(2d) 229,233 (1929).
^^Chin Wah v. United States, 13 F.(2d) 530,531 (1926).
^^United States v. Walker, 176 F.(2d) 564,566 (1949).
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77guileless investors of small means," according to the Judge.
However, the debasing qualities which in his opinions he seemed
to most strongly oppose were those where his country was the
victim. The fraudulent procurement of sugar in excess of
emergency wartime regulations caused direct injection of his
sympathies into United States v. Gottfried et al. "While the
Nation was at grips with its most deadly enemy and in peril of
its very existence," the Judge declared, "these men combined
to frustrate it in the equitable distribution of a staple,
necessary to its defense. That was . . . aid and comfort to
the enemy; and if severity is ever proper, we cannot imagine
a better occasion for its existence than upon those whose greed
78led them to such scurvy disloyalty." Whether the act resulted
79in failure to conserve our national resources, or in an effort
fin
to "cheat" the Treasury, he branded it a "sordid" effort.
Thus, the unworthy defendant who exploited unsuspecting women, 
who preyed on simple people, who betrayed his country, or who 
otherwise riled the Judge's ire and rankled his system of values 
instigated a denunciation of debasing qualities.
In summary, Judge Hand recommended his credibility as 
he acted in the best interest of a free society governed by
^^United States v. Cotter et al.. 60 F.(2d) 689,690
(1932).
^®165F.(2d) 360,368 (1948).
79United States v. Center Veal and Beef Company et al., 
162 F.(2d) 766,772 (1947).
80United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corporation. 241 
F.(2d) 925,935 (1957) .
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law. He made certain choices which painted his character in 
words and introduced a persuasive quality into his opinions. 
Rather than constantly indulge in the easy comforts of preced­
ents and literal interpretations of statutes he chose to reveal 
himself about our form of government, realism concerning sex, 
and litigants' rights. He chose to discredit the non-virtuous, 
to guarantee Constitutional rights, and to reinforce the 
authority of those who depended on him for support in enforcing 
law and order. Once justice and fairness could be certain he 
chose to stress the efficiency of expediting a legal proceeding 
and the desirability of avoiding its overthrow for harmless 
error or legal formalism. Just as these choices shaped his 
decisions, structured his written opinions, and influenced 
society in their consequences so, too, did they evince sagacity, 
high character, and good will in the form of ethical proof with 
a persuasive capacity.
Demonstrating an Understanding of Human Nature 
Judge Hand's criminal law opinions demonstrated insight 
into the nature of judges, juries, and other men. This appre­
ciation of the motivations, expectations, and tendencies inher­
ent in human nature produced a display of sympathy, compassion, 
and understanding about the actions of mankind. These toler­
ances and the wisdom which created them induced a reasonable 
expectation that his judicial commands would be considerate of 
and adjusted to mankind's needs. Thus, the Judge's understand­
ing of human nature which depicted his character and wisdom in 
words invited the respect of his audience.
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Insight into the Nature of Judges
A judge forced to endure a lengthy trial, badgered by
numerous requests to rule, tantalized into making comments
better left unsaid, and generally shaken from a normally serene
nature could find no more considerate review of his alleged
errors than that provided by Judge Hand. One trial judge
charged with bias caused Hand to observe;
The record discloses a judge tried for many months by 
turmoil, constantly provoked by useless bickering, exposed 
to offensive slights and insults, harried with interminable 
repetition, who, if at times he did not conduct himself 
with the imperturbability of a Rhodamanthus, showed consid­
erably greater self-control and forbearance than it is 
given to most judges to p o s s e s s . 81
Whether a trial had lasted a few or many days the Judge after
examination of the proceedings would consider those external
irritations which might disrupt any man and induce universal
sympathies. Though the trial judge's manner might have incited
Judge Hand's displeasure he would understandingly credit lack
82of urbanity to patience unduly tried by persistent counsel
83or objections too numerous to handle unerringly. He explained 
the insight he applied to human nature which allowed him to 
distinguish between irresponsible action and that which the 
frailties of mankind make unavoidable when he noted: "We have
81„  ^     ^ no-, m oo, oof
(1950) .
Q p
United States v. Liss et al., 137 F.(2d) 995,999
(1943).
^^United States v. Dilliard et al.. 101 F. (2d) 829,836
(1938). Cf. United States v. White. 124 F.(2d) 181,186 (1941)
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no ways of reading each other's minds, but by the rude standard
of assuming that men are alike, and checking the assumption by
84the appearance and demeanor of the individual."
Insight into the Nature of Juries 
Juries held few mysteries for Judge Hand. He regarded 
them as a group of human beings fundamentally unchanged in 
their beliefs and emotions because of their assumed role and 
not given markedly to changing their habits because of require­
ments the law may impose upon them. They are, he said in his 
opinions, subject to "the general feelings prevalent in the
O C
society in which they live," prone to test "a witness's
credibility by using their experience in the past as to similar 
86utterances," incapable of detaching all emotion from their 
87conclusions, and unpredictable as to what they may deem
88logically material. Essentially the Judge believed a juror
should be expected to respond like any normal person. During 
the case of United States v. Dilliard a male juror escorted a 
female juror to the judge. She told the judge that a stranger
84Knickerbocker Merchandising Companv v. United States. 
13 F.(2d) 544,547 (1926).
(1950).
^^United States v. Dennis et al.. 183 F.(2d) 201,226 
PA
^United States v. Becker. 62 F.(2d) 1007,1010 (1933) 
87United States v. Garsson et al., 291 F. 646,649 
(1923). Cf. United States v. Wexler, 79 F.(2d) 526,529-530 
(1935) .
^^United States v. Matot, 146 F.(2d) 197,198 (1944).
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had identified one of the prosecutors to her as a former member
of the Ku Klux Klan and when she advised the stranger that the
prosecutor was not on trial the stranger asked her if she were
a Jewish girl. The defendant's motion for a mistrial claimed
the male juror's interest showed that "he was committed to a
conviction, and no longer had an open mind." Judge Hand denied
the motion and held: "There was not the slightest reason to
suppose that he was actuated by any such motive: perhaps he
89was officious, but many fair-minded people are that."
Consideration of the influence upon the jury of a 
judge's instructions prompted Judge Hand to probe further the 
nature of juries. "Some jurors are wilful, some somewhat 
pathetically docile. . . . Indeed," he concluded, "unless we 
are to abdicate altogether, we may not proceed on the assump-
90tion that whatever a judge says, the result will be the same."
91To the Judge, juries were "not leaves swayed by every breath."
They caused him to doubt "whether a succession of abstract
propositions of law, pronounced staccato, has any effect but
to give them a dazed sense of being called upon to apply some
esoteric mental process, beyond the scope of their daily
92experience which should be their reliance." He clearly was
®^101 F.(2d) 829,837 (1938).
90„  ^ ^
(1931).
91^^ United States
(1923).
92
United States
(1944).
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not over-awed by the effectiveness on juries of procedural 
techniques. When discussing motions to strike evidence in 
the presence of a jury, he said in Van Riper et al. v. United 
States ; "Indeed, in a case of this kind it is extremely doubt­
ful whether such admonitions have any serious importance. We 
do, indeed, continue to give them, though it is impossible for 
any one, lay or legal, to divide his mind into proof-tight
compartments, and forget at one moment what he must use at 
93another." Similarly, where a co-conspirator included the 
defendant's name in his confession and the judge admonished 
the jury to disabuse their minds of the confession when consid­
ering the defendant's guilt, the defendant claimed the confes­
sion in its entirety should not have been admitted. Judge Hand 
regarded it "hard to believe that a jury will, or for that 
matter can, in practice observe the admonition . . . [because]
relatively few persons have any such power, involving as it
94does a violence to all our habitual ways of thinking."
Insight into the Nature of Other Men 
Judge Hand's long tenure on the federal bench exposed 
him to a multitude of defendants who engaged in so many differ­
ent schemes and criminal practices that experience alone told 
him much about the probable nature of those whose fate he 
determined. His insight into the nature of some required
^^13 F.(2d) 961,968 (1926).
94
United States v. Orlando Delli Paoli, 229 F.(2d) 319,
321 (1956).
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little more than the exercise of common s e n s e . However,
the nature of others he understood through prior exposure to
similar situations. For instance, defendants, convicted of
conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, claimed there was
insufficient evidence to support a verdict. However, Judge
Hand believed it sufficient. "The evidence," he claimed,
"seems to us to leave little doubt that, as so often happens
in similar cases, the company, being more and more pressed
financially, continued to repeat what though once true, had
become false and was then known to be f a l s e . H a b i t u a l
policies of defendants concerning procedural practices also
told the Judge what to expect when one defendant objected
because the trial judge did not provide a detailed discussion
of the facts. "It is strange to hear an accused complaining
of such a failure," remarked Hand, "we may be assured that, if
the power had been used, the complaints would have been louder,
97and almost certainly better grounded." Although his under­
standing of human nature worked to the detriment of the defend­
ants in these cases, such was not always true. His understanding 
of man's love for freedom benefited one defendant who was held 
in custody for refusing to testify before a grand jury. In this 
case the judge prohibited the investigation from continuing
95lnfra. p. 189.
S^united States v. Dilliard, 101 F.(2d) 829,834 (1938). 
^^United States v. Cohen et al., 145 F.(2d) 82,92
(1944).
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indefinitely until the "pains of punishment" overcame the defend­
ant's will. He held: "A man, faced with perpetual imprisonment
till he discloses his confederates, will in the end find con­
federates to disclose. There is no modern engine to effect the
98result; the costs are too high, and the results too meager."
Judge Hand spent a lifetime examining human nature.
The reflection of the result of this examination in his opinions
is not, therefore, unreasonable. In one case he explained how
witnesses tell their story in colloquial speech which runs in
99terms of stating inadmissible conclusions; in another he 
observed that anything, "a song, a scent, a photograph, an 
allusion, even a past statement known to be false," can revive 
a memory; in still another case he claimed that "even 
respectable persons may have a taste for s a l a c i t y . I n  
summary, whether he was describing the activity of judges, 
jurors, or other men, he demonstrated in his opinions an under­
standing nature and thereby prompted respect for his wisdom 
and character.
Displaying Expertness in the Use of Reasoning 
Rhetoricians have long recognized intelligence as a 
sign of speaker credibility. This display of sagacity they
^®Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.(2d) 807,809 (1926).
(1932).
United States V. Cotter et al., 60 F.(2d) 689,693
United States V. Rappv, 157 F.(2d) 964,967 (1946).
United States V. Levine, 83 F.(2d) 156,158 (1936).
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have identified with expertness in reasoning ability. The 
speaker, they claim, generates audience trust and confidence 
in his authoritative characteristics when he conveys his wisdom. 
Judge Hand manifested his wisdom and thus recommended his 
credibility through his reasoning process. The use of good 
judgment, common sense, and available knowledge accomplished 
this in his opinions. He made shrewd inferences when he exer­
cised both good judgment and common sense. The former resulted 
from his experience and adeptness as a judge, the latter infer­
ences were those common to any reasonably prudent person. He 
made use of available knowledge as he showed an appreciation 
of the history and traditions of the law and as he observed 
accepted legal and non-legal beliefs of his day. Thus, good 
judgment, common sense, and knowledge of the past and present, 
as ethical ingredients, recommended the Judge's credibility.
The Use of Good Judgment 
Without detectable pattern or plan the Judge appropri­
ately showed good judgment in a variety of different ways. In 
United States v. Cohen et al. the defendants, convicted for 
using the mails to defraud, conspired to sell stocks by fraudu­
lent misrepresentations. The prosecution called the defendants 
"confederates" in a single scheme in the execution of which 
each of twenty-nine letters cited in twenty-nine separate 
counts was a step. To join all the transactions into one was 
fatal error according to the defendants who believed that 
trying the counts together would confuse a jury into believing
185
a vast fraud existed. Hand disagreed. After noting that the 
charges involved two groups of defendants pursuing two generally 
like schemes, he held: "The most reasonable interpretation is
that, while the two groups worked with a general understanding 
and with mutual help, each was free to fleece its own customers 
at its own convenience. . . . Therefore . . . there was no 
variance; a single 'scheme' was proved, though by hypothesis
10 2it did not include by any means all the transactions proved."
In yet another conviction for mail fraud where an 
employee without authority took money from a company, the 
defendant, an accountant who entered these withdrawals as 
capital expenses, claimed that he trusted the employee. The 
prosecution contended that an accountant of defendant's experi­
ence and intelligence could not have permitted so much irregu­
larity without becoming aware of the fraud. The question on 
appeal was whether the cumulation of instances of false entries 
in the financial statements coupled with defendant's explanation 
would support his guilt. Judge Hand reasoned that the entries 
taken individually did not prove defendant knew he was making 
false entries, "but logically the sum is often greater than the 
aggregate of the parts, and the cumulation of instances, each 
explicable only by extreme credulity or professional inexpert­
ness, may have a probative force immensely greater than any of 
them alone." The Judge concluded about this "very irregular 
method of business" that "fair men might have had no compunction
^°^145 F.(2d) 82,88 (1944).
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in refusing to believe that he was so credulous or so ill 
acquainted with his calling as a finding of innocence 
demanded.
Realism in his approach to statutory interpretation
exhibited in examples of good judgment was another virtue of
the Judge. Under a statute which said "the running of any
existing statute of limitations . . . shall be suspended until
three years after termination of hostilities" the trial court
considered "running" to mean that three years after hostilities
and the statute of limitations begins "running" for three years
after which prosecution was barred. Judge Hand reasoned that
"running" meant "bar" and the statute meant that three years
after hostilities end an action is barred, not six years as
held by the trial court. He supported his view by describing
the propriety of reading words out of their literal meaning to
discover their overriding purpose;
It is idle to add to the acres of paper and streams of ink 
that have been devoted to the discussion. When we ask what 
Congress "intended," usually there can be no answer, if 
what we mean is what any person or group of persons actu­
ally had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must 
do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the 
position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to 
them how they would have dealt with the concrete o c c a s i o n . 104
By reasoning what we actually can do when interpreting statutes
the Judge demonstrated his preference. "No doubt we ought not
to press logic to its conclusions, for we are only dealing with
1 no
^"^United States v. White. 124 F.(2d) 181,185 (1941).
648 (1952)
1 0 4 .
United States v. Klinger et al.. 199 F.(2d) 645,
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common words, but we ought to execute the purposes which the 
words contain," concluded the Judge in another case which 
attempted to resolve whether a baggage porter who works for 
the Director of Railways acts in the official capacity of the 
United States. ^
A criminal case involving conviction for conspiracy 
provided the Judge with an opportunity to show that he knew 
when to avoid making inferences which, though, appearing logi­
cal, were actually unreasonable. Of several defendants indicted 
for violation of the National Prohibition Act the jury acquitted 
two who the prosecution claimed were indispensable to the 
commission of the crime. The other defendants claimed that 
the acquittal of the two made their conviction inconsistent 
and irregular. Judge Hand admitted to the existence of a 
rational inconsistency between the verdicts but reasoned:
the conviction finds that the appellants have done what 
they could not have done alone; the acquittal, that their 
inevitable accomplices did not share in it with them. If 
we were limited to a rational reconciliation, we might 
perhaps have to say that neither finding could stand, 
because, as we could not choose between them the doubt 
would infect both. But we are not so limited; the verdict 
in either case may have been the result of considerations 
not rational at all. With that possibility, so far as it 
touches the acquittal, we are not concerned, because the 
appellants have no vested right in the punishment of their 
fellows, however g u i l t y . 106
In another conspiracy case the Judge reasoned by analogy when
inferring the innocence of a defendant convicted of a conspiracy
^United States v. Krichman. 256 F. 974,976 (1919).
^^^United States v. Austin Bagiev Corporation et al..
31 F.(2d) 229,233 (1929).
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to transport stolen securities in interstate commerce. He 
failed to find the elements necessary for the conspiracy 
conviction in that the defendant "had no reason to suppose that 
any of the bonds he bought had been stolen in other states." 
Holding that "ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless 
he is aware of the existence of all those facts which make his 
conduct criminal," Judge Hand then made the following compari­
son: "While one may, for instance, be guilty of running past
a traffic light of whose existence one is ignorant, one cannot 
be guilty of conspiracy to run past such a light, for one can­
not agree to run past a light unless one supposes that there
107is a light to run past." The defendant, in still another
conspiracy case, moved for a mistrial when the judge admitted
into evidence the confession of a co-conspirator without
deletion of reference to the defendant's name. Judge Hand in
denying the motion reasoned that to have blacked out the
defendant's name "there could not have been the slightest doubt
as to whose name had been blacked out; and, even if there had
been, the blacking out itself would have not only laid the
108doubt, but underscored the answer."
The Judge further revealed his intellectual competency 
in other criminal cases when he denied the charge that a prose­
cutor overproved his case because a prosecutor must have
lO^united States v. Crimmins, 123 F.(2d) 271,272,273
(1941)
319,321 ( 1 9 ^
^*^^United States v. Orlando Delli Paoli. 229 F.(2d)
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certain freedom since he can never "know when he has satisfied
109a jury on the main issue"; when he found the procedure of 
issuing an arrest warrant indistinguishable from that of a 
search w a r r a n t ; a n d  when he acknowledged the distinction 
between an absence of belief and disregard for the truth.
All such instances disclosed an expertness in the use of 
reasoning which embraced good judgment.
The Use of Common Sense
Judges take judicial notice of an element in proceed­
ings before them when the element need not be proved because 
all people will agree to it as fact. When some inference is 
necessary and when reasonable and prudent people without special 
training might be expected to reach the same conclusion, the
judge indulges in common sense. The use of common sense by a
judge is particularly persuasive in that his audience can find 
common ground with him as they discover their agreement with 
his reasoning which is in effect the same reasoning to which 
almost every person would subscribe. Thus, when a judge 
through inference reaches a conclusion equally inescapable 
for almost everyone, he recommends himself as one possessed 
of shared wisdom.
109United States v. Glory Blouse and Sportswear Company 
Inc.. et al.. 158 F.(2d) 880,881 (1947).
ll°United States y. Casino. 286 F. 976,979 (1923).
^Knickerbocker Merchandising Company y. United 
States. 13 F.(2d) 544,546 (1926).
190
Judge Hand made repeated and sometimes pointed use of 
common sense as he added to his credibility in his written 
opinions. A typical example occurred as a result of an alleged 
violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, The question arose as 
to whether uttered words inducing insubordination were likely 
to reach members of the military forces in violation of the 
Act. The Judge utilized common sense when he held: "I may
take notice of the fact that in August, September, and November 
the country was already subject to the draft, and that large 
numbers of men were under arms. . . . That being so, it is 
certainly true that any one in his senses, distributing a 
magazine generally . . . must have supposed it would probably 
reach soldiers.
On two occasions the use of common sense served the 
Judge as a means by which he could verify the guilt of the 
accused. Defendants who fled from an illegal still when 
confronted by police "left no doubt in any reasonable mind 
that they were trying to escape arrest . . . [since] flight 
is a circumstance from which a court or an officer may infer 
what everyone in daily life would infer," reasoned the Judge. 
Other defendants in Dicarlo v. United States claimed a victim 
whom they allegedly assailed had improper motives in falsely
119United States v. Eastman et al.. 252 F. 232,233
(1918).
^^^United States v. Heitner et al.. 149 F.(2d) 105,
107 (1945).
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identifying them. The Judge considered the victim's declara­
tion to policemen immediately after the assault as
so near in time as to have the verity generally accorded 
to spontaneous declarations at the time, which are univer­
sally admitted. To exclude them one must suppose that, 
just after escaping, wounded, from a murderous attack, he 
should have seized upon the event as a means of escaping 
from his sentence, by imputing the assault to persons whom 
he had no reason to suppose the public authorities would 
be interested in coupling with the crime. To impute to 
him such a design seems to us fantastic.114
Judge Hand in addition to using common sense to verify 
the guilt of the immediate criminal also used it to verify the 
guilty implication of alleged privies to crime. Through common 
sense the Judge linked privies in narcotics, fraud, blackmail, 
and stolen goods cases. Defendants who received an opium- 
filled trunk and who denied knowledge of the contents or 
implication in an interstate conspiracy to ship opium lost to 
the Judge's reasoning that people do not send extremely valua­
ble drugs "long distances to unadvised c o n s i g n e e s . W h e n  
fraud by subordinates brought denials of implication from a 
superior. Judge Hand retaliated: "Men do not set up a business
of such a kind under a false name, employing cheats as active 
assistants and keep aloof and ignorant of the means by which 
the profits are made."^^^ After a common-sense explanation of 
why two other defendants possessed the same fraudulent scheme
F.(2d) 364,366 (1925).
Urchin Wah V. United States. 13 F.(2d) 530,531
(1926).
966 (1926).
^^^Van Riper et al. v. United States. 13 F.(2d) 961,
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Judge Hand called his conclusion "an irrefragable inference
that each man must have known what the other was doing." "Any
jury," he said, "which had allowed itself to be fobbed off with
the blind that each man had not been privy to what the other
was doing, would have been made up of simpletons or knaves.
Even blackmail cases necessitated determining if parties were
privies to a scheme. When a defendant imposed upon an employer
two employees neither of whom rendered services but were highly
paid, the Judge found "it tenable to assume that a ruthless
and grasping crew of blackmailers would not provide soft berths
for subordinates who were ignorant of the general nature of the
118undertaking of which they were the beneficiaries."
The theft of goods and handling of stolen property is 
frequently a multi-party effort. Implication of some parties 
as knowing participants in a joint venture may be quite remote. 
However, they were never too remote for Judge Hand to reason 
why, if in fact common sense dictated, they could be considered 
privies to the crime. For instance, a truck driver who claimed 
to have been called in for the occasion denied knowledge that 
certain goods were stolen. These goods, bales of duck canvas 
labelled for export, had been moved from one unlikely place of 
deposit to another. The judge identified the driver as a privy 
to the theft with the question: "Why should honest men be
117United States v. Center Veal and Beef Companv et 
al., 162 F.(2d) 766,769,770 (1947).
IIP
United States v. Compagna et al.. 146 F.(2d) 524,
527 (1944).
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shifting such goods about in so unwonted and furtive a fash- 
119ion?" But the Judge did not expect an alleged privy to
know the source of stolen goods. In fact, he said, "it is
more likely that he will not wish to do so. Inquiry is apt
to add to that information any evidence of which he will at
all hazards wish to suppress; it will be safer to take the
securities as they are presented than to meddle into their 
120source." In another case. United States v. Werner et al..
involving the movement of stolen goods in commerce. Judge Hand 
adeptly used common sense. A truck driver took misdelivered 
blades to the defendant telling him they were not stolen but 
an over-shipment. Whether the defendant had guilty knowledge 
that the blades were stolen was the crucial question. "Truck­
men, " Hand held, "do not honestly become the owners of cases 
of goods worth $800 which they peddle about without any docu­
ments of title. . . . Nobody but a child would have been so
121fobbed off" as to regard the blades as over-delivery. Hand
further provided another example in the Werner case which 
concludes this discussion of his use of common sense. He 
commented on the exclusion of testimony of experts as to the 
value of the blades:
1 1 Q
United States v. Sherman et al.. 171 F.(2d) 619,
623 (1948).
1
United States v. Bollenbach, 147 F.(2d) 199,202
(1944).
^^^160 F.(2d) 438,441 (1947).
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In prosecutions for receiving stolen property for obvious 
reasons one of the most telling indices of guilt is a low 
price paid by the receiver. Thieves are in no position to 
bargain; they must rid themselves of their loot as quickly 
as possible and their willingness to sell cheap betrays, 
or should betray, their predicament. On the other hand 
evidence that the receiver paid the right price, or close 
to the right price, for the goods is equally persuasive 
of his innocence; for no one is likely to incur the risk 
of buying stolen goods, who has little to g a i n . 122
The Use of Available Knowledge 
Judge Hand's use of available knowledge in his reason­
ing showed that he was no novice in his familiarity with the 
patterns of the past or the practices of the present. By 
demonstrating that his breadth and depth of knowledge enabled 
consideration of the many alternatives in a given situation he 
could generate confidence that he uttered well-informed deci­
sions predicated on an understanding of their historical place 
in the traditional scheme of things.
Showing knowledge of the history and tradition of the law
The Judge's contact with the history and tradition of 
the law included those who created as well as those who admin­
istered the law. He declared in United States v. Michael Pi 
Re, while condemning an arrest as indefensible, "if the prose­
cution of crime is to be conducted with so little regard for 
that protection vdtich centuries of English law have given to 
the individual, we are indeed at the dawn of a new era; and 
much that we have deemed vital to our liberties, is a
^^^Ibid.. p. 443.
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123delusion." One such protection which he believed history 
assured was "trial by jury, [which] certainly for the graver 
crimes, has a high place in our traditions; around it cluster 
many memories of freedom won at large cost; its surrender is 
not to be lightly imputed to the accused.
Judge Hand's adherence to the traditions of trial by 
jury did not end with its guarantee but also extended to its 
function. His knowledge of the habitual performance of juries 
enabled him to give what he called "conventional" answers to 
otherwise difficult questions. When confronted with whether 
an uncorroborated accomplice who turns state's evidence could 
support a conviction, he held: "Again and again it has satis­
fied juries of the guilt of those on whom such wretches turn; 
from time immemorial it has been the reliance of prosecutors;
and juries have probably shown their good sense in accepting 
125it." "From time immemorial" was an expression the Judge
used to reach back seemingly to the dawn of time when support­
ing his arguments. He used such terminology to describe the 
history of pleadings as well as juries. Responding to a chal­
lenge that an indictment did not contain solely allegations of 
fact, the Judge insisted on not pressing this requirement with 
"schoolman's logic" because
123i59 F.(2d) 818,820 (1947).
^^^United States v. Strewl et al., 99 F.(2d) 474,478
(1938).
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United States v. Cohen et al.. 145 F.(2d) 82,86
(1944).
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in all pleadings from time immemorial there have been 
allegations of so-called fact which presuppose for their 
truth the existence of certain rules of law. Allegations 
regarding "real property," "seisin," "possession," "owner­
ship, " and others, have been common from the earliest times, 
and no one has ever thought that it was necessary to allege 
all the facts from which the "mixed" [law and fact] con­
clusions arose. To do so would be to enormously incumber 
the pleadings, and the law, even in its pedantic days has 
not been theoretically consistent to that degree.12°
Whether referring to the intent of Congress when formu­
lating laws or to the activity of judges when conducting their 
proceedings and applying the law. Judge Hand conveyed an 
understanding of the past. Refusing to limit the words of a 
statute to satisfy the defendant's demands he noted that
"certainly there was not enough ground for that in the debates 
127of Congress." Or, answering counsel who objected to the
prosecution of two crimes at the same time. Hand recalled that
128"Congress clearly has not meant to insist upon that." In
United States v. Rosenberg the Judge combined a comprehension 
of the habitual practice of both Congress and the courts when 
he held: "Now, it is of course quite true, and indeed it has
been long recognized, that in the exercise of its taxing power 
Congress may in fact be actuated, in part, anyway, by purposes 
quite different from the raising of revenue, and the courts will
^^Snited States
(1909).
12?united States
368 (1948).
^^®United States
174 (1945).
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129nevertheless not question the result." The traditions of
the court as described by the Judge touched on various aspects
of judicial conduct. He told one defendant who complained
because the judge's charge to the jury did not include a
detailed discussion of the facts that although Lord Cockburn
in England once took a week or more to do this "whatever be
the rule across the water, in this country not only has the
exercise of the power never been obligatory, but the power
itself has been somewhat s u s p e c t . T o  another defendant
who protested the prosecution's speeches to the jury Hand said:
"These speeches seem to us comparatively pallid in comparison
131to much that courts have approved."
Judge Hand's knowledge of the history and tradition of
the law partly depended on direct personal experience which on
occasion he related in his opinions. Offering himself as an
authoritative source, when a defendant appealed admission of
allegedly irrelevant and damaging testimony, the Judge responded:
"To my own knowledge it has been the custom for over twenty-
five years in the Southern district of New York to admit such
132testimony in this class of cases; . . . "  Another defendant
12*251 F. 963,964 (1918).
ll^United States v. Cohen et al., 145 F.(2d) 82,92
(1944).
837 (1938).
(1935).
lllynited States v. Billiard et al., 101 F.(2d) 829, 
ll^united States v. Brown et al.. 79 F.(2d) 321,324
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challenged the method of drawing jurors in the Southern District 
of New York. His claim that no order had been entered author­
izing division of the district territorially in the interest 
of an impartial trial met with the following reaction: "A
practice of such long standing must have been known to the 
judges of the district and been approved by them. It is true 
that Judge Hand [cousin Augustus] and I, who served as district
judges in that district . . . believe that the practice existed
133also in our time which in my own case goes back to 1909."
Judge Hand may not have been reflecting as far back as "time 
immemorial" but the attention which he directed to his long 
experience and personal recollection served with these other 
examples to recommend his credibility as one closely in touch 
with the historical roots of the legal tree.
Observing accepted beliefs of his day
Judge Hand's decisions do not reflect isolated reason­
ing based on outdated convictions but reasoning based on 
current beliefs. He observed both legal and non-legal beliefs 
of his day— beliefs shared by his profession and the society 
which he influenced.
When the questioned discriminative ability of a jury 
caused hesitancy as to whether they could provide justice.
Judge Hand acknowledged the current legal belief that "today 
courts are disposed more to rely upon the ability of a jury
^^^United States v. Gottfried et al.. 165 F.(2d) 360,
364 (1948).
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to distinguish between those who are in fact involved in the 
crime and those who are not; . . . In a like manner he 
stressed acceptance of present, not past, standards for estab­
lishing when evidence is first hand. He regarded the require­
ment to produce original records in order to make a complete 
chain of proof as antiquated. "Unless the system under which 
they [bank books] are kept is defective," said Hand, "the 
danger of mistake is slight and in any event the putative 
corroboration by the entrants is inappreciable. The Civil 
Practice Act . . . [serves] to show the inapplicability to 
present-day conditions of rules made for a simpler society,
where the automatic recording of voluminous transactions had
135not become reliable. . . . "  In other cases reflecting a
similar emphasis on the beliefs of his day Judge Hand denied
reversal due to objection to the prosecutor's conduct by saying,
"today, when mere possibilities do not interest us as they did
our forerunners, we demand more tangible evidence that damage 
136has been done"; affirmed a trial judge criticized for admitt­
ing certain evidence by saying, "today such errors have much
137less importance than they once had"; and rejected a plea
^United States
582 (1940).
^United States
(1932).
^^^United States
^United States
836 (1938)
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that a man may not commit crime through an agent by saying,
"we do not to-day distinguish between principals and acces­
sories before the fact, the only distinction which was ever
138important in the subject." Characteristic of Judge Hand's 
observation of the legal beliefs of his day was a response he 
made to appellants who in their challenge to an indictment 
claimed false declarations of value do not constitute fraud.
By combining an observation of current business practices and 
the consideration afforded them by the law he held such decla­
rations of value can amount to fraud.
True the law still recognizes that in bargaining parties 
will puff their wares in terms which neither side means 
seriously, and which either so takes at his peril . . . 
but it is no longer law that declarations of value can 
never be fraud. Like other words, they get their color 
from their setting, and mean one thing when exchanged 
among traders, and another when uttered by a broker to 
his customer.139
Another combination of current legal and non-legal 
beliefs, observed by Judge Hand, occurred in a case involving 
a conviction for conspiracy to support aliens as prostitutes 
without registering them. "Traffic in prostitutes," he held, 
"gravely offends current moral standards, and is by law contra­
band in most places as it is in New York. . . . Moral 
propriety particularly concerned him and prompted his recognition
Van Riper et al. v. United States. 13 F.(2d) 961,
965 (1926).
1 3Q
United States v. Rowe et al., 56 F.(2d) 747,749
(1932).
14°United States v. Mack. 112 F.(2d) 290,292 (1940).
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of current moral conventions. He called a defendant's obscene 
utterances before a jury "quite unnecessary; [and] the fact 
that there were women among the jurors added to its impropri­
ety. In United States v. Kennerlev he identified a test
for obscenity with mid-Victorian morals and noted that it "does 
not seem to me to answer to the understanding and morality of 
the present time. . . .
In summary, through his perceptive use of reasoning, 
Judge Hand recommended his credibility. Expressions embodying 
good judgment, common sense, traditions of the past, and trends 
of the present induced an impression of his expertness. Such 
expertness in the use of sagacity by a communicator has long 
been recognized as a vital ingredient of ethical proof inher­
ently beneficial to the persuasive effort.
Exercising Caution
Learned Hand— the man was a cautious individual who 
was never too sure that he was right. He did not reserve this 
attitude for his non-legal life but maintained a similar dispo­
sition in his written opinions. His opinions, rather than 
taking on an air of artificiality and display, communicated 
commendable virtues of consistency and sincerity. About the 
former virtue John Ward maintained "that a speaker's arguments 
must not be inconsistent with his typical conduct or he will
^^^United States v. Bollenbach. 125 F.(2d) 458,460
(1942).
142209 F. 119,120 (1913).
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lose r e s p e c t . A b o u t  the latter virtue William Sattler 
contended that "sincerity is considered to be a reliable sign 
to audiences that the speaker's moral purpose is honorable. 
Thus, as a reliable sign capable of inducing audience respect 
Judge Hand found those words to use and thoughts to express 
which were in keeping with his cautious disposition and which 
were capable of reproducing the corresponding character. He 
expressed doubt about being right, respected precedent, recog­
nized his limitations, and rebuked with tact and moderation. 
Each had roots in his personal values, each reflected his 
honorable character, and each recommended his credibility.
Expresses Doubt About Being Right
Judge Hand did not capriciously render decisions with­
out concern for being right. Quite to the contrary, he would 
have given anything to be certain that he was right but knowing 
certainty was impossible he was tolerant of alternatives and 
not given to being dogmatic about his carefully considered 
conclusions. He prefaced interpretation of statutes with the 
comment "if I am r i g h t a n d  when not abundantly sure he 
concluded statutory interpretation with "if there be a doubt" 
and awarded the defendant under a criminal statute the benefit
^^^A System of Oratory (London: n.p., 1759), I, 140.
^^^"Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric" (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of Speech, Northwestern University, 
1941), p. 337.
l^^United States v. Ehrgott. 182 F. 267,273 (1910).
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145of that doubt. Confronted by equally imposing arguments
for differing interpretations of a statute and though committed 
to one in particular, the Judge, nevertheless, tempered an 
otherwise firm decision by cautioning "that the issue is not 
free from doubt. . . .  He who supposes that he can be certain 
of the result is the least fitted for the attempt.
The Judge's doubt on one occasion caused him to invite 
review by a higher court to prescribe proper procedure. 
Defendants moved for the return of liquors seized under an 
alleged violation of the Volstead Act. Judge Hand held; "In 
view of the doubt concerning the proper practice in such cases, 
I hope the United States will endeavor to review my decision.
In that event a stay will be granted, for if I am wrong a bond 
will not secure the United States, which is entitled to a 
destruction of the l i q u o r s . S i m i l a r l y ,  the Judge's doubt 
in a wire-tap case resulted in allowing bail previously denied 
and recommending application for certiorari. The question on 
appeal was whether the judge improperly denied to the accused 
examination of the prosecution to determine if any evidence in 
the proceedings was indirectly procured by wire-tapping. Judge 
Hand called the result doubtful and said: "Against this chance
we think that the accused should be allowed bail, pending
^^^Ibid.. p. 271.
^^^United States v. Klinger et al., 199 F.(2d) 645,
648 (1952) .
148.United States v. Casino. 286 F. 976,981 (1923).
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application for certiorari. When we denied bail originally,
we had not had the chance to examine the record or to appreci-
149ate the doubts which have now appeared." And, when the
Judge found the jurisdiction of a federal court "open to doubt" 
bail again served as temporary relief to a defendant encouraged 
to seek review.
Respects Precedent 
Judge Hand's disdain for judicial innovation which 
flaunts the will of the legislature and the consistency of the 
courts enabled an abiding respect for precedent. This respect 
provided an element of predictability in his decisions which 
was comforting in its consistency and adherence to prevailing 
wishes. His respect for precedent demonstrated an understand­
ing of the past and the skill with which to apply the past to 
the present. In addition to reinforcing his arguments in the 
traditional manner with numerous cases in point the Judge 
introduced statements manifesting a caution not to betray 
precedent. "That test [for obscenity] has been accepted by 
the lower federal courts until it would be no longer proper for 
me to disregard it," he held in United States v. Kennerlev. 
After citing various cases in a prosecution for theft from an 
interstate railroad car he commented: "Whatever may be said
(1939).
^^^United States v. Nardone et al.. 106 F.(2d) 41,44
ISOunited States v. Yohn. 275 F. 232,235 (1921).
I5I209 F. 119,120 (1913).
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of a state's powers of taxation, it seems to me that these
decisions settle it that if Congress chooses to act upon
152Commerce of the kind at bar, it has the power. . . . "  
Additionally, Judge Hand also found precedent in the absence 
of judicial action by other courts and refused to make precedent 
when he could not "see that as yet any court has gone so
far."153
Judge Hand was not averse to citing himself and his
court for precedent. He once denied a defendant's motion for
inspection of the grand jury's minutes with the declaration:
"I am no more disposed to grant it than I was in 1909. It is
said to lie in discretion, and perhaps it does, but no judge
of this court has granted it, and I hope none ever will.''^^^
In a stock fraud case he answered the defendant's objection by
recalling that "we have twice very recently discussed the ques-
155tion, and need do no more than refer to our own decisions." 
However, Judge Hand did not always use precedent only to rein­
force his position. When his belief ran contrary to precedent 
in United States v. Kelleher he held: "But we also think that
we should yield to the opinion of six other circuits and the
152united States v. Yohn. 275 F. 232,234 (1921).
153ynited States v. Center Veal and Beef Company et al., 
162 F.(2d) 766,772 (1947).
15^United States v. Garsson et al.. 291 F. 646,649 
(1923). Cf. United States v. Freed. 179 F. 236,238 (1910); 
United States v. Salen. 216 F. 420,422 (1914).
Riper et al. v. United States. 13 F.(2d) 961,
964 (1926).
206
District of Columbia, there being no dissent, and that my 
decision in United States v. O'Leary . . . must be overruled 
until the Supreme Court sees fit to declare otherwise if it 
ever s h o u l d . I n  effect Judge Hand recognized the limita­
tion on his personal preferences which precedent imposed. 
Tolerant of contrary beliefs and cautious not to thwart a will 
more popular than his he called the law "too well settled for 
us to change it" in United States v. Lacato et al. and said: 
"Our own decision was made without citation or discussion, and 
apparently without acquaintance with the body of authority to
the contrary; it seems to us that it can no longer stand in
157its [authority to the contrary] face."
Recognizes His Limitations
Judge Hand's modest recognition of his fallible quali­
ties resulted in reminders to his audience that he possessed 
certain limitations. Any signs of vanity or self-assuredness 
he obscured by sincere recognition that he possessed the same 
human frailties and externally imposed limitations to which 
any honest man must inevitably admit. In a sense his inability 
to be absolutely certain about anything characterized a human 
frailty and the force of precedents represented an externally 
imposed limitation. But the limitations which he recognized 
exceeded even these. He answered a defendant's complaint that
^^^57 F.(2d) 684,685 (1932).
^^^29 F.(2d) 694,695 (1928).
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the judge on the voir dire refused to put certain questions
to the jury by observing that "it is of course true that any
examination on the voir dire is a clumsy and imperfect way of
detecting suppressed emotional commitments to which all of us
are to some extent subject, unconsciously or subconsciously.
It is of the nature of our deepest antipathies that often we
158do not admit them to ourselves." In addition to human limi­
tations he recalled being admonished by the Supreme Court for 
159his complacency and referred to Congress, not the courts, 
as the sole determiner of the limits to which relevant evidence 
should be p r i v i l e g e d . T h e s e  external limitations were but 
two of others which the Judge recognized as preventing the 
appellate court from usurping the function of the trial jury, 
exercising control over sentences, and going beyond an applica­
tion of the law.
The Judge knew that "except in plain cases we cannot 
tell from the cold record where the truth lies."^^^ Conse­
quently, when asked to reverse a conviction because of a verdict
based on "incredible" testimony he held, "as always, we reply
162that that question is not for us, but for the jury." Judge
(1950)
^^®United States V. Dennis et al., 183 F.(2d) 201.227
IS^united States V. Lotsch, 102 F.(2d) 35,37 (1939).
IGOunited States V. Walker. 176 F.(2d) 564,568 (1949).
^^^Marsh v. United States, 29 F. (2d) 172,173 (1928).
^^^United States V. Compaana et al., 146 F,(2d) 524,526
(1944), Cf. United States v. Bollenbach, 147 F.(2d) 199,201 
(1944); Chin Wah v. United States, 13 F.(2d) 530,531 (1926).
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Hand also recognized the prerogative of the trial jury to fix
sentence and the limitation imposed on the appellate court not
to interfere. He refused to allow personal feelings to intrude
163and cause adjustment of sentences which he found too severe.
The legal opinion was not a media, according to Judge 
Hand, for making political predictions or telling the govern­
ment how to conduct its business. He believed the opinion to 
be a media for reflecting how the judge applied the law. The 
belief caused him in the Dennis case to hold:
It is of course possible that the defendants [Communists] 
are inspired with the fanatical conviction that they are 
in possession of the only gospel which will redeem this 
sad Planet and bring on a Golden Age. If so, we need not 
consider how far that would justify the endless stratagems 
to which they resorted; and it is not for us to say whether 
such a prosecution makes against the movement or, on the 
contrary, only creates more disciples; ours is only to 
apply the law as we find it.164
However, the Judge in the Coplon case subtly overstepped his
limitations even while denying to himself the liberty he had
just taken. Holding that the evidence did not justify the
arrest of Judith Coplon by the P.B.I. he seemingly advised:
Perhaps, also, the powers of the Bureau to arrest without 
warrant should be broadened; and perhaps it would be 
desirable to set limits— as, for example, in cases of 
espionage, sabotage, kidnapping, extortion and in general 
investigations involving national security and defense—
^^^Van Riper et al. v. United States. 13 F.(2d) 961,
965 (1926). Cf. United States v. Bollenbach. 147 F.(2d) 458, 
460 (1942); United States v. Gottfried et al.. 165 F.(2d) 360,
368 (1948); United States v. Libérale Parrino. 203 F.(2d) 284,
286 (1953); United States v. Chiarella et al.. 184 F.(2d) 903,
911 (1950).
(1950).
^^^United States v. Dennis et al.. 183 F.(2d) 201,234
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to the immunity from "wiretapping" of those who are shown 
by independent evidence to be probably engaged in crime.
But then he added: "All these are matters with which we
express no opinion; we take the law as we find it. . . .
Rebuking with Tact and Moderation 
Judge Hand was not averse to using the written opinion 
to enlighten a trial judge or a prosecutor about the inexpert­
ness of his performance in court. To assure an atmosphere 
within which justice could prevail the conduct of an official 
occasionally forced the Judge to warn the deviant party. 
Generally the warning cast in tones of cautious tact and 
moderation did not terminate in a reversal. The tactful repri­
mand not only exhibited fairness to the rights of the litigant 
but also to the one rebuked. Judge Hand in maintaining his 
composure and employing moderation extended the benefit of any 
doubt to the offending party. The usual subtlety of the rebuke 
appeared to leave untarnished the reputation of a judge or 
prosecutor who depended on respect for performance of his 
future duties. However, when "outbursts of petulant irrita­
tion marred the serenity of the c o u r t o r  the judge took 
on the role of partisan and displayed the zeal of a prosecu­
t o r , J u d g e  Hand subordinated preservation of the judge's
IG^united States
(1950).
^^^United States
507 (1944).
^^^United States
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reputation to preservation of justice. A rebuke for conduct
which told "heavily in the estimate of judicial service" lacked
168the tact, moderation, and subtlety otherwise apparent.
Generally, however, these latter qualities prevailed.
To a judge accused of bias Hand said in United States
V. Liss et al.; "It may perhaps have been true that at times
his manner was not as urbane as could have been wished, and
counsel may have occasionally smarted under his admonitions;
but we can find no evidence that he expressed even indirectly
169any opinion as to the guilt of the accused." Judges also
experienced criticism for the way they unfelicitously turned
a phrase or indulged in "unhappy locution." Responding to an
appeal which objected to a judge's charge to the jury, Judge
Hand held: "There were indeed a few passages not felicitously
phrased, e.g., those seeming to demand 'meticulous accuracy'f
but when read as a whole the charge does not seem to us really
170to leave the essentials in doubt." Another judge who said
in court that "the heavy tread of false swearing is stalking 
through the record" but then warned the jury that his opinion 
was not to affect their judgment precipitated a complaint for 
bias. "It would be absurd," the Judge held, "to reverse the
^^^United States v. Andolschek et al., 142 F.(2d)
503,507 (1944).
1 ftq
137 F.(2d) 995,999 (1943).
1 70United States v. Brown et al.. 79 F.(2d) 321,326
(1935) .
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conviction on this ground, even though it may not have been 
happy locution.
Not only what the trial judge said but what he inappro­
priately did brought him under Judge Hand's scrutiny. When 
one judge at 4 o'clock in the afternoon instructed his clerk 
to discharge the jury if they had not agreed by 9:30, Hand 
advised him in his decision that while the trial was still on 
he should always remain accessible to the jury and could not 
justify depriving them of a means of communication with him. 
"Nevertheless," the Judge concluded, "he had in fact fixed the 
time for their discharge, reasonable in that he was under no 
duty to keep them out all night, and at most the defendant lost 
nothing but the chance that he [the judge] might change his
172mind, and that further confinement might result in acquittal."
Thus, Judge Hand, consistent with his reputation, could rebuke
173a person one minute and lick his wounds the next. In United
States V. Bollenbach he declared the trial judge wrong and then 
placed the blame on his own court. The judge had charged the 
jury that "possession of stolen property in another state than 
that in which it was stolen shortly after the theft, raises a 
presumption that the possessor was a thief and transported 
stolen property in interstate commerce." Judge Hand replied
^^^United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corporation,
241 F.(2d) 925,934 (1957).
^^^Kastel V. United States. 23 F.(2d) 156,158 (1927).
1 71Supra. pp. 81-82.
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that such a charge was wrong "although it is only fair to add 
that the mistake was ours, not his, as will appear, he borrowed 
the instruction directly from us."^^^
Prosecutors as well as judges came under the cautious
examination of Judge Hand. Their conduct during a trial was
a matter of concern to him and objection by a defendant to
impropriety in such conduct elicited his appraisal. About one
prosecuting attorney he said:
It is indeed true that this officer failed in moderation 
and good taste; we might have been better content had the 
trial judge seen fit to keep him more closely in hand than 
he did. But the abuse of his position as prosecutor— for 
it seems to us to have been such— was not so extreme as to 
require us to upset the judgment. More can be said as to 
those questions which he put to Berger implying that Berger 
had made declarations to him, contradictory to what he 
swore on his direct. That common device is an abuse which 
ought to be straitly controlled, at times even at the cost 
of a mistrial if need be.175
Indeed, for the Judge, who possessed the vocabulary to excori­
ate those who abused their authority, this admonition was most 
moderate and tactful.
Admonitions showing dedication and fairness recommended 
Hand's credibility as he rebuked with tact and moderation those 
who might impede justice.
When Judge Hand was not demonstrating his cautious 
nature by expressing doubt about being right, respecting 
precedent, recognizing his limitations, or rebuking with tact 
and moderation, he could be found telling his audience that
174i47 F.(2d) 199,201 (1944).
^^^United States v. Berger, 73 F.(2d) 278,280 (1934).
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he possessed this virtue. This occurred in Knickerbocker 
Merchandising Company v. United States when he concluded: 
"Nevertheless, out of abundant caution, we affirm the judgment 
only on the seventh c o u n t . I n  summary, caution, so impor­
tant to the administration of justice, was a virtue which Judge 
Hand radiated in his written opinions and through which he 
recommended the credibility of his character.
Identifying with Trustworthy Virtues
Aristotle said, "Each class of men, each type of dispo­
sition, will haye its own appropriate way of letting the truth
177appear." In a general sense each ingredient of ethical
proof in Judge Hand's opinions served to let the truth appear. 
In a more specific sense the Judge induced appearance of the 
truth as he identified with truth and honesty. 3oth his 
expressed pursuit of the truth and his style of writing created 
the impression that he always dealt with the facts and sought 
only to understand reality. Indeed, his message became more 
believable when one realized the source to be a truthful and 
honest man.
Truth
Judge Hand appealed in his criminal law opinions for 
"any efforts that help disentangle us from the archaisms that
^^^13 F.(2d) 544 (1926). Cf. Loubriel v. United 
States. 9 F.(2d' 807 808 (1926),
177Rhetorics, tr. W. Rhys Roberts, in The Works of 
Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946),
XI, 1408a.
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178still impede our pursuit of truth," Consequently in one
case he authorized confronting a witness with contradictory
statements to find "what is the truth," and noted:
Again and again in all sorts of situations we become 
satisfied, even without earlier contradiction, not only 
that a denial is false, but that the truth is opposite:
"The lady doth protest too much, methinks." This is not 
to rely upon the statement as a ground of inference, taken 
apart from the sum of all that appears in court; it is to 
allow the jury to use the whole congeries of all that they 
see and hear to tell where the truth l i e s . 179
A discussion in United States v. Walker of the marital privilege
committed him to the pursuit of truth. Here, he questioned how
far the privilege should suppress relevant evidence and lamented
that "it deprives the party against whom the privilege is
envoked of access to the truth, and a disclosure of the whole
180truth should be the prime concern of a court of justice."
Judge Hand's pursuit of truth and desire to maintain truth as
a goal for all judicial proceedings further appeared when he
regarded courts as challenged by "shifts and subterfuges in
181the place of truth" as they seek to end trifling; when he
called truth "too precious to society at large to be mutilated"
182by those who would pervert it; and when he proposed to
178United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corporation.
241 F.(2d) 925,934 (1957).
179^^^Ibid.. p. 933.
^®°176F.(2d) 564,568 (1949).
1 ft!
Loubriel V. United States. 9 F.(2d) 807,808 (1926).
1 A9
United States v. Kennerlev. 209 F. 119,120 (1913).
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ignore a judge's allegedly unfair comment unless it "cast off
183some really substantial aspect of the truth."
Judge Hand's style of writing in addition to his 
announced pursuit identified him as one who sought the truth. 
Though possibly only a matter of expression, the repeated use 
of phrases stressing truth were so numerous as to attract 
attention to the meaning they embraced. The following phrases 
reflect examples of this style: "it is true"; "it is of course
true"; "it is, of course, quite true"; "it is quite true";
"this being true"; "it is perfectly true"; “it would be truer 
to say"; "it is indeed true"; and "nothing could be more 
untrue.
^^^United States v. White, 124 F.(2d, 181,186 (1941).
1 AA
See United States v., Nearing et al. , 252 F, 223,
231 (1918); United States v. Krichman, 256 F . 974,975 (1919); 
United States v. Robinson, 259 F. 685,690,691 (1919); United 
States V. Casino, 286 F. 976,980 (1923); Becker et al. v.
United States 5 F.(2d) 45,51 52 (1924); Avignone et al. v. 
United States, 12 F.(2d) 509,510 (1926); Chin Wah v. United 
States, 13 F.(2d; 530,532 (1926); Knickerbocker Merchandising 
Company Inc.. et al. v. United States. 13 F.(2d; 544,545,546 
(1926); Van Riper et al. v. United States, 13 F.(2d) 961,964 
(1926); United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.(2d) 202,203,204 
(1926); Vachuda v. United States, 21 F.(2d; 409,412 (1927); 
United States v. Downing et al., 51 F.(2d) 1030,1031 (1931); 
United States v. Cotter et al.. 60 F.(2d) 689,692 (1932);
United States v.M^çket al., 73 F. (2d) 265,266 (1934); United 
States V. Krakower, 86 F.(2d) 111 112 (1936); United States v. 
Strewl et al.. 99 F.(2d) 474,477,478 (1938); United States v. 
Dellaro et al.. 99 F.(2d) 781,783 (1938); United States v.
Peoni, 100 F.(2d; 401,403 (1938); United States v. Rebhuhn,
109 F.(2d) 512,515 (1940); United States v. Mack, 112 F.(2d) 
290,292 (1940); United States v. White, 124 F.(2d) 181,185 
(1941); United States ex rel, McCann v. Adams et al., 126 F.
(2d) 774,775 (1942); United States v. Zeuli 137 F.(2d) 845,
847 (1943); United States v. Liss et al., 137 F.(2d) 995,1001
(1943); United States v. Andolschek et al., 142 F.(2d) 503,
507 (1944); United States v. Cohen et al., 145 F.(2d) 82,90,
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Honesty
Judge Hand benefited from the attributes of honesty 
derived from his appearance as a truthful man. In addition he 
identified himself with honesty directly and by recognizing 
honesty as a virtue of a responsible jury and conscientious 
counsel. He credited himself with honesty by referring to a 
count in a fraud case when he held; "Moreover, I think it may 
be quite honestly said that the count taken alone is insuffi-
n Q  c
cient, if I have correctly limited the scope of the order."
He assessed honesty to juries by referring to a charge of mail
fraud as "so indisputably proved that no honest jury could fail
to convict." And, he said about counsel's efforts that "any
187honest reasoning is quite legitimate." In each instance the
91 (1944); United States v. Bronson. 145 F,(2d) 939,944 
(1944); United States v. Compaqna et al., 146 F.(2d) 524,528
(1944); United States v. Thomas Balogh. 157 F.(2d) 939,943 
(1946); United States v. Rappv. 157 F.(2d) 964,967 (1946); 
United States v. Glory Blouse and Sportswear Company Inc.. et 
al.. 158 F.(2d) 880,882 (1947); United States v. Michael Pi Re. 
159 F.(2d) 818,820 (1947); United States v. Werner et al., 160 
F,(2d) 438,443 (1947); United States v. Center Veal and Beef 
Company et al.. 162 F.(2d) 766,770,771 (1947); United States 
V. Sherman et al.. 171 F.(2d) 619,622 (1948); United States v. 
Walker. 176 F.(2d) 564,567-568 (1949); United States v. 
Rabinowitz. 176 F.(2d) 732,735 (1949); United States v. Dennis 
et al.. 183 F.(2d) 201,210,215,221,226,227 (1950); United 
States V. Chiarella et al.. 184 F.(2d) 903,908 (1950); United 
States V. Allied Stevedoring Corporation. 241 F.(2d) 925,932 
(1957); United States v. Reina. 242 F.(2d) 302,307 (1957); 
United States v. Ralph Cioffi. 253 F.(2d) 494,496 (1958).
185United States v. United States Brokerage and Trading 
Company. 262 F. 459,463 (1919).
^^^United States v. Brown et al.. 79 F.(2d) 321,326 
(1935). Cf. United States v. Wexler. 79 F.(2d) 526,529 (1935).
^^^United States v. Franklin. 174 F. 163 (1909).
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Judge found in honesty a virtue valuable to himself and worthy 
of those with whom he had contact.
In summary, trustworthy virtues which encourage accept­
ance of a speaker's message as one emanating from a source 
worthy of being believed occurred in the criminal law opinions 
of Learned Hand who represented himself as a judge devoted to 
truth and honesty.
Summary
These five ingredients, concern for the best interests
of society, an understanding of human nature, expertness in
reasoning, caution, and trustworthy virtues, might well have
been what Felix Frankfurter had in mind when he spoke of the
good judge as a good chef using "the best materials" to make
1 S8"the best dish." But Frankfurter cautioned, and rightfully 
so, that metaphors "in the realm of thought" may not do justice 
to "a calling which so deeply involves the well-being of 
society and is so dependent on the scientific spirit of truth- 
seeking, but which has few of the aids of scientific verifica­
tion, [that it] calls for men of the highest professional and
189moral qualities." Judge Hand offered himself in his crimi­
nal law opinions as one cast of nothing but "the highest 
professional and moral qualities." He freed himself of any 
cause or class and stood for the well-being of the whole of
^®®"Judge Learned Hand," p. 327.
lB*Ibid.
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society. He understood man and his expectations, capabilities, 
and anxieties. He saw man confronted by more than final solu­
tions found in universally applicable generalizations. He 
faced difficulty with disinterestedness, not evading the 
complex and the adverse but searching his soul for absolute 
truth which he knew he could not find but could not fail to 
seek. He artistically wove these attributes into his opinions 
and thus offered to his audience qualities which evoke feelings 
of approval for their source.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The announced purpose of this study is to (1) examine 
Judge Learned Hand's image and (2) with this image in mind 
analyze his criminal law opinions for the presence of ethical 
proof used as a persuasive device whereby the Judge offered 
himself as a credible source worthy of being believed. Ful­
fillment of this purpose has been attempted by looking first 
at Learned Hand as a man and then as a judge. A review of 
concepts of ethical proof followed. Consideration of the like­
lihood of finding such proof in a legal opinion preceded the 
prescribed analysis of the Judge's criminal law opinions. The 
findings demand condensation to provide needed continuity and 
perspective to that "piece of tapestry, made up of many strands, 
which interwoven makes a pattern."^
The Image
Through manhood and judgeship as Learned Hand grew his 
image grew with him. With considerable assistance from both
^"Mr. Justice Brandeis," in Learned Hand, The Spirit 
of Liberty, ed. Irving Billiard (New York: Vintage Books
Inc., 1959), p. 128.
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intimate and more distant contemporaries the Judge built a 
reputation for conscientious devotion to his profession and 
his country. He started with a heritage rooted in the legal 
tree of a prominent state. As though he were predestined to 
guide the judicial fortunes of a segment of our federal court 
system, his formative years which gained strength from his 
heritage, included wide reading, close companionships, and 
Broad formal training at Harvard. As a devoted student of 
philosophy and an imposing individualist he made his mark on 
Harvard and Harvard even more indelibly made its impression on 
him. The infusion of the impression lasted through three 
degrees, the last in law. To satisfy family desires and to 
follow in the tradition of his ancestors he pursued legal 
studies. Profoundly influenced by those great legal minds 
which brought eminence to the Harvard Law School, Learned Hand 
emerged with his latent talents about to be unleashed on the 
scene of American jurisprudence. After a disappointing venture 
into private law practice fate rescued him from what he regarded 
as the unstimulating drudgery of a routine and petty existence. 
He had more ambitious things in mind for himself and so did 
President Taft who in 1909, attracted to Learned Hand's judi­
cial potential, appointed him a federal district court judge 
for the Southern District of New York. Judge Hand's fifteen 
years on the district bench were diligently but inauspiciously 
performed. They were not unrewarding, however, for the Judge's 
achievement resulted in his appointment as a federal circuit 
judge in 1924.
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Judge Hand's career on the bench involved him in a 
multitude of legal controversies spanning litigation from 
contract and tort to tax and patent cases. However, he is not 
remembered so much for the number of opinions he wrote as for 
their quality and what he brought to the court which contri­
buted to that quality. Although the Supreme Court never 
benefited from his competence and overall judicial ability, 
as a member sitting on the highest bench, his contributions to 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals undoubtedly made the work 
of the Supreme Court easier. With the clash of minds in appel­
late court conferences Judge Hand found the stimulation he had 
eagerly sought in the law. Contributions of insight, intellect, 
and experience emerged as the Judge assumed the role of a 
devout pleader for tolerance, caution, truth, justice, and 
constructive thinking. On the circuit court he handed down 
decisions for thirty-seven years during which time his prestige 
increased virtually with each case and each year of service. 
Frequently the Supreme Court cited his opinions. Consequently 
the Judge on occasion supported decisions of the higher court 
based on rules which he initiated.
Through his perceptions of himself and professions of 
beliefs Learned Hand contributed to his image. He perceived 
himself to be a skeptic faced with the inevitable uncertainties 
of life. Blessed with humility, he demanded caution of himself 
in the use of self-possessed authority. Beliefs which professed 
the worth of the individual, the temporariness of answers to
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life's problems, the virtues of doubt, caution, and skepticism, 
and a reverence for "the spirit of liberty" came forth from 
Hand to shape his image. Additionally, his expressions of 
devotion to betterment of the legal process emanated not from 
a theorist or philosopher writing legal treatises but from a 
teacher delivering speeches and writing essays and legal opin­
ions. The lessons on which he expounded frequently dealt with 
some phase of the nature of law, the responsibilities of the 
legal profession, and the traits of the judge. To Judge Hand 
the law was a living organism which periodically needed cau­
tious updating. He saw the function of the judge limited by 
imperative moderation and restraint. The Judge urged those 
who would interpret statutes to look for the social purposes 
behind legislation and derive the intent of the legislators 
from the cultural, social, and political context of the words 
used. To satisfactorily accomplish judicial interpretation and 
properly apply the law he charged judges with the responsibility 
to read widely, understand with sensitivity, and view their 
work without prejudice.
Learned Hand's contemporaries saw him as a thinking 
and sometimes gregarious man as well as a deliberating and 
sometimes deviating judge. Through the reaction and reitera­
tion of contemporaries of the bench, bar, and general public 
who reflected on his life and character, both in and out of 
court, the Hand image became more distinct. They respected 
him for his pursuit of the truth, for his tolerance, for his
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human qualities and his understanding of human nature, for his 
discontent with dogmas, for his respect for freedom, and for 
his high ethical standards. They voiced their opinions to the 
world and told those who heard that they knew a rare human 
being. For here was a man constituted of solid qualities who 
tempered his life with escapades and eccentricities which 
enlivened and added vigor to the sterner stuff of which he 
was made.
Learned Hand's personal contributions to his image
ceased with his death in August, 1951. Those who stand in
judgment of his life and work continue to add detail and
contribute to an image which as Justice Frankfurter prophesied
2
promises to assume the proportions of a legend. Regardless 
of who examines Learned Hand's image, if they undertake the 
effort with integrity and thoroughness, they will expose a man 
who sought "to see so far as one may and to feel the great 
forces that are behind every detail . . .  to hammer out as 
compact and solid a piece of work as one can, to try to make 
it first rate, and to leave it unadvertised.
The Likelihood of Ethical Proof
Two theories have persisted about the function of the 
judge in the Anglo-American law-making process. The "mechanical"
2
"A Great Judge Retires; American Law Institute Honors 
Learned Hand," American Bar Association Journal. XXXVII (July, 
1951), 503.
^Oliver Wendell Holmes in The Spirit of Liberty, p. v.
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theory says that the judge seeks truth by arriving at a judg­
ment from discovered principles without application of individ­
ual views and preferences. The other or "free legal decision" 
theory says that a judge's conclusions are the consequence of 
"his own concepts and conscience influenced largely as these 
are by his training and experience, and by the litigants whose 
controversies are to be settled.Disciples of this theory 
tend to recognize those stimuli which expose the judge to 
certain forces, condition him through his experiences, and 
demand of him choice-making. Those who endorse the "human" 
theory believe that the judge cannot eliminate the personal 
element from his work. Followers of the "mechanical" theory 
distrust the undependable consequences of the human element 
and discourage its exercise by judges who, these advocates 
claim, not only must but can eliminate this element. Accept­
ance of the "mechanical" theory encourages neither expectations 
of ethical proof in legal opinions nor an admission that the 
proof is there. To the contrary the "human" theory recognizes 
that judges as human beings make choices and seek to influence 
other human beings about their choices. This theory invites 
expectancy that the personal characteristics of the judge who 
responds frankly and sincerely will emerge as ethical proof in 
his written opinions.
^Charles Grove Haines, "General Observations on the 
Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the 
Decisions of Judges," Illinois Law Review. XVII (May, 1922), 
96-98.
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Clearly Judge Hand's beliefs and opinions more dis­
tinctly exemplify the "human" than the "mechanical" theory.
He did not distrust the human element but cautioned judges to 
understand the inevitable part it plays in decision-making and 
to assume the responsibility for rendering informed opinions 
worthy of themselves, their profession, and society. Judge 
Hand, contrary to the wishes of the "mechanical" adherents, 
did not couch his decisions in a technical language which 
concealed any subjective element to make the decision appear 
controlled only by the law. Rather than risk insincerity 
through unrealistically rigid arguments the Judge demonstrated 
a conscious frankness in his beliefs and opinion-writing that 
judges are men and their decisions upon complex facts face the 
uncertainty of making necessary choices about which they must 
influence others. The influence will lie, therefore, not only 
in the mechanical reproduction of precedents but in the ability 
of the judge to bring his total logical and ethical resources 
as well as those of the law to bear on the human production of 
written legal opinions. Under the "mechanical" theory the 
presence of ethical proof would be unreasonable, alarming, and" 
destructive. Under the approach with which Hand's theory and 
practice seems allied, such proof would be reasonable, unavoid­
able, and blessed with the virtues of frankness and sincerity.
The Presence of Ethical Proof 
Analysis of Judge Hand's criminal law opinions, to 
discover the presence of those ingredients about which
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> rhetoricians contend create a subtle partiality in favor of 
the side espoused, revealed numerous recognized elements of 
ethical proof. They can be grouped into five categories; 
concern for the best interests of society; an understanding 
of human nature; expertness in the use of reasoning; caution; 
and trustworthy virtues.
Judge Hand acted in the best interests of a free 
society governed by law when he demonstrated concern for its 
well-being; protected Constitutional rights; reinforced the 
authority possessed by judges; recognized the need for expedi­
ency in the judicial process; disdained allowing harmless error 
or legal formalism to upset an otherwise just decision; and 
linked offending litigants with debasing qualities. The Judge 
used these elements of ethical proof in a manner consonant with 
the wishes of the author of the Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum who 
seemed to say that righteous conduct is the consequence of one 
who gives the impression of acting to benefit the individual 
and the state.^ An equally important use of ethical proof and 
one inherent in the nature of this category was compliance with 
the Aristotelian notion of creating good will through appearing 
to behave toward one individual as one might behave toward 
all.^ Aristotle also supported the belief that through a
^William Martin Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in 
Rhetoric" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of Speech, 
Northwestern University, 1941), p. 23.
^Rhetorica, tr, W. Rhys Roberts, in The Works of 
Aristotle, ed. W. D, Ross (Oxford; The Clarendon Press,
1946), XI, 138ia.
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speaker’s choices which evince intelligence, character, and 
good will he can win audience approval.^ Judge Hand conspicu­
ously indulged in choice-making and subjected his selections 
to audience evaluation. Rather than indulge in the easy 
comforts of precedents and literal interpretations of statutes 
with meager elaboration he chose to support a democratic form 
of government, realism concerning sex, and litigants' rights. 
He chose to discredit the non-virtuous, to guarantee Constitu­
tional rights, and reinforce the authority of those who 
depended on him for support in enforcing law and order. Once 
justice and fairness could be certain he chose to stress the 
efficiency of expediting a legal proceeding and the desirabil­
ity of avoiding its overthrow for harmless error or legal 
formalism. Rhetoricians have long regarded choices of the 
nature Judge Hand made as those essential to effective persua­
sion. For instance, the logographer Lysias understood the
8importance of depicting his clients as just; Aristotle called 
justice a virtue which men honor because it enables everyone
to feel they enjoy "their possessions in accordance with the
9 10law"; Hugh Blair spoke of cultivating a love of justice.
Appropriately, Learned Hand demonstrated that he was a just
^Ibid.. 1366*.
p
Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric," p. 17.
^Rhetorica, 1366^.
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Edinburgh: 
Bell and Bradfute, 1813), II, 430.
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man who would assure justice to all exposed to his jurisdiction, 
Hugh Blair also urged upon orators the dignity of noble senti­
ments in refining and improving upon moral feelings. Requisite 
dispositions and sentiments which he prescribed were indigna­
tion at insolence and oppression, detestation of fraud and 
corruption, and love of liberty, country, and the public.
Judge Hand as though well schooled in the teachings of Blair 
did not tolerate insolence or oppression by counsel, judge, 
witness or litigant. He identified offending litigants with 
fraudulent and corrupt intentions, was a renowned spokesman 
for the "spirit of liberty," and in the best interests of 
society showed devotion to his country and the public. Just '
as these choices shaped his decisions, structured his written 
opinions, and influenced society in their consequences so, 
too, did they evince, in the Aristotelian tradition, sagacity, 
high character, and good will in the form of persuasive ethical 
proof,
George Campbell located the foundation of ethos in 
12human nature. Judge Hand spent a lifetime examining human 
nature. The reflection of the result of this examination in 
his opinions is not, therefore, unexpected., His opinions 
possessed insight into the nature of judges, juries, and other 
men and displayed appreciation of the motivations, expectations, 
and tendencies inherent in human conduct,, This insight
l^Ibid,
12Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1871), p , 119,
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demonstrated sympathy, compassion, and understanding about 
mankind. If George Campbell was right, Judge Hand was well 
fitted for conciliating his audience. For the Judge's under­
standing of human nature which painted his character and wisdom 
in words invited the respect of his audience.
In addition to good character, Plato believed that a 
speaker should be intelligent and i n f o r m e d . T h r o u g h  his 
perceptive use of inference and his adept awareness of avail­
able knowledge. Judge Hand exhibited that he was both intelli­
gent and informed. Little can be added to the support which 
Aristotle and virtually all who have thought about ethical 
proof have given to the significance of a speaker's intelli­
gence, But the logographers who insisted that their clients 
observe existing laws and customs^^ and the Rhetorica Ad 
Alexandrum^  ^which emphasized the importance of observing 
accepted beliefs and following common customs to show good 
intentions and win respect and confidence need to be mentioned. 
Hand induced an impression of his competence with expressions 
embodying good judgment and common sense and an understanding 
of traditions of the past and trends of the present. Thus he 
manifested possession of wisdom and available knowledge and
^^Phaedrus in Plato. tr. Lane Cooper (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 61-64.
^^Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric," p. 16.
^^Tr. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1937), 1 4 4 7 b .
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consequently recommended his credibility through expertness 
in the use of both.
Learned Hand was a cautious man who was never too sure 
that he was right. His possession of this attribute both on 
and off the bench demonstrated a consistency and sincerity in 
that he conditioned his legal arguments in a reserved manner 
consonant with his routine beliefs and conduct. Thus, as a 
sign of reliability recognized by John Ward as capable of 
inducing audience respect^^ Judge Hand found those words to 
use and thoughts to express which were in keeping with his 
cautious disposition. Hand's opinions reflected other virtues 
recognized by rhetoricians as conducive of audience approval. 
These virtues consisted of a preference for modesty over bold­
ness and jaunty confidence;of an admission to his weak 
18points; of an unwillingness to immoderately detail others'
19 20mistakes; and of commendable disinterestedness. The Judge
communicated these virtues when he expressed doubt about being
right, respected precedent, recognized his limitations, and
rebuked with tact and moderation. Each had roots in his
personal values, each reflected his honorable character, and
each recommended his credibility.
Judge Hand’s opinions disclosed a judge who pursued 
truth and supported honesty. Rhetoricians since early Greece
System of Oratory (London; n.p., 1759), I, 140.
^^Ibid,, p. 146. ^^Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1381^.
20Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric . . ., p. 427.
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have called truth and honesty those virtues which create
goodwill and respect for the speaker. Corax and Tisias noted
that an appearance of good character emerged from apparent
21conformity to truth; logographers depicted their clients as
22faithful and honest; the author of the Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum
23stressed honesty; Aristotle treated honesty as indicative of 
24good will; Hugh Blair urged cultivation of a love of truth 
and honesty; and Richard Whately said aim at truth. Judge 
Hand wrote in his opinions about the dependence of the judicial 
process on honest men who seek the truth. Indeed, his opinions 
incurred greater believability when one realized the source to 
be a truthful and honest man who advocated these qualities for 
others„
Those who knew Learned Hand other than through his 
opinions knew a man of highest reputation for his professional 
and moral qualities. His manner of life contributed not only 
to his reputation but ethically to his powers of gaining audi­
ence approval. To these critics as well as to those who first 
experienced him through his opinions he presented qualities 
traditionally recognized as capable of evoking feelings of
14.
21Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric," pp. 12,
~^Ibid.■ p. 16. ^^1431^.
^^Rhetorica, 1381^.
25Lectures on Rhetoric . . ., II, 430.
26Elements of Rhetoric (New York; William Jackson,
1834), p. 154.
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approval for his arguments. Judge Hand freed himself of any 
cause or class and stood for the well-being of the whole of 
society, understood man and his expectations, capabilities, 
and anxieties, saw man confronted by more than final solutions 
found in generalizations of universal applicability, and faced 
difficulty with disinterestedness--not evading the complex and 
adverse but searching his soul for absolute truth which he 
knew he could not find but could not fail to seek. He artis­
tically wove these attributes into his opinions and thus 
offered his intellect, character, and good will as character­
istics of a source worthy of being believed.
Felix Frankfurter lauded Judge Hand for his wisdom and 
his eloquence. For those who continue to conceive of law "as 
the effort of reason to discover justice," Frankfurter con­
cluded, "the body of his opinions will be an enduring source 
of truth-seeking and illumination. His insights, the morality 
of the mind which respects those insights, the beauty with 
which they are expressed, make them so. . . , I must leave to
others a detailed exposition and estimate of Judge Hand's 
27contributions." This study has detailed an exposition and 
made an estimate of one facet of Hand's previously unassessed 
contributions. The findings reveal ingredients of ethical 
proof abundantly evident in the legal opinions of an eminent 
judge.
27"Judge Learned Hand," Harvard Law Review, LX
(February, 1947), 326.
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